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Preface 
The manuscript of a book may be written alone, but it is not revised 
without the opinions of others, nor does it reach publication 
without the assistance of still others. 
I owe a great debt to my friends Professor William B. Piper of Rice 
University and Professor Robert Wallace of Case Western Reserve 
University, both of whom read the entire manuscript and made 
innumerable, invaluable comments and criticisms—the majority of 
which I incorporated into the final draft. I wish also to thank my 
friends and former colleagues Professor Louis D. Giannetti, 
Professor P. K. Saha, and Professor Gary Lee Stonum, as well as my 
former graduate students Leonard Podis and Evelyn Gajowski, all of 
whom read and commented on various chapters. And I owe thanks 
to Ms. Carol S. Sykes, my editor, who read and reread the 
manuscript with a thoroughness above and beyond what was 
required. 
Beyond the gratitude expressed above, I want to take this public 
opportunity to express my thanks to my wife Jane, whose astute 
advice and endless patience are matched by a deep confidence in me. 
Parts of chapter 6 appeared originally in quite different form in 
"The Epistemology of Fictional Failure: Swift's Tale of a Tub and 
Beckett's Watt," Texas Studies in Literature and Language 15 
(Winter 1974): 649-72, published by the University of Texas Press. 
All references to the Tale are to A Tale of a Tub, to which is added 
The Battle of the Books and the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, 
ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1958). For 
the sake of clarity I have in a few minor instances taken the liberty of 
silently deleting Swift's italics or reversing his italics and roman 
type; however, any important changes in original texts have been 
duly noted. 

Language 
and Reality in Swift's 
A Tale of a Tub 

Introduction 
How to analyze the Tub, was a Matter of difficulty; when after long 
Enquiry and Debate, the literal Meaning was preserved. 
Irvin Ehrenpreis refers to "the brilliant style which makes A Tale of 
a Tub the greatest prose satire in English."1 Few would quibble 
with his judgment. But like the critics Swift condemns, we have 
been too often satisfied to catalogue stylistic devices or merely to cite 
them as examples of the Modern Author's faults. What we have 
failed to recognize is that the young Swift, after his early imitative, 
conventional odes (1690-94), was experimenting in the Tale (1696-
97)2 with a new tone and genre and that he was using style in this 
work as a way of working toward some important truths. Mark 
Schorer points out that for the contemporary novelist technique has 
become a preoccupation, a means not just of containing intellectual 
and moral implications but of discovering them.3 Similarly, I think 
that for Swift technique in the Tale is a means of exploring his 
relationship to his mentor, Sir William Temple, his inherited 
literary traditions, and a wide range of seventeenth-century ideas 
and values.4 And what remains constant in all his satire is his 
willingness to let style, rather than plot or character, carry the 
burden of his message. 
Criticism has over the past twenty-five years made up for its earlier 
slighting of Swift's rhetoric. In particular, Martin Price's Swift's 
Rhetorical Art (1953), Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr.'s Swift and the 
Satirist's Art (1962), and John R. Clark's Form and Frenzy in Swift's 
"Tale of a Tub" (1970) have dealt with Swift's language at close 
range. But criticism, like everything else, moves in cycles, and dis­
cussion of the Tale seems to have entered a new phase, one that 
focuses less on the nature of Swift's persona and more on his own 
presence in the satire: I am thinking especially of studies of the Tale 
by Gardner D. Stout, Jr., John Traugott, and Cary Nelson.5 What 
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recent criticism has shown is that it is impossible to split the 
function of the author between a persona who is a modern hack and 
a wholly detached manipulator of that persona. In fact, the Modern 
Author is not a persona in the sense that Swift's other speakers are— 
a "style," Kathleen Williams calls him.6 Although as a convenience 
I refer in the pages that follow to the "Modern" or to Swift's 
"persona," I intend by these terms to signify not a character but a 
certain identifiable style. I have accepted the rhetoric of the Tale as 
Swift's but have discovered that it everywhere pulls simultaneously 
in two directions, toward a convoluted verbosity and toward a 
concise plain-spokenness. Swift has cleverly intermingled these two 
styles for satiric effect. 
In the Tale the relationship between language and reality—a 
critical issue in the seventeenth century—is one of Swift's most 
important themes as well as the basis for his unique style. 
Philosophers from Descartes to Locke deal with this same linguistic 
and philosophical issue. So too does Antoine Arnauld in La logique 
ou Vart de penser, a popular and often translated logic that Swift 
may have read while at Trinity College. In discussing the language 
of madness, philosophers and physicians such as Thomas Willis 
approached this same question from another angle. The Royal 
Society's insistence on a plain style appropriate to scientific inquiry 
was yet another manifestation of such concern, as was the interest in 
a simpler pulpit style. The search of John Wilkins and others for a 
universal language was likewise part of this attempt to systematize 
language as well as knowledge. And finally, no one denies the 
influence of Cervantes on Swift, and Don Quixote, like the Tale, is a 
satiric fiction that is very much about words and their dubious 
connections with things.7 This whole period was marked by what 
Murray Cohen has described as "a lively struggle with the structure 
of language, or, more precisely, with the relationship between 
reality and language."8 A Tale of a Tub reflects and comments on 
this struggle, is very much a product of its time, and could have been 
written in no other century, with the possible exception of our own. 
The Tale was the first English book to take advantage of both the 
satirical and the philosophical possibilities inherent in this heated, 
contradictory debate over the relationship between language and 
reality. Anglican preacher and political conservative, Swift as a 
young man was looking for his own solution to this problem at the 
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very time when the old structure of the universe was giving way to 
the new science and philosophy. In the Tale Swift comes across not 
as a gloomy skeptic but rather as a brilliant satirist and (although he 
would never admit it) something of a philosopher. "His Invention 
at the Height, and his Reading fresh in his Head" (p. 4), he self­
consciously mixes fact and fiction, empiricism and rationalism, and 
reality and language in a way that is surely meant to reflect the 
confusing intellectual struggles of the prevous half century. What 
emerges is a paradoxical style that often contradicts itself. But such 
is modernism. 
Throughout this study I take style to be neither the same as a 
writer's ideas nor the vehicle for his ideas, but rather his habitual 
means of arranging concepts, experiences, and implications into a 
significant form. As linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf says in his essay 
"Language, Mind, and Reality," "Thinking is most mysterious, and 
by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study 
of language."9 Whorf posits a connection between language and 
reality so intimate that the systematizations inherent in a particular 
language (be it English, Chinese, or Hopi) dictate the reality of a 
person who speaks that language, forcing certain perceptions on 
him, denying others, and channeling his reason.10 Pushing Whorf's 
hypothesis somewhat further, we may infer a comparable link 
between an individual's private habits of language and his private 
perception of reality. If there is validity to this argument—and I 
think there is—then we may say that the uniqueness of a writer's 
style represents his personal organization of the world, his personal 
arrangement not merely of words but of reality itself. 
Richard Ohmann, in his "Prolegomena to the Analysis of Prose 
Style," describes the aim of such an approach as clearly as one could 
want it: "If the critic is able to isolate and examine the most 
primitive choices which lie behind a work of prose, they can reveal 
to him the very roots of a writer's epistemology, the way in which he 
breaks up for manipulation the refractory surge of sensations which 
challenges all writers and all perceivers."11 A study of a writer's style 
is thus no mere description of image patterns, nor a computerized 
table of nouns and verbs, nor a rhetorical analysis of a given passage. 
We can go well beyond this. In pointing up the connection between 
style and epistemology, Ohmann has provided a firm theoretical 
basis for the study of diction, syntax, and other configurations of a 
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text. The proper study of style is very exciting and can bring 
together linguistics, philosophy, and psychology in a way that has 
been impossible since the seventeenth century.12 
What makes this approach to style singularly appropriate for a 
study of Swift is his peculiar awareness of how language can inhibit 
or be the means of reaching an understanding of reality. To cite only 
the most obvious example, Gulliver's Travels dwells on right and 
wrong interpretations of experience: Gulliver delineates his reality 
for us in a plain, circumstantial style (he insists on this), but Swift 
implies that such a style is too plain and too circumstantial to bear 
complex, subtle interpretations of complex, subtle experiences. 
Gulliver views things too simply and seems incapable of accepting 
ambiguity. When Swift offers him the choice of being a beastly 
Yahoo or a reasoning Houyhnhnm, Gulliver opts for the latter and 
denies any resemblance he bears to the Yahoos, just as he denies any 
animal traits in his Houyhnhnm master. But Gulliver's Travels 
presents at least one alternative that is too subtle for its narrator: 
man is both a physical and a rational being, and neither mere Yahoo 
nor mere Houyhnhnm. 
Swift's interest in the relationship between language and reality, 
however, antedates Gulliver's Travels. Although A Tale of a Tub's 
broken, bathetic style is in no way an epitome of Swift's statements 
concerning style,13 nor a model for his subsequent satires, it was 
clearly for him a pivotal work, and in it we can see him working out 
his ideas concerning language and its connection with understand­
ing. What Swift does in the Tale (and you can feel him beginning to 
wrestle with these ideas in the odes) is to create a loose, flexible satire 
that is remarkably unassertive and that is based on the interweaving 
of his style with that of his Modern. If words and sentences can lead 
us back to a writer's epistemology, then in A Tale of a Tub the 
dichotomous configurations of style lead us back simultaneously to 
the Modern's and Swift's opposing epistemologies. One reason the 
work is so difficult is that these two outlooks are not kept clearly 
apart; a reading of the Tale uncovers no easy opposition between 
Swift and a fully developed persona, but a crisscrossing of two styles 
and two ways of knowing. Swift forces us to recognize two 
conflicting styles and two conflicting approaches to life, that of the 
aloof, intellectualized, abstracting persona as against the earthy, 
sensate, experience-oriented approach that he recommends. 
Like a typical modern, the persona makes much of arranging 
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knowledge into abstracts, summaries, and compendiums—"all 
disposed into great Order, and reducible upon Paper" (p. 127). Swift 
puns here on "reducible." Without ever developing a full-fledged 
persona, he repeatedly undercuts his own modernistic attempts to 
neutralize unpleasant realities by transforming them into abstract 
lexical or logical items. Throughout the Tale he reminds himself 
and us of these realities, which will not be denied. The only ballast 
for the high-flying intellectualism of A Tale of a Tub is the 
empirical, physical reality suggested by its imagery; this explains 
why such things as crusts or bread, corpses, and excrement appear 
with such frequency. If Gulliver's Travels is, as Hugh Kenner says, 
"a satire on mindless empiricism,"14 then Swift's earlier book is a 
satire on mindless rationalism, a horrifying example of empirical 
data almost overridden by mere mental functioning. 
1. Irvin Ehrenpreis, Mr. Swift and His Contemporaries, vol. 1 of Swift: The Man, 
His Works, and the Age (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 176. 
2. Parts of the book were written later. For a discussion of the date of composition, 
see Guthkelch and Smith, pp. xlii-xlvii. 
3. Mark Schorer, "Technique as Discovery," in The Theory of the Novel, ed. 
Philip Stevick (New York, 1967), p. 72. 
4. For helpful background concerning these issues, see Ehrenpreis, pp. 185-203. 
5. Gardner D. Stout, Jr., "Speaker and Satiric Vision in Swifts Tale of a Tub," 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 3 (Winter 1969): 175-99; John Traugott, "A Tale of a 
Tub," in Focus: Swift, ed. C. J. Rawson (London, 1971), pp. 76-120; and Cary 
Nelson, "Form and Claustrophobia: Intestinal Space in A Tale of a Tub," chap. 5 of 
The Incarnate Word: Literature as Verbal Space (Urbana, 111., 1973). 
6. Kathleen Williams, Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise (Lawrence, 
Kans., 1958), p. 136. 
7. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1970), pp. 46-50. 
8. Murray Cohen, "Sensible Words: Linguistic Theory in Late Seventeenth-
Century England," in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, vol. 5, ed. Ronald C. 
Rosbottom (Madison, Wis., 1976), p. 232. 
9. Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Language, Mind, and Reality," originally published in 
1942; rpt. in Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee 
Whorf, ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 252. 
10. On this whole question see "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior 
to Language," in Language, Thought, and Reality, pp. 134-59, and other essays in 
this volume. 
11. Richard Ohmann, "Prolegomena to the Analysis of Prose Style," in Style in 
Prose Fiction: English Institute Essays, ed. Harold C. Martin (New York, 1959), p. 9. 
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12. See Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of 
Rationalist Thought (New York, 1966), p. 76: "It should be borne in mind that we are 
dealing with a period [i.e., the seventeenth century] that antedates the divergence of 
linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. The insistence of each of these disciplines 
on 'emancipating itself from any contamination by the other is a peculiarly modern 
phenomenon." 
13. Perhaps the greatest impediment to a proper understanding of Swift's style is 
his own statements on style; his repeated emphasis on simplicity and propriety has 
misled readers from the eighteenth century on. See D. W. Jefferson, "An Approach to 
Swift," in From Dryden to Johnson, ed. Boris Ford (Baltimore, 1957), p. 230: "Swift's 
remarks on prose style, while of great interest, bear very little on the secret of his own 
greatness in that medium." 
14. Hugh Kenner, Flaubert, Joyce, and Beckett: The Stoic Comedians (Boston, 
1962), p. 89. 
chapter one 
Words and Things 
Words; which are also Bodies of much Weight and Gravity, as is 
manifest from those deep Impressions they make and leave upon us. 
"Words are only Names for Things," says Gulliver.1 Swift would 
agree. But it is in A Tale of a Tub rather than Gulliver's Travels that 
he worked out his view of this relationship. In fact, the Tale is a key 
document in the seventeenth-century controversy over words and 
things.2 Writers and thinkers of this period, reacting against the 
florid style of the Renaissance, sought a language more appropriate 
to their own scientific and philosophical reasonings and turned to 
the relation between words and things as a matter of great 
importance. Swift's wordy book about words reflects a major 
concern of Bacon, Hobbes, Wilkins, and Locke; it is a parody of 
their preoccupation with language and at the same time a young 
writer's fresh exploration of an inherited stylistic and philosophical 
question. 
Although it seems to me that every author (and every speaker) has 
his own implicit ideas on how language relates to the real world, in 
the Tale Swift—like Sterne, Carroll, and Beckett after him—brings 
his thoughts about language up front, makes language one of his 
main themes, and proceeds quite self-consciously to work out his 
ideas about words and things. Even though A Proposal for Correct­
ing, Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue treats of the 
sociological causes and moral effects of the misuse of language, 
Swift, years before he wrote that politically motivated argument, 
had approached imaginatively the much deeper issue raised by such 
linguistic corruption—its distortion of the world. Written in the 
context of discussions of words and things such as John Wilkins's 
influential Essay Towards a Real Character (1668) and, more 
immediately, book 3 (entitled "Of Words") of Locke's Essay on 
Human Understanding,5 Swift's first prose satire may be read as his 
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personal philosophy of language. Like Wilkins and Locke, Swift 
urges a return to things as the proper source of knowledge; the 
trouble with the Modern Author is that he deals with words apart 
from things. 
In his book The Order of Things, Michel Foucault argues that in 
Europe the general sense of language had become by Swift's day 
quite different from what it had been during the Renaissance: "In 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the peculiar existence and 
ancient solidity of language as a thing inscribed in the fabric of the 
world were dissolved in the functioning of representation; all 
language had value only as discourse. The art of language was a way 
of 'making a sign'—of simultaneously signifying something and 
arranging signs around that thing."4 In an attempt to eliminate 
verbal ambiguity and the superficial use of language, writers and 
philosophers of the seventeenth century turned toward a descriptive 
language of signs. The accumulation of real evidence in the new 
philosophy and science was typically set against scholastic book 
knowledge.5 And the emphasis on signs was a part of this desire to 
forge a new, more direct relationship between words and objects. 
A peculiar but highly relevant chapter in the new emphasis on 
signification was the keen interest in building a universal language 
scheme. Believing that before Babel man had been united by a 
common language, linguists such as Johann Amos Komensky, 
(Comenius), Samuel Hartlib, Francis Lodowick, Seth Ward, 
William Petty, George Dalgarno, and John Wilkins dreamed of a 
reunification of peoples and a reorganization of the world itself 
through the development of a universal language that might be 
shared once again by all men.6 "The transition that took place in 
England in the middle years of the century," explains James 
Knowlson in his recent book on language schemes, "was thus from a 
character which merely represented things and notions by agree­
ment, to one which mirrored the whole of human knowledge by 
means of the combination of its elements."7 Ideally, of course, such a 
language not only would be an arrangement of words as signs of 
things but would itself be knowledge, since each word would 
provide a direct and accurate description of the thing signified. 
Bishop Wilkins was a key figure in this movement. Complaining 
of "the Curse of Babel," he says in the Real Character that "besides 
the best way of helping Memory by natural Method, the Under­
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standing likewise would be highly improved; and we should, by 
learning the Character and the Names of Things, be instructed 
likewise in their Natures, the knowledge of both which ought to be 
conjoyned." The theory itself, he goes on, "upon which such a 
design were to be founded, should be exactly suted to the nature of 
things."* In his "Epistle Dedicatory" Wilkins claims a great deal for 
his real character, saying that it would lead to "the improving of all 
Natural knowledge," "the clearing of some of our Modern 
differences in Religion," and even "the Universal good of Man-
kind."9 Although I do not wish to argue that Swift in the Tale was 
parodying Wilkins, he had certainly read the Essay Towards a Real 
Character, he would have found such hyperbolic promises laugh­
able, and the Modern's similar claims (on the title page and 
elsewhere) that his book is "Written for the Universal Improvement 
of Mankind" are strikingly close to Wilkins's proud projections. 
Swift would agree with Wilkins and others that we ought to move 
our words closer to the things they stand for, but he would have 
found Wilkins's compendium of knowledge (with its unwieldy 
thesaurus of elements, animals, manners, and so forth) an absurdity 
because paradoxically it was, in the end, so far from real things. 
Swift might have agreed with Wilkins's general goal, but he could 
have accepted neither his universal claims for his project nor his 
encyclopedic methods.10 
Despite the Modern Author's attempts to organize all knowledge 
for us, he lets slip in the final paragraph of A Tale of a Tub that he 
has "thought fit to make Invention the Master, and to give Method 
and Reason, the Office of Lacquays" (p. 209). But Swift has been 
undermining his attempts all along. Multiple introductions, digres­
sions, and the "scenic" or anecdotal style of the Tale blur its 
potentially neat profile. Swift breaks things 'down even further, 
however. His emphasis on the individual word—an arrangement of 
the typesetter's twenty-six pieces—is part of his unrelenting frag­
mentation of his persona's ideas. One thing that makes A Tale of a 
Tub unique is that in it words tend to jump out of the text and out 
of their context, to take on meanings or values in their own right, 
apart from their larger meanings or values within the sentences in 
which they appear. "It often happens that men," says Locke, "even 
when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do 
set their thoughts more on words than things"11 He could be 
describing Swift's Modern. 
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Hugh Kenner cites the Tale as the first book that admits openly 
(and over and over) to being Herr Gutenberg's progeny.12 Capital 
letters, asterisks, chapter divisions, parentheses, italics, footnotes, 
marginalia, even blank spaces in the text—everywhere Swift draws 
attention to the technological parts of the book in our hands. Like 
the carcass of human nature, A Tale of a Tub is anatomized before 
our very eyes: "They tell us, that the Fashion of jumbling fifty 
Things together in a Dish, was at first introduced in Compliance to 
a depraved and debauched Appetite, as well as to a crazy 
Constitution; And to see a Man hunting thro' an Ollio, after the 
Head and Brains of a Goose, a Wigeon, or a Woodcock, is a Sign, he 
wants a Stomach and Digestion for more substantial Victuals" (p. 
144). The ingredients of the Tale flash in every spoonful. And the 
ignorant eater mentioned here is the ignorant reader, who picks 
through this olio in search of the head or brains of the Modern's 
panegyric without understanding that the man really responsible is 
Jonathan Swift. 
For example, italics in the Tale draw our attention repeatedly to 
the typographical existence of words. "Whatever word or Sentence is 
Printed in a different Character," says the Modern, "shall be judged 
to contain something extraordinary either of Wit or Sublime" (pp. 
46-47). Yet italicizing the words "Wit" and "Sublime" makes them 
in no way extraordinary; as a matter of fact, the italics in this case 
emphasize the lack of any special meaning in those words.13 Swift 
knows—although the Modern does not—that it is not the printer's 
type but the way an author uses language that lends a statement its 
significance or force. 
Thus Swift's italics often work ironically, drawing our attention 
to the Modern's fine-sounding but quite empty words. At the same 
time, the italicization of words—usually of nouns, by the way14— 
repeatedly compels us to focus our eyes on an odd word or a word 
used in an odd way, sometimes sets up a parallelism between two 
key words in a sentence, and, beyond this, makes us dig for the real 
meaning that Swift has concealed within the Modern's pedantic 
vocabulary. The italics in this passage work one way for the Modern 
and another for Swift: 
I have one Word to say upon the Subject of Profound Writers, who are 
grown very numerous of late; And, I know very well, the judicious World 
is resolved to list me in that Number. I conceive therefore, as to the 
Business of being Profound, that it is with Writers, as with Wells; A 
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Person with good Eyes may see to the Bottom of the deepest, provided 
any Water be there; and, that often, when there is nothing in the World at 
the Bottom, besides Dryness and Dirt, tho' it be but a Yard and half under 
Ground, it shall pass, however, for wondrous Deep, upon no wiser 
Reason than because it is wondrous Dark. (Pp. 207-8) 
Of course, the Modern has a good deal more than "one Word" to say 
on this or any other subject! In this paragraph there are ten italicized 
words, six nouns and four adjectives. Although Swift might have 
italicized any of the twelve other nouns and five other adjectives, he 
has drawn our attention to the words that are, from his point of 
view, most important. If this were really the proud Modern 
speaking, the one word that he would certainly italicize would be 
the "me" in "I know very well, the judicious World is resolved to list 
me in that Number." But Swift chooses rather to stress the paradox 
of a literal and a figurative profundity, of darkness that passes for 
depth. He italicizes "Profound Writers," then splits the two words 
in order to use "Profound" to modify "Writers" and "Wells," thus 
setting up analogies between literary works and wells, readers and 
those who stare into wells. By the time we get to the end of the 
paragraph, Swift has us thinking both at once as we read "Dryness" 
and "Dirt" (which expresses his contempt for bad writing) and 
"Deep" and "Dark" (which is essentially the paradox he is playing 
with). Swift is, of course, ridiculing the shallowness of the Modern's 
Tale of a Tub at the same time that he is encouraging us to plumb 
the very real depths of his own Tale of a Tub. The effect of all this is 
that we pay a disproportionate amount of attention to the meaning 
of individual words. 
Both the numerous footnotes (which were added to the fifth 
edition)15 and the marginal notes (which appeared in the first and 
all subsequent editions) refer often to single words within the text 
proper—defining a word, interpreting it, or questioning its use. The 
Tale keeps the reader looking simultaneously at the body of the text, 
at the bottom of the page, and at the margin. In a theoretical way we 
ought to observe that an author who uses such notes is on the one 
hand underlining the purely typographical nature of his book, since 
we do not use notes in speaking, but on the other hand refusing to 
let his book stand still, since notes offer alternate or fuller readings. 
When the Modern says that Peter sets his papal bulls roaring in 
order to frighten "Naughty Boys" (p. 112), and when Swift adds at 
the bottom of the page, "That is Kings who incurr his Displeasure," 
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then we are forced to accept "Naughty Boys" both as youths who 
pester Lord Peter the fop and as the royal enemies of the Pope in 
Rome. "Ventriloqual gadget," Kenner calls the footnote.16 Swift's 
footnotes are necessary to the multilevel effect of A Tale of a Tub. 
Like the italics and footnotes, the marginal notes focus our 
attention on individual words or phrases, if only in forcing us to 
slow down or interrupt our left-to-right reading. Beyond this, many 
of the notes explain or define words used in the text proper. "Three 
Pence" is said to be "A Lawyer's Coach-hire" (p. 176). "True 
illuminated" is "A Name of the Rosycrucians" (p. 186). "Husks and 
their Harlots" is "Virtuoso Experiments, and Modern Comedies" 
(p. 65). And sometimes it is difficult to know what validity one of 
these readings has over another. "Husks and their Harlots," for 
example, would seem to suggest simply "dried-up old fops and their 
women"; the equation with "Virtuoso Experiments, and Modern 
Comedies" would occur to no one but the Modern Author. As usual, 
the Modern is compromised: although he condemns hieroglyphic 
writing, Swift shows him consistently writing that way himself. 
Less obvious, perhaps, is what we might call the "glossary style" 
of A Tale of a Tub.11 The Modern frequently uses synonymous pairs 
of words to get his meaning across, a device characteristic of Bacon, 
Browne, Milton, and other seventeenth-century writers. The Tale is 
full of such doublets: "Cant, or Jargon" (p. 28), "Transposal or 
Misapplication" (p. 43), "Briguing and Caballing" (p. 65), 
"Thought and Application of Mind" (p. 71), "Dispositions and 
Opinions" (p. 81), "Errors and Defects" (p. 92), "Tyros's or junior 
Scholars" (p. 101), and so on. What is obvious from this list is that 
whereas a few terms are usefully joined, the second term helping to 
define the first (e.g., "Briguing and Caballing"), most of these pairs 
are redundant, the second term merely echoing the first (e.g., "Errors 
and Defects").18 And Swift on occasion toys ironically with this 
rhetorical construction, as in "the Dross and Grossness" (p. 62) and 
"the most Illustrious and Epidemick" (p. 142). The Modern believes 
mistakenly that a multiplicity of words guarantees meaning; on the 
other hand, Swift intends for us to read his Tale of a Tub on one 
level as a parody of such seventeenth-century redundancy, as is clear 
from the following absurdity: "Now this Physico-logical Scheme of 
Oratorical Receptacles or Machines, contains a great Mystery, being 
a Type, a Sign, an Emblem, a Shadow, a Symbol, bearing Analogy 
to the Spacious Commonwealth of Writers" (p. 61). It is significant 
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that in the Tale the italics, the footnotes and marginal notes, and the 
Modern's glossary style all play up the synonymy of language. But 
the Modern's use of words and more words betrays everywhere the 
authority of his categorical statements. 
Another aspect of Swift's fascination with individual words is his 
emphasis on proper names. In the "Apology" he denies the charge 
that he has borrowed the names of the three brothers (p. 13). In 
section 2 the brothers go without names, although the Modern 
promises to supply them later (p. 84). In section 4 "the learned 
brother" becomes "Peter," Swift stressing Peter's insistence on a 
proper title: "He told his Brothers, he would have them to know, 
that he was their Elder, and consequently his Father's sole Heir; 
Nay, a while after, he would not allow them to call Him, Brother, 
but Mr. PETER; And then he must be styl'd, Father PETER; and 
sometimes, My Lord PETER" (p. 105). True to religious history, 
Swift delays naming the other brothers until section 6, when they are 
baptized "Martin" and "Jack" (p. 134). Names or titles are clearly 
important to Peter in a way that they are not to Swift. Peter's 
assumption of progressively more formal titles shows Swift's 
contempt of papal aloofness; by insisting on such artificial respect, 
Peter indeed becomes these titles, and nothing more. 
Jack likewise travels under various labels. It is typical that Peter 
should demand his titles whereas Jack is given his nicknames: "And 
now the little Boys in the Streets began to salute him with several 
Names. Sometimes they would call Him, Jack the Bald; sometimes, 
Jack with a Lanthorn; sometimes, Dutch Jack; sometimes, French 
Hugh; sometimes, Tom the Beggar; and sometimes, Knocking Jack 
of the North. And it was under one, or some, or all of these Appella­
tions (which I leave the Learned Reader to determine) that he hath 
given Rise to the most Illustrious and Epidemick Sect of Aeolists" 
(pp. 141-42). The italicization of each nickname and Swift's 
footnote on each draw attention to the names proper. But to push 
further, if we assume that one's name is his most personal posses­
sion, then the multiplicity of names here implies a multiplicity of 
identities. And I take Swift seriously when he leaves it up to the 
reader to decide which name or names (and thus which identity or 
identities) Jack deserves. Names in A Tale of a Tub tend to shift, to 
be loosely, not absolutely, applied to people.19 
So what's in a name? The most obvious explanation for the 
instability of proper names is that Swift intends to satirize both 
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Catholics and Protestants into stereotypes, suggesting that whatever 
you call them they are all the same. But Swift is seldom so easy. The 
several names for Calvin—"Jack the Bald," "Jack with a 
Lanthorn," "Dutch Jack," and so on—suggest that Calvinism is not 
one movement but different movements in different countries, as it 
was. Swift plays loose with Calvinism by playing loose with John 
Calvin's name; but he likewise knocks the Modern for making so 
much of mere nicknames. Like the alternate readings forced on us 
elsewhere, the multiplication of names in the Tale is part of Swift's 
simultaneous objection to and delight in alternate explanations of 
things. Throughout his writings, and in A Tale of a Tub in 
particular, Swift plays on the fluidity of language, forces his reader 
to juggle alternate expressions, and generally condemns yet exploits 
the multifarious meanings of words. He has it both ways: while 
making fun of Peter's insistence on a proper title and Jack's 
numerous nicknames, he raises the quite serious problem of naming 
and suggests that agreement is essentially a matter of propriety and 
convenience. Interestingly, the Modern Author does not have a 
name, and Jonathan Swift attached his own name to only one of his 
literary works. 
Swift's emphasis on naming is only part of his keen interest in 
words. The Modern is explicit about the plight of words in the 
Restoration theater (pp. 60-61), the various definitions of the word 
"Critic" (pp. 92-93), and other matters of diction. And clauses like 
these are common: "a damn'd Kick on the Mouth, which hath ever 
since been call'd a Salute" (p. 115); "which we commonly suppose to 
be a Distemper, and call by the Name of Madness or Phrenzy" (p. 
162); "the whole Operation of Preaching is to this very Day among 
their Professors, styled by the Phrase of Holding forth" (p. 202). In 
the Tale Swift uses words so self-consciously that we sometimes get 
entangled in his language at the expense of his meaning. 
But for all his verbal pyrotechnics, Swift intends to bring up 
(without necessarily resolving) some crucial questions about the 
nature of language. He jokes poignantly about the whole words-
and-things controversy. In one passage he seems to satirize the 
thinking behind the Royal Society's insistence on "so many things, 
almost in an equal number of words":20 "Air being a heavy Body, 
and therefore (according to the System of Epicurus) continually 
descending, must needs be more so, when loaden and press'd down 
by Words; which are also Bodies of much Weight and Gravity, as it 
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is manifest from those deep Impressions they make and leave upon 
us" (p. 60). The pseudoserious argument of course pivots on the 
ironic pun on "Impressions," which Swift forces us to take in its 
physical as well as its figurative sense.21 He reduces the Royal 
Society's honest desire to bring words and things closer together to 
an absurdity: words are themselves things. Correspondingly, 
"Words are but Wind" (p. 153) is a gross perversion of Bacon's 
"Wordes are but the Images of matter."22 Swift here takes Bacon's 
(and Locke's) warning that words do not stand for things but for the 
ideas of things and reduces it to another absurdity: words have no 
relation whatever to things. Thu s Swift brings the whole 
seventeenth-century debate over words and things down to the 
ridiculous opposition between words as things and words as hot air. 
This matter of the signification of words comes up time and time 
again. After a series of crack-brained equations ("Is not Religion a 
Cloak . . . "), the Modern argues that "those Beings which the 
World calls improperly Suits of Cloathes, are in Reality the most 
refined Species of Animals, or to proceed higher, that they are 
Rational Creatures, or Men" (p. 78). Then, narrowing his focus, he 
says that people "do according to certain Compositions receive 
different Appellations" and gives a couple of examples: "If certain 
Ermins and Furs be placed in a certain Position, we stile them a 
Judge, and so, an apt Conjunction of Lawn and black Sattin, we 
intitle a Bishop'' (p.79).23 These few pages are reminiscent of 
Locke's extended discussion "Of General Terms," in which he 
shows how quickly the human mind fits particulars into the pigeon­
holes of genus and species.24 This process has to do not with real 
essences but only with what Locke calls "nominal essences" and is 
just another kind of naming: "Men, making abstract ideas and 
settling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do 
thereby enable themselves to consider things and discourse of them, 
as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and 
communication of their knowledge, which would advance but 
slowly were words and thoughts confined only to particulars."25 
Locke considers what several accidents are required to name a thing 
"gold," "horse," or "man." In light of Locke's commentary, what 
the Modern says does not sound foolish at all but seems rather like 
Swift's humorous account of the agreements we make among 
ourselves that the presence of a couple of accidents is sufficient for 
labeling a person "man" and a few more for labeling him "judge," 
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"bishop," or something else. Our dictionaries are collections of such 
agreed-upon signs for things.26 
Disputing the value of the judge's "bench," the Modern advises us 
to look into the "Etymology of the Name, which in the Phoenician 
Tongue is a Word of great Signification, importing, if literally 
interpreted, The Place of Sleep; but in common Acceptation, A Seat 
well bolster'd and cushion'd, for the Repose of old and gouty Limbs: 
Senes ut in otia tuta recedant" (p. 57). Here again the tongue-
in-cheek tone should not be allowed to obscure Swift's fascination 
with words and their histories; in this case he is making a rather 
clear separation between a word's etymology, its literal denotation, 
and its popular connotation. No matter that the reference to the 
Phoenician origin of the word is malarkey. No matter either that in 
the end the common implication of the word is undercut by a 
learned quotation from Horace. At least the subject was for Swift a 
most serious one. The words "Signification" (that which is signified 
by a word) and "Acceptation" (the sense in which a word is accepted 
or received) are both common in seventeenth-century discussions of 
language and are found elsewhere in the Tale, as well as in book 3 
of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.21 
Behind the Modern's misguided explanation of the word "Zeal" is 
an ironic consideration of a topic treated quite seriously by others: 
"For this Meddly of Humor, he made a Shift to find a very plausible 
Name, honoring it with the Title of Zeal; which is, perhaps, the 
most significant Word that hath been ever yet produced in any 
Language; As, I think, I have fully proved in my excellent 
Analytical Discourse upon that Subject; wherein I have deduced a 
Histori-theo-physilogical Account of Zeal, shewing how it first 
proceeded from a Notion into a Word, and from thence in a hot 
Summer, ripned into a tangible Substance" (p. 137).28 The 
hyperbolic diction and proud tone (one is responsible for the other), 
plus the absurdity of the closing metaphor, serve to repel us from the 
content of the Modern's lingusitics. The terms "Analytical 
Discourse," "physilogical Account," and "tangible Substance" lend 
an air of parody to the passage. Our immediate response is to 
guess that Swift would take exception to everything the Modern says 
here. 
But look again. The subtlety of the linguistic pun on "significant 
Word" suggests that Swift may be saying something on that topic 
worth listening to. In fact, the three key terms in seventeenth­
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century linguistics are here—"Notion," "Word," and "tangible 
Substance." Swift would agree with the Modern that a sign for a 
complex idea stands for a "Meddly of Humor." And Swift would 
undoubtedly agree with the point that Locke hammers home ad 
nauseum: "We should have a great many fewer disputes in the world 
if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only and 
not for things themselves."29 Thus although Swift would say (with 
the Modern) that the notion or idea spawns its sign,30 he would 
certainly add (against the Modern) that the word could not possibly 
spawn the thing itself. That the Modern should put "Notion" and 
"Word" ahead of "tangible Substance" is an indication of his 
inverted priorities. 
The story of the three brothers and their manipulation of their 
father's will is itself an example of the gradual abasement of the 
meaning of words. And in telling that story, Swift has borrowed a 
favorite trick of the Modern's—taking a metaphor in its literal 
sense31—and has ingeniously spun a book out of it. "Words are the 
clothing of our thoughts" was a seventeenth-century cliche'.32 Swift 
uses it in his Thoughts on Various Subjects: "Common Speakers 
have only one set of Ideas, and one set of Words to clothe them in."33 
It appears also in his quite serious Tatler contribution on linguistic 
degeneracy: "In this last Point, the usual Pretence is, that they spell 
as they speak: A noble Standard for Language! To depend upon the 
Caprice of every Coxcomb; who, because Words are the Clothing of 
our Thoughts, cuts them out, and shapes them as he pleases, and 
changes them oftener than his Dress."34 
That Swift had this cliche in mind as he was writing A Tale of a 
Tub is clear from his absurd equation of language with clothing in 
section 2, the first part of the allegory: "To this System of Religion 
were tagged several subaltern Doctrines, which were entertained 
with great Vogue: as particularly, the Faculties of the Mind were 
deduced by the Learned among them in this manner: Embroidery, 
was Sheer wit; Gold Fringe was agreeable Conversation, Gold Lace 
was Repartee, a huge long Periwig was Humor, and a Coat full of 
Powder was very good Raillery: All which required abundance of 
Finesse and Delicatesse to manage with Advantage, as well as a strict 
Observance after Times and Fashions" (p. 80). Thus Swift is using 
his story of the three brothers as an allegory of corruption not only 
in the Church but also in language and style. Like clothing and 
religion, language degenerates when one insists upon "a strict 
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Observance after Times and Fashions." And a moment later writing 
and clothing are confused in a pun, as the Modern Author says, 
"And so leaving these broken Ends, I carefully gather up the chief 
Thread of my Story, and proceed" (p. 81 ).35 Looked at this way, the 
Tale assumes a satisfying wholeness (if we insist on such a thing!), 
the story proper giving us an allegory of linguistic degeneracy, the 
digressions a series of bad examples of degenerated language. The 
Modern Author's style is fashionable all right, but it bears little or 
no relation to what men with common sense regard as real, moral, 
or human. 
In a passage that is in effect a little essay on words, Swift implies 
that the source of such decadence is a cavalier use of language. 
However, after some Pause the Brother so often mentioned for his Erudi­
tion, who was well Skill'd in Criticisms, had found in a certain Author, 
which he said should be nameless, that the same Word which in the Will 
is called Fringe, does also signifie a Broom-stick; and doubtless ought to 
have the same Interpretation in this Paragraph. This, another of the 
Brothers disliked, because of that Epithet, Silver, which could not, he 
humbly conceived, in Propriety of Speech be reasonably applied to a 
Broom-stick: but it was replied upon him, that this Epithet was 
understood in a Mythological, and Allegorical Sense. However, he 
objected again, why their Father should forbid them to wear Broom-stick 
on their Coats, a Caution that seemed unnatural and impertinent; upon 
which he was taken up short, as one that spoke irreverently of a Mystery, 
which doubtless was very useful and significant, but ought not to be 
over-curiously pryed into, or nicely reasoned upon. And in short, their 
Father's Authority being now considerably sunk, this Expedient was 
allowed to serve as a lawful Dispensation, for wearing their full 
Proportion of Silver Fringe. (P. 88) 
Just beyond the edge of the page, Swift listens intently while the 
three brothers bicker over the rules of signification. To the attentive 
reader, the verbal in-jokes "signifie" and "significant," plus the 
irony of a "nameless" author, point to Swift's presence. The 
question would seem to be not simply whether the father's will can 
be wrenched this way, but also whether words in general can be torn 
loose from their accepted referents. May one person (or even three) 
decide that the word "Fringe" signifies what others customarily call 
a "Broom-stick"? Swift typically buries his point of view within a 
passage; here the one commonsensical brother thinks the "Mystery" 
of signification ought to be pried into, and at least he asks the right 
questions. The passage implies that to switch referents on the basis 
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of what is momentarily expedient is to destroy the "Authority" of 
linguistic convention. 
What leaves words open to such private redefinition—Swift else­
where equates linguistic change with linguistic corruption36—is the 
imperfection of language itself. As Locke says, "Thus we may 
conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that 
purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas: 
not by any natural connexion that there is between particular 
articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one 
language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition whereby 
such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea."51 Swift 
would agree, regretfully. Because the connection between a word 
and an idea of a thing is based only on convention, the three 
brothers may, if they want, decide that "Fringe" means "Broom­
stick." But to abandon linguistic convention is to abandon the 
possibility of communication with others. If you say "toe-may-toe" 
and I say "toe-mah-toe," we may get on one another's nerves; but if 
you say "Fringe" and I say "Broom-stick," how can we understand 
one another? 
The consequences of linguistic distortion go further. Swift deals 
most memorably with the problem in his three-page dramatization 
of Peter's mutton dinner. 
Come Brothers, said Peter, fall to, and spare not; here is excellent good 
Mutton; or hold, now my Hand is in, I'll help you. At which word, in 
much Ceremony, with Fork and Knife, he carves out two good Slices of 
the Loaf, and presents each on a Plate to his Brothers. The Elder of the 
two not suddenly entring into Lord Peter's Conceit, began with very civil 
Language to examine the Mystery. My Lord, said he, / doubt, with great 
Submission, there may be some Mistake. What, says Peter, you are 
pleasant; Come then, let us hear this Jest, your Head is so big with. None 
in the World, my Lord; but unless I am very much deceived, your 
Lordship was pleased a while ago, to let fall a Word about Mutton, and I 
would be glad to see it with all my Heart. How, said Peter, appearing in 
great Surprise, / do not comprehend this at all—Upon which, the 
younger interposing, to set the Business right; My Lord, said he, My 
Brother, I suppose is hungry, and longs for the Mutton, your Lordship 
hath promised us to Dinner. (Pp. 116-17) 
Swift is, of course, joking about transubstantiation. But also at issue 
here is the source of linguistic authority.38 What we have is a sort of 
emperor's-new-clothes situation. Peter had earlier "let fall a Word 
about Mutton," but the brother^ say they "would be glad to see it." 
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And Peter speaks of "excellent good Mutton," but Swift (not the 
imperceptive Modern here) speaks of a "Loaf" of bread. In this 
context I find "Conceit" an interesting word: it signifies Peter's mad 
fancy and at the same time (referring to the rhetorical device) 
suggests his linguistic trickery. 
The question is, Is this thing before us a "shoulder of Mutton" or 
a "Crust of Bread"? What name do we give it? 
Pray, said Peter, take me along with you, either you are both mad, or 
disposed to be merrier than I approve of; If You there, do not like your 
Piece, I will carve you another, tho' I should take that to be the choice Bit 
of the whole Shoulder. What then, my Lord, replied the first, it seems 
this is a shoulder of Mutton all this while. Pray Sir, says Peter, eat your 
Vittles, and leave off your Impertinence, if you please, for I am not 
disposed to relish it at present: But the other could not forbear, being 
over-provoked at the affected Seriousness of Peter's Countenance. By 
G—, My Lord, said he, / can only say, that to my Eyes, and Fingers, and 
Teeth, and Nose, it seems to be nothing but a Crust of Bread. Upon 
which, the second put in his Word: / never saw a Piece of Mutton in my 
Life, so nearly resembling a Slice from a Twelve-peny Loaf. Look ye, 
Gentlemen, cries Peter in a Rage, to convince you, what a couple of 
blind, positive, ignorant, wilful Puppies you are, I will use but this plain 
Argument; By G—, it is true, good, natural Mutton as any in Leaden-
Hall Market; and G— confound you both eternally, if you offer to believe 
otherwise. Such a thundring Proof as this, left no farther Room for 
Objection. (Pp. 117-18) 
The struggle is between dictation of meaning and empirical testing 
for meaning. Between "By G—, it is true, good, natural Mutton as 
any in Leaden-Hall Market" and "/ can only say, that to my Eyes, 
and Fingers, and Teeth, and Nose, it seems to be nothing but a Crust 
of Bread," Peter reminds me of Humpty Dumpty in Through the 
Looking Glass: "'When / use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, 'it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'"89 
Because Peter's proof "left no farther room for Objection," it 
precludes the world of the senses and is to Swift as unreal as 
Wilkins's arbitrary scheme. The error is linguistic as well as 
theological. Of course, as in the "Broom-stick" passage, the wrong 
opinion wins out; Martin and Jack eventually surrender to Peter's 
dogma. But not before Swift has made his point: to set aside the 
conventionality of language is to set aside communicable reality, or 
rather, what we conventionally call reality. 
The point Swift makes here about words and things is precisely 
that made by Locke: "For words, being sounds, can produce in us no 
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other simple ideas than those very sounds, nor excite in us but by 
that voluntary connexion which is known to be between them and 
those simple ideas which common use has made them signs of. He 
that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste 
of a pineapple and make him have the true idea of the relish of that 
celebrated delicious fruit."40 The word "pineapple" is no more the 
same as my relish in eating a real pineapple than the word 
"mutton" is the same as my relish in eating a real leg of mutton. To 
confuse one with the other is to mistake language for reality. A Tale 
of a Tub implies a culture in which language has become the art of 
sign-making. Yet the Modern's myriad signs often seem to be signs 
without referents. Swift admits that sign-making is critical; he also 
suggests that mere sign-making is not enough and that it can 
degenerate into sign-collecting. 
Johnson notwithstanding, Swift never, even in The Conduct of 
the Allies, relies on "strong facts" alone for his effects.41 In the Tale 
he toys with language and draws attention to the linguistic process 
of naming things; but whereas the Modern treats language as the art 
of making signs, Swift insists that making signs is only one of its 
functions. Although he is never again the philosopher of language 
that he is in the Tale, Swift here explores the signification of words 
while simultaneously demonstrating their deep resonances. He uses 
language not just for signifying but also for implying, reminding, 
and insinuating. A great deal of the force of this and Swift's later 
satires depends upon his extraordinary sensitivity to the significa­
tion as well as the multiple connotations of individual words. 
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chapter two 
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In order to allure them, he gave a Liberty to his Pen, which might 
not suit with maturer Years, or graver Characters. 
It should not surprise us that the age of Descartes, Charles II, the 
Royal Society, and the periwig would have spawned A Tale of a 
Tub, a work that sums up the serious play that is so characteristic of 
the period.1 Swift comes at the end of that generation. The man who 
wrote the Tale is the man who corresponded with Stella in a private 
language and with his friend Sheridan in a highly esoteric Anglo-
Latin. Swift is everywhere a lover of words, but nowhere more than 
in his first prose satire. In the Tale he toys with hard words, 
archaisms, neologisms, puns, proverbs, foreign terms, cliche's, slang, 
and every sort of verbal nonsense. What is odd is that despite his 
objection in principle to many of these things, in the Tale he 
surrenders to them. Verbal ingenuity is characteristic of all of Swift's 
satire, but in the Tale he seems to enjoy such ingenuity for itself, and 
its frequency implies a downright playful attitude toward 
language.2 
Regarding his collation of the drafts of An Enquiry into the 
Behavior of the Queen's Last Ministry, Irvin Ehrenpreis says that 
Swift "was struggling against a tendency to write in just the way he 
disliked."3 I think an analogous struggle exists in A Tale of a Tub. 
If Swift despises neologisms and puns, for example, then why is he 
responsible for so many himself? His decision to write as a modern 
hack author allows him to play loose with the language in a way he 
could not otherwise have done. To view the style of the Tale simply 
as a parody of modernism's abasement of language is to overlook the 
joie de mot at its heart. What comes clear in the reading is that the 
stylistic gusto of A Tale of a Tub belongs to Swift as much as that 
similar gusto of Tristram Shandy belongs to Sterne—or that of 
Ulysses to Joyce. Swift in 1696-97 may have been worrying about 
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the corruption of English, but in the Tale he loves corrupting it; this 
is one of the paradoxes that make the satire so difficult. 
Amazingly little has been written on the lexical inventiveness of 
Swift.4 Talk of his linguistic conservatism has kept us from 
acknowledging many of his linguistic games in the Tale and 
elsewhere. One critic goes so far as to tell us that "the chief 
characteristic of Swift's style is that it has little use for the recesses of 
language."5 Nothing could be further from the truth. Mocking 
stillborn language schemes like Wilkins's Essay Towards a Real 
Character, Swift demonstrates over and over what can be done with 
words when an author brings them to life. It is significant, for 
example, that according to one calculation, the first volume of 
Johnson's two-volume Dictionary contains some 1,761 references to 
Swift, a total that among prose writers puts him third behind 
Addison (2,439) and the Authorized Version (2,270).6 Similarly, the 
frequency with which he is mentioned in The Oxford English 
Dictionary is an indication of Swift's use of words in rare, old-
fashioned, new, or peculiar ways.7 A sort of amateur lexicographer 
himself, Swift throughout his life seems to have recorded in his 
notebooks instances of proverbs, cliche's, and odd usages he came 
across in books or conversation, and many of these found their way 
into his published satires. In the Tale the Modern's allusions to his 
use of a commonplace book may be a hint of Swift's actual practice, 
even at this early date.8 
Swift is extraordinarily sensitive to language, and in A Tale of a 
Tub he plays untiringly on the multiple connotations of words and 
their recent or antiquated meanings. A Discourse to Prove the 
Antiquity of the English Tongue is a series of ridiculous jokes about 
etymology (e.g., Achilles = A Kill-ease), a subject Swift took very 
seriously in the Tale. In this work he likewise uses words in uncon­
ventional senses, coins words of his own, and puns continually. 
Swift is a "linguistic conservative" in that he feared the 
corruption of English and in that he was a master of the plain style; 
but his idea for an academy (which was not new) and his plain style 
(which is never as plain as it looks) are only one side of the coin. We 
ought to remember that although his style is indeed plain by 
comparison with Browne's or Milton's, by comparison with Defoe's, 
or even Addison's, it is subtle and complex. Outside of a couple of 
pieces like the "Apology" to the Tale or The Conduct of the Allies 
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(and there are exceptions in both), Swift seldom says merely what he 
means. "Poetry," writes Winifred Nowottny, "is language at full 
stretch, bringing into maximal interplay the various potentialities 
afforded by linguistic forms in artistic structures."9 One could say 
exactly the same of A Tale of a Tub. 
One clear sign of Swift's delight in words is the frequent use of 
neologisms in the Tale. In A Proposal for Correcting, Improving 
and Ascertaining the English Tongue he hits at "new conceited 
Words,"10 and in his Tatler essay on language he says: 
It is manifest, that all new affected Modes of Speech, whether borrowed 
from the Court, the Town, or the Theatre, are the first perishing Parts in 
any Language; and, as I could prove by many Hundred Instances, have 
been so in ours. The Writings of Hooker, who was a Country Clergyman, 
and of Parsons the Jesuit, both in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth; are in a 
Style that, with very few Allowances, would not offend any present 
Reader; much more clear and intelligible than those of Sir H. Wooton, 
Sir Robert Naunton, Osborn, Daniel the Historian, and several others 
who writ later; but being Men of the Court, and affecting the Phrases 
then in Fashion; they are often either not to be understood, or appear 
perfectly ridiculous.11 
But that neologisms make a language unintelligible to subse­
quent generations is not Swift's only objection. Surely he would 
agree with Locke: "These, for the most part, the several sects of 
philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors or 
promoters, either affecting something singular and out of the way of 
common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions or 
cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new 
words and such as when they come to be examined, may justly be 
called insignificant terms."12 Neologisms are dangerous because the 
ambiguity of their referents makes their meanings entirely personal 
and therefore incommunicable. And in Swift's mind there is always 
a connection between linguistic corruption and moral corruption.13 
Although in the Tale the Modern complains of "the Narrowness of 
our Mother-Tongue" (p. 167),14 and although we may infer Swift's 
opposite theoretical position, his coining of words in the Tale, not 
entirely parodic, controverts his theory. "Lilliput," "Yahoo," and 
"Houyhnhnm," to cite only the most obvious examples from 
Gulliver's Travels, show that he was not averse to inventing new 
words for new realities. 
Swift's reference in the Tatler to the dated modernisms of Sir 
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Henry Wotton and others suggests we look to them for the sort of 
newfangledness he objected to. Wotton's uncompleted Philosoph­
ical Survey of Education, or Moral Architecture (1639), published 
posthumously by Izaak Walton in Reliquiae Wottonianae (1651), 
offers a number of bad examples. Short as the Survey is (eighteen 
pages in the most recent edition), six of Wotton's words are listed in 
The Oxford English Dictionary as first uses: 
unquietude (only use recorded) 
manurement 
washy 
serenetude (only use) 
insinuant 
proditorius15 
Compared with Swift's, as we shall see, Wotton's coinages are rather 
uninventive, formed as they are by the simple addition of a suffix to 
an old word. At any rate, there are in the Survey a number of other 
words current in Wotton's day but out of use by 1710, the date of the 
Tatler essay.16 On this evidence Swift's fear for contemporary 
English sounds real enough. By 1710 much of Wotton's diction 
would indeed have appeared difficult and even ridiculous. 
Yet in A Tale of a Tub the Modern's coinages, recent words, and 
odd usages make him far more difficult and ridiculous than Wotton, 
although Swift cheats by putting in the Modern's mouth a number 
of words already out of vogue, or nearly so, by 1704: for example, 
"annihilate" (pp. 35, 43), used as an adjective, was being replaced by 
the past participle; an instance of "Expedition" (p. 145), in the sense 
of the action of expediting, last occurs in 1649; and Swift's use of 
"flesht" (p. 101), meaning "to initiate," is the last recorded use of 
this word.17 "What I am going to say," promises the Modern, "is 
literally true this Minute I am writing" (p. 36). He may be 
overestimating. 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists over forty words in A Tale of 
a Tub that I take to be Swift's coinages.18 In addition, a surprising 
number of words are of quite recent origin, and he uses them too 
with an awareness of their novelty.19 Swift possesses a remarkable 
sensitivity to the age of words and is aware when an old word feels 
archaic, just as when a very recent word, or a neologism, has the feel 
of newness about it. "If any English man should now write or speak 
as our forefathers did about six or seven hundred years past," says 
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Wilkins, "We should as little understand him as if he were a 
foreiner." Bentley goes further, asking in his Dissertation upon 
Phalaris: "For what Englishman does not think himself able from 
the very turn and fashion of the style, to distinguish a fresh English 
composition from another a hundred years old?"20 The pervasive 
concern in the second half of the seventeenth century for the relative 
antiquity of words21 meant that Swift could count on his reader's 
sensitivity in this regard, and in the Tale he intentionally uses new 
words, or constructs his own, for ironic effect. "Neologisms are 
dangerous," warns a recent critic, "because they may produce an 
illusion, that of being reality when only being 'terms.' "22 I suppose 
this is true. But given a subtle satirist and a responsive reader, 
neologisms can be both a way of parodying an overly inventive 
persona and an apt proof of the real author's real inventiveness with 
words. 
The paragraph in the Tale on the structure of Restoration theaters 
shows how Swift's Modern uses a decidedly modern vocabulary in 
talking about a modern subject. After each seventeenth-century 
coinage or new usage I insert the date of its first citation in The 
Oxford English Dictionary: 
I confess, there is something yet more refined in the Contrivance [1695] 
and Structure of our Modern Theatres. For, First; the Pit [1649] is sunk 
below the Stage with due regard to the Institution above-deduced; that 
whatever weighty Matter shall be delivered thence (whether it be Lead or 
Gold) may fall plum into the Jaws of certain Criticks (as I think they are 
called) which stand ready open to devour them. Then, the Boxes [1609] 
are built round, and raised to a Level with the Scene [1638], in deference 
[1660] to the Ladies, because, That large Portion of Wit laid out in 
raising Pruriences [1688] and Protuberances [1646], is observ'd to run 
much upon a Line, and ever in a Circle. The whining Passions, and little 
starved Conceits, are gently wafted [1704] up by their own extreme Levity 
[1704], to the middle Region [1626], and there fix [1626] and are frozen by 
the frigid [1643] Understandings of the Inhabitants. Bombastry [1704] 
and Buffoonry [1621], by Nature lofty and light, soar highest of all, and 
would be lost in the Roof, if the prudent Architect had not with much 
Foresight contrived for them a fourth Place, called the Twelve-Peny 
Gallery [1690], and there planted a suitable Colony, who greedily 
intercept them in their Passage. (P. 61) 
Some of these words deserve special comment. "Pit," "Box," and 
"Scene" are relatively recent names for parts of the typical Restora­
tion theater. As recently as 1690 playwright John Crowne had 
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introduced the term "Gallery" in the phrase "eighteen-penny 
gallery."23 And the word "Contrivance" was apparently first used in 
the sense of the adaptation of a means to an end in John 
Woodward's Natural History of the Earth (1695), where the author 
speaks of "Proofs of Contrivance in the Structure of the Globe,"24 a 
phrase Swift seems to echo. But even more interesting are Swift's two 
neologisms: "Bombastry,"25 perhaps an echo of "pedantry," is 
developed from the earlier "bombast" and is reminiscent of 
"Bumbastus," which Swift cites elsewhere (p. 152) as a humorous 
nickname for Paracelsus; "Levity," a term from physics that 
signifies an inherent property of a body that causes it to rise,26 is 
used here for the first time in a figurative sense. In addition, 
although "deference" goes back to 1660, Swift may be one of the first 
writers to employ "in deference to," for The Oxford English 
Dictionary records no incidence of the phrase before the mid 
nineteenth century. And the transitive verb "waft," although dating 
back to the previous century, began about this time to mean to carry 
a thing (especially a sound, scent, or something similar) through 
space, as in Pope's pastoral to "Summer" ("And Winds shall waft it 
to the Pow'rs above"), a sense Swift bends to his own ironic 
27purpose.  The important thing here is to observe in a general way 
that many of Swift's words are chosen self-consciously from the 
previous fifty years or so. The Modern has an authentic modern 
vocabulary. 
In the pages that follow I shall discuss the morphology of 
neologisms and unique or original usages in the Tale, their satirical 
effect, and what they tell us about Swift's attitude toward language. 
These words fall into a wide range of types: (1) a few seem to have 
been borrowed from nonliterary vocabularies; (2) a number are 
foreign (usually Latin) words used in an English text for the first 
time; (3) a number are compounds formed by the combination of two 
or more extant words; (4) a few are old words used in a new sense; 
and (5) a great many are new words formed by the addition of a 
prefix or (usually) a suffix to an existing root. The transformations 
are familiar, although their variety is remarkable, especially when 
compared with Wotton's simple addition of suffixes. But whatever 
transformation lies behind Swift's forty plus neologisms, what 
stands out is his fascination with etymology. His coinage "Liftings" 
(p. 129), for example, is probably his colloquial equivalent to the 
Latinate "exhaltation," as elsewhere "Flowings" (p. 128) is substi­
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tuted for the Latin "effluvia." On the other hand, Swift's lexical 
masterpiece—"Reincrudation" (p. 68)—is a high-sounding Latin­
ism for the low process of being made crude again; although built 
on the recent and very rare (single instances only) "reincrudate" and 
"reincrudescence," this new word refers ironically to a manner of 
writing and may also be a blasphemous allusion to the Incarnation. 
Swift's conglomerate is a full-blown parody of seventeenth-century 
virtuosos who could take anything, no matter how foul, and 
lexicalize it into a more sanitary abstraction. (Recall Wotton's 
"manurement.") To uncover the etymology of a Swiftian neologism 
is often to uncover a humor and satire that extend well beyond the 
word itself. 
The simpler neologisms are much less interesting to us and less 
useful to Swift than the more complex types. In the first group, 
"separate Maintenance" (p. 121), a legal term, and "good for 
nothing" (p. 173) are both listed in The Oxford English Dictionary 
as first instances, although they are simply terms that Swift may 
have been responsible for importing from nonliterary sources.28 In 
the second group, terms such as "Opus magnum" (pp. 127, 187), 
"bonae notae" (p. 68), and "Amorphy" (p. 124) are foreign words 
that Swift first brought into English. In a couple of these cases he 
cannot resist the irony of using the term outside its usual context: 
"separate Maintenance" he employs in reference to the "Divorce" of 
the three brothers, and "Opus magnum," an alchemical term 
meaning "the conversion of baser metals into gold," in reference to 
the best way to read A Tale of a Tub! 
In the third group, Swift's interest in etymology leads him into 
parodies of certain characteristic seventeenth-century word forma­
tions. With "Monster-mongers" (p. 131) he has taken an apparently 
fading sense of "monster," meaning a prodigy or a marvel, and 
combined it with an old word for "merchant"; the model is not new 
(cf. "fly-monger," "water-monger," and so forth), and The Oxford 
English Dictionary suggests that from the middle of the sixteenth 
century these compounds had discreditable connotations. Similarly, 
"Physico-logical" (p. 61) is based on a popular seventeenth-century 
model for scientific terms (cf. "physico-chemical," "physico­
mathematical," and so on); Swift mocks this series of compounds,29 
but at the same time his own compound has peculiar significance in 
the Tale, where the Modern's overblown logical arguments are 
consistently deflated by Swift's heavy physical imagery. Finally, the 
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most satirically poignant neologism (it is also a pun) in the Tale is 
"Micro-Coat" (p. 78), a comical takeoff on "Microcosm";30 in reduc­
ing the Renaissance "microcosm" to the Restoration "Micro-Coat," 
Swift has polarized the difference between the two periods, a 
difference between man as little world and man as clothes. Swift's 
compounds force us to pay attention to their constituent elements, 
and those elements clash ironically with each other (e.g., "Physico-" 
versus "-logical") or with something else (e.g., "-Coat" versus 
"- cosm"). The dichotomies are simultaneously playful and serious. 
In the fourth group of neologisms, Swift uses an old word in a 
new way, either employing it for the first time in a figurative sense 
or reviving its dead metaphor. "Abortion" (p. 206), which 
originated in its medical sense in the sixteenth century, was first 
used by Swift to mean "a failure of an aim or promise"; but notice 
how the sexual imagery of the previous section, plus the puns in this 
very sentence ("Going too short," "Labors of the Brain") keep us 
aware of the earlier medical meaning at the same time. Similarly, 
"astride" (p. 171) is used by Swift for the first time in a figurative 
sense, although again his irony insists upon our recalling the word's 
physical meaning—Fancy astride of Reason like a horse. Swift does 
just the opposite with the word "Protrusions" (p. 202), employing it 
in a more concrete sense than it had been employed before; whereas 
Browne and Boyle use it to mean the action of protruding, Swift uses 
it to mean that which protrudes, although here it is "Zeal" that 
protrudes! Swift makes fun of his own usage. 
In two other cases he may for the first time be punning on a 
heretofore unknown physical sense of an old word: namely, 
"Bottom" (p. 190), where he seems to be implying the posteriors, 
although in The Oxford English Dictionary 1794 is the earliest 
citation in this sense; and "Intercourse" (p. 60), where he seems to be 
implying sexual congress (cf. "Engine," "erected," and "Seminary" 
above), although 1798 is the earliest citation. But whether we accept 
these last two new usages or not, we ought to recognize that 
although Swift often gives words new meanings for satiric effect, he 
also seems to push literal senses into figurative, and figurative into 
literal, simply because he enjoys the richness of language. He seems 
driven to keep every old sense of a word alive while cultivating new 
ones. 
The most frequent and most satirical transformation among 
Swift's neologisms is the addition of a suffix to an extant word. He is 
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responsible for first turning the action "claim" into the person 
"Claimant" (p. 21), the adjective "sedate" into the superlative 
"sedate " (p. 138),31 and the noun "pederasty" into the adjective 
"Pederasticfc" (p. 41). As in this last example, Swift ordinarily uses 
suffixes in an ironic sense in order to heighten the derogatory tone of 
the root word. Thus in transforming "Banter," a word he disliked,32 
into "Bantring" (p. 19), Swift suggests that this banter is of 
indefinite duration, and his elision (he hated contractions)33 is a sort 
of bantering of his own. In transforming "modern," which first 
appeared in this sense in 1670, into "Modenusto" (p. 169), Swift 
personifies (a Modernist = one who practices modernism) that 
seventeenth-century bias he wrote the Tale to condemn. In trans­
forming "yeoman" into "YeomanJry" (p. 181), Swift cheats a little 
on the conventional spelling ("-try" instead of "-ry") in order to 
establish an ironic echo of "Gentry"34—the parallel lexically 
elevating yeomen to the level of gentlemen. "Sparge/ac^orc" (p. 
110), built on the Latinate verb "sparge," meaning to sprinkle, 
follows the model of seventeenth-century coinages such as "rare­
faction," "torrefaction," and "petrifaction"; but Swift's earlier 
equation of sprinkling and pickling, combined with the political 
sense of "faction," yields something like "pickling faction" (i.e., 
Catholics). And "Fastidioszty" (p. 124), one of the Tale's finest 
coinages, follows the transformation "curious" -> "curiosity," the 
suffix used to convert an adjective into a noun indicating state or 
condition; Swift's neologism, itself a wee satire, echoes recent 
seventeenth-century concoctions such as "spirituosity," "virtu­
osity," and "coxcombity." Neologisms of this type mock what Swift 
viewed as the century's linguistically unsound practice of multiply­
ing words by the addition of suffixes. But beyond this, the above 
neologisms show Swift using suffixes to imply an unfavorable 
attitude toward root words; his dislike for certain word formations, 
that is, often shows his dislike for the things those words stand for. 
Swift's problem in the Tale is to create a persona who relies 
heavily on faddish words and his own coinages, while keeping that 
persona from compromising his own position. He succeeds bril­
liantly. Although he uses enough neologisms and relatively new 
words to give the feel of modernism to his work, the frequency and 
quality of those words very quickly prove the Modern a pedant. In 
fact, some of Swift's coinages are themselves little parodies of 
modernism's cut-and-paste jobs. And to Swift the building of new 
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words out of the scraps of old ones involves the destruction of old 
truths. "Reincrudation" is such an abomination because it attempts 
to conceal reality, because it is a made-up- word that attempts to 
escape the inescapable filth at its center.35 Like "Micro-Coat" and 
"Fastidiosity," but more obviously, "Reinrrwdation" can be viewed 
as a sort of symbol of the struggle in the Tale between the unreality 
of the Modern and the reality of Swift, between the attempt to create 
a word world apart from experience and the attempt to use words to 
get back to the experiential world. The paradox is that while 
neologisms in the Tale parody the distortion of lexical wizardry, 
they likewise demonstrate what a lexical wizard can do. Swift simply 
never separates himself categorically from his persona, and, like his 
Modern, he shows a certain relish for neologisms and odd usages, as 
he does for puns. 
It is difficult to explain our prejudice against puns. Herbert Davis 
speaks of "that dangerous practice," Denis Donoghue of "this 
subversive game."36 Swift himself ridicules puns in A Modest 
Defence of Punning ("We sit up at Supper Late in the £t^ning, 
which is false in the Supperlative Degree") and teases Stella for 
slipping into unwanted puns.37 We all knock the pun for its cheap­
ness while delighting in its ingenuity. Although some of Swift's 
puns undercut the Modern or modernism or something else, and are 
important to his satire, others have no clear purpose, or simply 
make us groan.38 In fact, many would not be caught on a first 
reading. I think Swift wrote the Tale in one of those rare moods we 
have all experienced at some time or other—when every word looms 
a potential pun. They average better than one per page. And Swift's 
open lexical form keeps his readers always attentive to possible puns 
and perhaps allows them to contribute a few of their own. 
Arthur Koestler defines the pun as "two strings of thought tied by 
an acoustic knot."39 As such, the pun is an apt satirical device for 
Swift, who can use it to combine in a single word a thought of his 
own with a thought of the Modern's. Puns in A Tale of a Tub are of 
several types: (1) a few are based on a confusion between a name and 
the thing itself; (2) a large number are based on the inherent double 
meaning of a word; (3) a smaller number originate in the etymology 
of a word, the pun in this case dwelling in one syllable; and finally, 
(4) a special kind is the double entendre, a neutral word that takes on 
sexual connotation from its sexually charged context. Of course, 
context is what makes all puns, for the two strings of thought must 
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in each case be supported and encouraged by other words in the 
immediate vicinity. I shall discuss examples of each type of pun, 
tracing their morphology and pointing to their local effects, satiric 
purpose, and implications concerning Swift's attitude toward 
language. 
Puns based on a confusion between a name and the thing itself are 
relatively rare in the Tale, although this sort of confusion is not, 
being closely related to Swift's habitual literalization of metaphor.40 
The most important example of this type is in that beautifully 
ironic sentence, "But to. return to Madness" (p. 174).41 Coming as it 
does after the central paragraph of the Tale, Swift's transition means 
two things: while the Modern casually informs us that he is return­
ing to the subject of madness, he unwittingly suggests that he is 
returning to the condition of madness. But the irony here gives rise 
to further irony, as we ask ourselves, Has the Modern ever really left 
madness? 
The second type of pun, that based on the inherent double 
meaning of a word, is by far the most common in A Tale of a Tub. 
Such is the nature of the puns on "Dark" (pp. 128, 208), meaning 
both profound and dim; "Revolutions" (p. 189), meaning complete 
changes and spinning; "Gravity" (p. 60), meaning seriousness and 
heaviness; "Hemp" (p. 101), meaning hashish and the hangman's 
rope;42 "Caballing" (p. 65), meaning a plotting and the mystery of 
the cabala; "Sheer wit" (p. 80), meaning absolute wit and trans­
parent wit; "Vessel" (pp. 153, 156), meaning the human body and a 
large cask or barrel; "Inspiration" (pp. 154, 155, 159), meaning 
divine influence and flatulation; "Bulls" (p. 110), meaning papal 
documents and horned animals with hooves; and "knotty Point" (p. 
170), meaning a difficult problem in philosophy and mere tangled 
laces. Another such pun is that on "Vision" (p. 171), meaning the 
action of seeing with the bodily eye, but also, as Swift defines the 
term in his Thoughts on Various Subjects, "the Art of seeing Things 
invisible."43 An especially outrageous pun of this sort—"all Man­
kind appeared closed up in Bars of Gold Lace" (p. 84)—shows Swift 
playing on the pronunciation of a word.44 There seem also to be a 
couple of puns that rely on the reader's awareness of contemporary 
slang, namely, "Cackling" (p. 66), meaning both the chittering of a 
hen and farting, and "Academy" (p. 166), meaning both a university 
and a brothel.45 In addition, there are other possible puns, like 
"Naturals" (p. 29), meaning in an unimproved condition, but 
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perhaps hinting at "natural," a current word for a half-witted 
person; "Occasion" (p. 191), meaning simply situation, but perhaps 
suggesting "occasions," meaning the necessities of nature, a sense 
first used in 1698; and "Remains" (p. 70), meaning remainder, but 
perhaps ironically implying a corpse, a sense first found in Dryden 
in 1700.46 
In each of the above cases the first meaning, usually the more 
appropriate in an intellectual context, is the Modern's, and the 
second, usually the literal or less complimentary meaning, is Swift's. 
And in every instance the second meaning serves to drag the 
Modern's high-flying intellectualism back to earth. By reviving the 
dead metaphors in these words, Swift forces us to see them in their 
usually older, more physical senses. As with the word "Dark," for 
example, while the persona in the Tale brags that moderns write 
profound books, Swift whispers that they write dim books, and so 
on. Swift's puns are often little doors into his thoughts on the 
Modern's various subjects. 
For example, one of the most significant labels in the Tale— 
"Modern"—may well contain a powerful pun on an apparently 
obsolete sense of the word (frequent in Shakespeare) meaning 
everyday, ordinary, or commonplace.47 Similarly, when the Modern 
defines "Happiness" as "a perpetual Possession of being well 
Deceived" (p. 171), we are meant to see that "Possession" can be 
taken in two ways. Whereas the Modern says that happiness is to be 
continuously deceived, Swift says that to be deceived is to be 
possessed, and possession is madness.48 A comparable pun occurs at 
the end of the "Digression on Madness," where, after introducing 
his grand scheme for utilizing insanity, the Modern says: "which, 
perhaps, the gentle, courteous, and candid Reader, brimful of that 
Modern Charity and Tenderness, usually annexed to his Office, will 
be very hardly persuaded to believe" (p. 180). The tentative syntax, 
the melodramatic compliment to the reader, and that Beckettian 
"perhaps"—all weaken what the Modern has just said. But the final 
blow is landed by the quite casual pun on "hardly," which the 
Modern uses to mean "emphatically" and Swift to mean scarce-
ly."49 You can hardly believe, warns Swift, this stuff the Modern just 
told you! 
A third, more arcane and less prevalent kind of pun is that in 
which Swift uses the etymology of a word to set up a double 
meaning for just one syllable. Such is the pun "Ragousts" (p. 143), 
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which immediately follows a reference to modern foods "drest up in 
various compounds." Other even more subtle puns are "Topog­
raphy" (p. 35), which alludes to the shapes of clouds in the sky; 
"penetrating" (p. 39), which leads into1 a discussion of pens as 
weapons; and "flotation" (p. 40), which refers to the Rota Club, a 
political club founded in 1659 to advocate rotation in government 
offices. Although some few of these etymological puns mock the 
thing the word names, Swift seems in this group mainly to be 
sporting with language, playing games his reader may not even 
notice. 
The double entendre, the fourth type of pun in the Tale, depends 
upon a sexually charged context to turn ordinarily innocent words 
into obscene insinuations.50 In such contexts Swift's words 
"Engine" (pp. 59, 164), "Machine" (p. 164), "Tongue" (p. 195), 
"Ear" (pp. 195, 200, 203), "Nose" (p. 201), "Sprout" (p. 202), and 
"Handle" (p. 203) are all Freudian jokes on "penis."51 But to get the 
full effect of Swift's double entendres we must look not at single 
words but at a whole passage. At the end of a paragraph full of 
words such as "propagate," "Loppings," and "Protuberancy," we 
get this: 
Lastly, the devouter Sisters, who lookt upon all extraordinary Dilatations 
of that Member, as Protrusions of Zeal, or spiritual Excrescencies, were 
sure to honor every Head they say upon, as if they had been Marks of 
Grace; but, especially, that of the Preacher, whose Ears were usually of 
the prime Magnitude; which upon that Account, he was very frequent 
and exact in exposing with all Advantages to the People: in his 
Rhetorical Paroxysms, turning sometimes to hold forth the one, and 
sometimes to hold forth the other: From which Custom, the whole 
Operation of Preaching is to this very Day among their Professors, styled 
by the Phrase of Holding forth. (P. 202) 
Although Swift's subject is Puritan preachers and their effect on 
their congregations, he forces us to recognize the sexual connota­
tions of this relationship, so that by the end of the paragraph, 
"Rhetorical Paroxysms" and "Holding forth" have both come to 
mean orgasm. Of course, the equation is never absolute, and Swift 
throughout pretends to be talking only about the language of these 
preachers; but the ambiguity of his own language is enough to 
damn the religious practices of the Puritans by associating their 
services with orgies. Yet we cannot escape paradoxes: Swift satirizes 
the seductive rhetoric of dissenting preachers, but it is the seductive­
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ness of his own rhetoric that makes that satire possible; at the same 
time, it takes two to have rhetorical intercourse, and in a double 
entendre it is the reader himself who gives a perfectly clean word its 
dirty meaning. Since words are like seeds, those scattered on a 
fruitful ground "will multiply far beyond either the Hopes or 
Imagination of the Sower" (p. 186). Swift's puns turn a good reader 
into an irresponsible one. Thus we end up guilty of overreading 
while Swift, like Sterne in Tristram Shandy, may pretend to a 
transparent innocence. 
Some puns have no satiric purpose whatsoever. Here Swift plays 
on the double meaning of a word: anxious to try his dedication, the 
Modern climbed "a prodigious Number of dark, winding Stairs; But 
found them all in the same Story, both of your Lordship and them­
selves" (p. 24). Here he fools with the etymology of a word: giving 
Cicero's advice concerning English hackney-coachmen, the Modern 
goes on, "For, to speak a bold Truth, it is a fatal Miscarriage . . .  " 
(p. 168). And here he makes a double pun on the etymology of a 
word and an old superstition: discoursing on the gallows ladder, the 
Modern says, "'Tis observed by Foreigners themselves, to the Honor 
of our Country, that we excel all Nations in our Practice and Under­
standing of this Machine" (pp. 58-59). Swift is out to have fun, and 
this is proved finally by that single pun in the "Apology" in which 
he accuses Wotton of "going out of his way to be waggish, to tell us 
of a Cow that prickt up her Tail" (p. 19). Daringly, Swift in this 
instance breaks into his serious argument with a joke, taking the 
chance he may appear as waggish as Wotton. It is as if, having held 
his own waggishness in check through the entire "Apology," Swift 
on the last page cannot hold any longer and slips for a moment into 
a parodic style more appropriate to the body of the Tale.52 
As Swift says in the Introduction to Polite Conversation, puns 
"break, or very much entangle the Thread of Discourse."53 His view 
here is comparable to Freud's in Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious', "the diversion of a train of thought, the displacement 
of the psychical emphasis onto a topic other than the opening 
one."54 But who in A Tale of a Tub keeps derailing us, the Modern 
or Swift? To say that puns in the Tale are always serious ironies is to 
say that Swift's relation to his persona is always antagonistic, which 
clearly it is not. It is perhaps possible to say that the Modern moves 
always in an elaborative, expansive direction, whereas Swift moves 
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in the opposite direction, achieving an explosive compression of 
ideas in few words.55 But the neatness of such a juxtaposition is 
quite un-Swiftian. I think it is truer to our experience in reading the 
Tale to say simply that its style pulls simultaneously in two 
directions, in general toward a belabored wordiness, and in many 
particular instances toward an incisive brevity. When Swift packs 
his words close, what results are oxymorons like "oracular Belches" 
(p. 156) and, with even greater compression, neologisms like "Rein­
crudation" or puns like "Possession" or "Paroxysms." These terms 
are abstract and physical, serious and comic, exemplary and parodic 
at the same time. Both the Modern and Swift are in each of them. 
Wordplay in A Tale of a Tub may suggest the Modern's verbal 
irresponsibility, but it is likewise one of Swift's most important and 
subtle ways of communicating to his reader. Thus while the surface 
ideas in the following passage are the persona's, the deeper effects 
are not. Complaining first of "a superficial Vein among many 
Readers of the present Age," the Modern goes on to argue that 
Wisdom is a Fox, who after long hunting, will at last cost you the Pains 
to dig out: 'Tis a Cheese, which by how much the richer, has the thicker, 
the homelier, and the courser Coat; and whereof to a judicious Palate, the 
Maggots are the best. 'Tis a Sack-Posset, wherein the deeper you go, you 
will find it the sweeter. Wisdom is a.Hen, whose Cackling we must value 
and consider, because it is attended with an Egg; But then, lastly, 'tis a 
Nut, which unless you chuse with Judgment, may cost you a Tooth, and 
pay you with nothing but a Worm. In consequence of these momentous 
Truths, the Grubaean Sages have always chosen to convey their Precepts 
and their Arts, shut up within the Vehicles of Types and Fables, which 
having been perhaps more careful and curious in adorning, than was 
altogether necessary, it has fared with these Vehicles after the usual Fate 
of Coaches over-finely painted and gilt; that the transitory Gazers have so 
dazzled their Eyes, and fill'd their Imaginations with the outward Lustre, 
as neither to regard or consider, the Person or the Parts of the Owner 
within. A Misfortune we undergo with somewhat less Reluctancy, 
because it has been common to us with Pythagoras, Aesop, Socrates, and 
other of our Predecessors. (P. 66) 
Swift's characteristic slippages of meaning are the essence of the 
humor and satire in this passage. "Grubaean," a brilliant coinage, 
ygenerally echoes the corruption of the whole passage, and more 
particularly offers a pun on "Worms," which ends the preceding 
sentence, and "Maggots," which occurs a few lines above.56 Swift's 
transformation is worth tracing: 
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Maggot 
I

Worm 
Grub 
I

Grub-Street 
Grubaean 
I

Grubaean Sages57 
To realize all of Swift's wit, the reader must dig out this transforma­
tion in reverse order. If he does, he finds that what began for the 
Modern as the kernel of wisdom has become for Swift the filthy 
Grub-Street parasite who feeds on the wisdom of others. Moreover, 
Swift does not leave it at this, but develops another pun on 
"Vehicle," meaning both a literary form and a gentleman's coach; in 
this context the words "convey," "shut up within," and "transitory" 
all assume double meanings.58 At any rate, Swift finally works his 
way back to the problem of the reader, who may be so "dazzled" by 
the outside of A Tale of a Tub's vehicle that he will be unable to 
consider the owner within. Swift has by the end of the paragraph 
made an extremely complex analogy— 
Nut : Coach : Fable :: Worm : Gentlemen : Wisdom 
—and thus the Tale itself, like a nut, may break a tooth, or like a gilt 
coach, blind our eyes to what is inside. What is at the start of the 
paragraph the Modern's criticism of the superficiality of modern 
readers has been transformed by the end into Swift's criticism of the 
superficiality of modern writers, of whom the Modern Author 
himself is the prime example. The situation is even more compli­
cated than this, however, for the Modern professes a depth that he 
cannot deliver on, although Swift does, and thus in a sense fulfills 
his persona's unwitting claims. 
Swift's characteristic handling of words permits him to twist the 
Modern's point of view into his own. The coinage "Grubaean," the 
pun on "Vehicle," and what we might call the bleeding of meaning 
throughout the whole passage—all this forces on us at least two 
points of view and a discomforting density of meaning.59 While 
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theoretically turning over the paragraph to his persona, Swift's 
verbal ingenuity carries it well beyond him. Swift objects here to 
shutting up ideas in types and fables, and despite his metaphors, he 
avoids that; he writes about ideas in an altogether different way, 
allowing connotation to beget connotation to beget connotation. 
Words in the Tale never come as mere static, explicit, ahistorical 
entities. Of course, Swift's powerfully resonant use of words, plus 
his apparent ease in the face of compounded ambiguity, put tre­
mendous responsibility on his reader: "Unless you chuse with 
Judgment," he warns us. A reader must be able to spy Swift inside 
this gilt vehicle. 
"Let us ask ourselves," says Wittgenstein, "why do we feel a 
grammatical joke to be deep?"60 In A Tale of a Tub neologisms and 
puns demonstrate the paradox that while the Modern engages in a 
kind of anticreation, a kind of writing that destroys reality, Swift 
himself is truly creating, using the Modern's words in order to rub 
our noses in reality. Neologisms and puns both challenge the stricter 
boundaries of language, and in that sense can be dangerously 
destructive of it and the world it mirrors; yet in the very process of 
breaking language down, neologisms and puns force a reconsidera­
tion of words and their relation to reality. Thus while the Modern is 
turning reality into cool lexical abstraction, Swift, simultaneously, 
is destroying that lexical abstraction in order to reconstitute 
language on another, more direct, more realistic basis. Destruction 
in the Tale becomes a kind of creation. 
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"grubby," meaning stunted or dwarfish, a word that first appeared some hundred 
years earlier. He may also be punning on "Grubaean's Ages." 
58. Swift seems especially to be enjoying the ambiguity of the word "transitory," 
which is used also earlier in the paragraph and which here refers both to a moving 
vehicle and to the evanescence of those watching the vehicle. 
59. Cf. Glossary under "Cackling," a word that appears immediately above. The 
general effect of neologisms and puns in the Tale is close to what Leo Spitzer calls 
"Linguistic Perspectivism in the Don Quijote," in Linguistics and Literary History: 
Essays in Stylistics (Princeton, 1948), pp. 41-85. 
60. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(New York, 1953), p. 47. 

chapter three 
Lexical Fields 
/ was laughed to scorn, for a Clown and a Pedant, without all Taste 
and Refinement. 
The seventeenth century was the age of the dictionary, and the 
emphasis on "hard words" in the dictionaries of Blount (1656), 
Coles (1676), and others, plus the publication of specialized 
dictionaries, like Blount's Nomo-Lexicon: A Law Dictionary (1670) 
and B. E.'s New Dictionary of the Terms Ancient and Modern of the 
Canting Crew (1690), points to a special interest in the usages of 
certain professional groups or levels of society. A Tale of a Tub in 
prose, like Hudibras in verse, reflects the linguistic fragmentation of 
its time.1 As Wotton suggested in 1705, the style of the Tale is a 
shocking juxtaposition of high and low, literary and colloquial, 
proper and vulgar.2 And though in the "Apology" Swift ridicules 
Wotton's own improprieties,3 he himself scrambles vocabularies— 
but to ironic effect. 
In particular, the Tale echoes a century-long theoretical and 
practical struggle between a Latinate, polysyllabic diction and an 
Anglo-Saxon, colloquial diction. For ironic purposes—and because 
he enjoyed language in all its reaches—Swift wrote his first prose 
work in a unique, bastardized style that jams Latinisms and collo­
quialisms up against one another. Even more than Donne, Burton, 
or Browne, he capitalized on the Romance and Germanic contra­
dictions inherent in our language.4 Swift delights in parodying the 
jargons peculiar to religion, law, criticism, medicine, and 
philosophy, and in peppering these specialized, pedantic vocabu­
laries with down-home colloquialisms. Much of his success in the 
Tale and elsewhere depends upon his keen sensitivity to what I call 
"lexical field"5—a word's complex of related words, level of usage, 
and aura of tone and value. Shifting lexical fields is one of Swift's 
chief devices for humor and satire.6 
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What Wimsatt calls "philosophic words" were appropriate to 
seventeenth-century philosophers, scientists, and others because 
they imply a belief in the unity and systematization of knowledge 
and an intellectual control of real phenomena, and because these 
attitudes were conveyed in an assured tone. "The scientific author­
ity, the deliberation and certainty," says Wimsatt, "is backed up by a 
thump on the table."7 Browne's Vulgar Errors, which Swift surely 
had in mind as he wrote the Tale,8 is an extreme instance of this 
philosophic style. In this passage Browne takes up the popular 
belief that chameleons feed on air: "Whatsoever properly nourisheth 
before its assimulation, by the action of natural heat it receiveth a 
corpulency or incrassation progressional unto its conversion; which 
notwithstanding cannot be effected upon air; for the action of heat 
doth not condense but rarifie that body, and by attenuation, rather 
then for nutrition, disposeth it for expulsion."9 The Anglo-Latin 
"assimulation," "action" (twice), "corpulency," "incrassation," 
"progressional," "conversion," "condense," "rarifie," "attenua­
tion," "nutrition," and "expulsion"—all suggest the order of 
scientific abstraction. "By their very removal from the ordinary," 
says Wimsatt, "the Latin words suggest the principles of things—a 
reason or an explanation."10 In this passage Browne's philosophic 
words are based on the intellectual concepts of cause and effect, 
increase and decrease, analogy and antithesis. Although his ideas 
about chameleons may be wrong, his language, at any rate, lends his 
argument credibility. 
But if the seventeenth century fostered a Browne, it also fostered a 
Bunyan; and in A Letter to a Young Gentleman Swift cites The 
Pilgrim's Progress as a paragon of stylistic simplicity. Surely he 
would have admired a passage like the following: "And with that, a 
great darkness and horror fell upon Christian, so that he could not 
see before him; also here he in great measure lost his senses, so that 
he could neither remember nor orderly talk of any of those sweet 
refreshments that he had met with in the way of his pilgrimage. But 
all the words that he spake still tended to discover that he had horror 
of mind and hearty fears that he should die in that River, and never 
obtain entrance in at the Gate."11 Swift admits that he has been 
better entertained and informed by Bunyan than by many preachers 
of university erudition who "are apt to fill their Sermons with 
philosophical Terms, and Notions of the metaphysical or abstracted 
kind."12 In the passage from Bunyan there is not a word that could 
Lexical Fields 51 
not be understood readily by a man of small education and ordinary 
intelligence. Whereas in the single sentence from Browne there are 
26 polysyllables out of a total of 52 words (50 percent), in the two 
sentences from Bunyan there are only 19 polysyllables out of 89 
words (21 percent). And whereas in the passage from Browne there 
are 17 words of three or more syllables (33 percent), in the passage 
from Bunyan there are only 5 three-syllable words (6 percent). No 
principles of things here. Browne writes about the superstitions of 
the common people in a highly academic prose, whereas Bunyan 
writes for the common people in a direct, unadorned prose remi­
niscent of the Authorized Version. In A Tale of a Tub Swift 
embraced both styles simultaneously. 
Hard words crowd every page of the Tale.13 The Modern wants to 
impress us with his learning, and he parades that learning in a 
difficult vocabulary. Erudite, polysyllabic, Latinate words from this 
lexical field lend the book its philosophical air: 
Anatomy (pp. 123, 174) Evomition (p. 108) 
Approbation (p. 182) Exantlation (p. 67) 
capacitate (p. 44) Excresencies (p. 202) 
Celestial (p. 79) Exhalations (pp. 163, 166) 
Circumfusion (p. 79) Oscitation (p. 124) 
Contexture (p. 123) Paroxysms (pp. 196, 202) 
dilucidate (p. 68) Perspiration (pp. 107, 185) 
disembogue (pp. 153, 156) Pretermission (p. 96) 
Epidemical (p. 124) Suffocations (p. 101) 
Eructation (pp. 108, 160) Superficies (pp. 76, 103, 174) 
The Tale has about it the musty smell of university and laboratory. 
But the Modern's big words expose him; he uses them mechanically, 
like a poet who has just discovered Roget. He shuffles fat Latinisms 
not as symbols for ideas but in lieu of ideas. 
Then there is that "other" diction oiA Tale of a Tub, those words 
more common to speech than to writing, more appropriate in the 
mouths of farmers, tradesmen, and fishwives than of scholars, 
preachers, and philosophers.14 Here is a sampling of words from the 
Tale that are found also in B. E.'s New Dictionary of the Canting 
Crew, the first dictionary of English slang:15 
bilkt (p. 75) Jade (p. 188) 
Bully (pp. 19, 165) Jakes (pp. 36, 163) 
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Cackling (p. 66) Noddle (p. 198) 
Cant (p. 171) paumed (p. 138) 
Chops (p. 115)16 Rabble (pp. 45, 46, 54) 
Claps (p. 75) Raree-Shows (p. 109) 
Coxcomb (p. 122) Snivel (p. 112) 
Curs (p. 189) Spunging-house (p. 204) 
Hell (pp. 76, 102) Thwack (p. 197) 
Hob-Nails (p. 63) waggish (p. 19) 
And there are innumerable other low words not in B. E., such as 
"Fart" (p. 112), "Gear" (p. 195), "grunting" (p. 203), "jog" (p. 188), 
"pop" (p. 181), and "Spittle" (p. 129). Words from this lexical field 
are mostly of Anglo-Saxon etymology, are of one or two syllables, 
and are dominated by abrupt consonants;17 some, like "snivel" and 
"Thwack," are onomatopoetic. Although the Tale is composed for 
the most part in a highly literate, bookish vocabulary, its many 
colloquialisms mean that we are always brought back, if fitfully, to 
ordinary speech. 
Swift achieves the same effect with his cliches. Although in A 
Letter to a Young Gentlemen he warns against "old threadbare 
Phrases,"18 he employs them throughout A Tale of a Tub: 
Time which has lain heavy upon my Hands (p. 30) 
the breadth of a Hair (pp. 43, 81) 
as good Luck would have it (p. 87) 
time out of Mind (p. 121) 
kickt out of Doors (pp. 122, 138, 171) 
when the Fulness of time is come (p. 148) 
stifled, or hid under a Bushel (p. 153) 
the Reason is just at our Elbow (p. 172) 
left him in the lurch (p. 204) 
it would run like Wild-Fire (p. 207) 
Again the words are primarily monosyllabic and of Anglo-Saxon 
origin and are familiar to all of us. Cliche's in the Tale introduce 
elements of spontaneous, everyday talk into the Modern's style; but 
coupled with his highly self-conscious, learned vocabularly, they 
seem essentially like unwitting slips of the tongue. Just as the 
Modern literally goes blank at the heights of some of his most 
abstruse arguments, so he drops into cliches in the midst of his 
predominantly intellectual phraseology.19 Swift means for us to 
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realize that a speaker who uses cliches is not only falling back on 
everyone else's words but also on everyone else's ideas. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to pin Swift down, for on several occasions he 
himself—surely not the Modern—toys humorously with a cliche", as 
in "ought to be understood cum grano Salis" (p. 89) and "[Nature] 
put her best Furniture forward" (p. 173). And that Swift's cliche's are 
not simply an ironic device is shown by their frequency in his 
correspondence, especially the Journal to Stella. 
The following paragraph demonstrates the Tale's characteristic 
word-heaviness and its effect on the reader: 
Tho' I have been hitherto as cautious as I could, upon all Occasions, 
most nicely to follow the Rules and Methods of Writing, laid down by 
the Example of our illustrious Moderns; yet has the unhappy shortness 
of my Memory led me into an Error, from which I must immediately 
extricate my self, before I can decently pursue my Principal Subject. I 
confess with Shame, it was an unpardonable Omission to proceed so far 
as I have already done, before I had performed the due Discourses, 
Expostulatory, Supplicatory, or Deprecatory with my good Lords the 
Criticks. Towards some Atonement for this grevious Neglect, I do here 
make humbly bold to present them with a short Account of themselves 
and their Art, by looking into the Original and Pedigree of the Word, as 
it is generally understood among us, and very briefly considering the 
antient and present State thereof. (P. 92) 
Notice the words "Occasions," "cautious," "illustrious," "extri­
cate," "Omission," "Discourses," "Expostulatory," "Supplicatory," 
"Deprecatory," and "Original." Swift is having fun here with 
Latinisms, most obviously in his string of "-tory" adjectives, which 
concludes, tellingly, with a word used in this sense for the first time 
in English.20 The sheer multiplication of words (especially 
adjectives and adverbs), plus the melodramatic parody of authorial 
apologia ("I confess with Shame") and ironic meticulousness 
("Tho' I have been hitherto as cautious as I could")—all this gives 
the passage its superformal tone. Of course, Swift's real attitude 
everywhere shows through the bowing and scraping. "Our 
illustrious Moderns" and "my good Lords the Criticks" drip with 
sarcasm. And the contradictions inherent in the whole paragraph 
are caught in the Modern's unintentional (Swift's intentional) 
oxymoron: "I do here make humbly bold." 
In the Tale Swift chooses to use his colloquial style sparingly, 
mostly for jarring loose some particularly offensive pedantry with 
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a well-placed word or phrase. But on a couple of occasions he quits 
his Latinisms altogether. 
A Mountebank in Leicester-Fields, had drawn a huge Assembly about 
him. Among the rest, a fat unweildy Fellow, half stifled in the Press, 
would be every fit crying out, Lord! what a filthy Crowd is here; Pray, 
good People, give way a little, Bless me! what a Devil has rak'd this 
Rabble together: Z—ds, what squeezing is this! Honest Friend, remove 
your Elbow. At last, a Weaver that stood next him could hold no longer: 
A Plague confound you (said he) for an over-grown Sloven; and who (in 
the Devil's Name) I wonder, helps to make up the Crowd half so much as 
your self? Don't you consider (with a Pox) that you take up more room 
with that Carkass than any five here? Is not the Place as free for us as for 
you? Bring your own Guts to a reasonable Compass (and be d-n'd) and 
then I'll engage we shall have room enough for us all. (P. 46) 
The distance between this passage and the passage on critics is as 
great as the distance between Browne and Bunyan. The sense of real 
speech is caught here in expletives like "Z—ds," "Bless me," and 
"with a Pox." And there are colloquialisms such as "filthy," 
"rak'd," "Rabble," "Sloven," and "Guts." The difference between 
the two passages can be measured: whereas polysyllables comprise 
37 percent of the words in the passage on critics, here they comprise 
only 24 percent; and whereas in the first some 16 percent of the 
words are of three or more syllables, here a mere 4 percent are. The 
real difference, however, is in the quality of the diction. Both para­
graphs set up a verbal relationship between people, but whereas the 
Modern treats the critics with a polysyllabic sycophancy (Swift's true 
feelings held under tenuous lexical control), the lowly weaver curses 
the blathering fat man (saying precisely what someone in that 
situation would feel like saying). The difference is crucial, for all of 
Swift's satire depends upon our being able to sense when his 
language is being used to mask ignorance and when it is being used 
as a means to understanding. One guideline we have is that poly­
syllabic, Latinate diction ordinarily represents Swift's satire of his 
speaker, whereas colloquial diction suggests that Swift is sincere. 
Swift's definition of good style—"Proper Words in proper 
Places"21—suggests the importance he put on context in the use of 
words. Yet his own satirical style could be more aptly described as 
proper words in improper places, or better, as improper words in 
proper places. A good example of Swift's sensitivity to context is to 
be found in one of his best-known sentences: "For, if we take an 
Examination of what is generally understood by Happiness, as it 
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has Respect, either to the Understanding of the Senses, we shall find 
all its Properties and Adjuncts will herd under this short Definition: 
That, it is a perpetual Possession of being well Deceived" (p. 171). 
The terms "Examination," "Properties," "Adjuncts," "Definition," 
and "Possession" were all picked from the same lexical barrel—one 
labeled Polysyllabic Hard Words. "Herd," on the other hand, was 
picked from another barrel—one labeled Monosyllabic Low 
Words. Although Swift reaches into another lexical field for just 
one word, the colloquial tone and animal connotations of that word 
are enough to shake the credibility of the Modern's pseudointellec-
tualism.22 How different the effect if we substitute a synonym like 
"assemble"! Of course, "herd" does not work alone: its tone echoes 
words like "Tickling" and phrases like "Dupe and play the Wag 
with," which appear immediately above; and in the definition that 
follows, we are expected to catch the pun on "Possession." But the 
full force of this particular sentence depends on our responsiveness 
to Swift's quite intentional use of an improper word in a proper 
place. It is as if Swift means to show that the pedantic Modern is a 
farm boy underneath, a new London dandy (like the three brothers) 
with the smell of cow dung still clinging to his shoes. 
That Swift was aware of lexical field is shown not only by his 
remarks on language in A Letter to a Young Gentleman and A 
Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English 
Tongue23 but also by some things he says in A Tale of a Tub itself. 
At one point he objects to "the Cant, or Jargon of the Trade" (p. 
28),24 and elsewhere he uses formulas such as "which are vulgarly 
called" (p. 79), "to speak in Form" (p. 155), and "as the common 
Phrase is" (p. 192).25 In the preface he complains about the tender­
ness of modern wit, which "has its Walks and Purlieus, out of which 
it may not stray the breadth of a Hair" (p. 43). And in the 
"Apology," his etymology of the word "Banter" demonstrates his 
serious attentiveness to level of usage: "This Polite Word of theirs 
was first borrowed from the Bullies in White-Fryars, then fell among 
the Footmen, and at last retired to the Pedants, by whom it is 
applied as properly to the Productions of Wit, as if I should apply it 
to Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematicks" (p. 19). "Banter" is of 
unknown etymology, and in 1690 Locke uses it as an example of the 
formation of a new word: "He that first brought the word sham, 
wheedle, or banter in use, put together as he thought fit those ideas 
he made it stand for."26 Swift's etymology, though humorous, may 
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well be correct in suggesting that the word originated as a slang 
term, only gradually working its way up from vulgar to polite 
society. Every word has its proper lexical field, and although 
"banter" is appropriate in the company of other slang—low words 
like "sham" or "wheedle," for instance—it is inappropriate amidst 
more polite, learned, or literary words. Yet while Swift the 
philologist objects to the incongruous use of colloquialisms, Swift 
the satirist saw here an opportunity for powerful ironic effect. 
In each of the following passages one or more colloquial words or 
phrases serve momentarily to rip away the Modern's learned rhetoric 
and let us hear Swift. I have eliminated the original italics and have 
italicized these colloquial words and phrases. 
Nor have my Endeavours been wanting to second so useful an Example: 
But it seems, there is an unhappy Expence usually annexed to the 
Calling of a God-Father, which was clearly out of my Head, as it is very 
reasonable to believe. Where the Pinch lay, I cannot certainly affirm. (P. 
72) 
But Heroick Virtue it self hath not been exempt from the Obloquy of 
Evil Tongues. For it hath been objected, that those Antient Heroes, 
famous for their Combating so many Giants, and Dragons, and Robbers, 
were in their own Persons a greater Nuisance to Mankind, than any of 
those Monsters they subdued. (P. 94) 
Martin had still proceeded as gravely as he began; and doubtless, would 
have delivered an admirable Lecture of Morality, which might have 
exceedingly contributed to my Reader's Repose, both of Body and Mind: 
(the true ultimate End of Ethicks;) But Jack was already gone a Flight-
shot beyond his Patience. (Pp. 139-40) 
For, I have observed, that from a laborious Collection of Seven Hundred 
Thirty Eight Flowers, and shining Hints of the best Modern Authors, 
digested with great Reading, into my Book of Common-places; I have 
not been able after five Years to draw, hook, or force into common 
Conversation, any more than a Dozen. (Pp. 209-10) 
The colloquialisms are in each case out of key with the accompany­
ing words and phrases. The result is a sort of stylistic cacophony 
that exposes the Modern's pretentious intellectualization. Swift is 
never willing to surrender authorship totally to his persona, and 
these heavy, at least partially imagistic, socially low words yank us 
suddenly back to his point of view. When we come upon one of 
Swift's colloquialisms, we are forced to reevaluate what we have jusP 
read, put it into a more sensible perspective, and perceive that 
though words can be used to talk about reality, they are no substitute 
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for it. Swift's sympathies are not with the Modern's rationalizations 
but with everyday things such as pinches, robbers, arrows, and 
hooks. 
The stylistic satire in the Tale is directed less at particular authors 
or works than it is at certain types of diction and the wrongheaded­
ness they imply. Critics have in this sense been misled by Swift's 
own reference in the "Apology" to places "where the Author 
personates the Style and Manner of other Writers, whom he has a 
mind to expose" (p. 7). We must keep in mind that Swift is pointing 
here only to some few passages (he makes this clear), and that he is 
answering Wotton and Bentley, not offering a reader's guide to A 
Tale of a Tub. True enough, Cervantes, Browne, Marvell, Dryden, 
Rabelais, Lucretius, Shakespeare, Descartes, Milton, Wotton, 
Bentley, and the Authorized Version are all echoed in the Tale; but 
Swift's method is inclusive, he was writing (as he put it) when his 
reading was fresh in his head, and, surely, to track down his 
allusions and parodies would be the work of seven years, and then 
some. His satire is typically directed at groups rather than 
individuals: looking back from his letter to Pope of 29 September 
1725 concerning Gulliver's Travels, I think it is wiser to say that 
even thirty years earlier Swift's ire was raised not by Counselor Such-
a-One or Physician Such-a-One, but by the whole tribe of lawyers or 
physicians.27 
Swift objects to the exclusiveness of the jargon of law, religion, 
medicine, criticism, science, philosophy, and the occult. Cleverly, he 
compels us to face this problem by flooding the Tale with 
specialized terms peculiar to each of these professions: from lawyers 
we get "Fee-Simple" (p. 47), "Codicil annexed" (p. 87), and "Heirs 
general" (p. 90); from preachers and theologians "Antitype" (p. 40), 
"Vessel" (pp. 58, 153), and "Circumfusion" (p. 79); from physicians 
"Fistula" (p. 166), "Diureticks" (p. 185), and "Pilgrim's Salve" (p. 
196); from scientists "annihilate" (p. 35), "Mechanick" (p. 101), and 
"Hermetically" (p. 126); from philosophers "Signification" (p. 57), 
"Forma informant' (p. 151), and "Vortex" (p. 167); from critics 
"Emblem" (p. 61), "Hieroglyph" (p. 98), and "Observanda's" (p. 
148); and from the Dark Authors "Vere adepti" (p. 114), "Arcanum" 
(pp. 114, 127), and "Opus magnum" (pp. 127, 187). 
Although these different types of jargon are sprinkled throughout 
the Tale, Swift at certain points concentrates on parodying the style 
of a single profession. And it is in such passages that his sensitivity 
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to language stands out; in them he establishes a credible jargon for a 
profession while simultaneously undercutting that jargon with a 
few earthy colloquialisms of his own. And by satirizing the cant of a 
profession, Swift satirizes the profession itself—its methods, practi­
tioners, and basic assumptions. Particularly apt are his parodies of 
the language of lawyers and the law, of theological discourse, and of 
contemporary medical treatises. 
When Gulliver is asked by his Houyhnhnm master to explain 
something of English law, the question opens Swift's spleen. 
Interestingly, he levels much of his criticism at the language of 
lawyers, who practice "the Art of proving by Words multiplied for 
the Purpose, that White is Black, and Black is White, according as 
they are paid":28 "It is likewise to be observed, that this Society hath 
a peculiar Cant and Jargon of their own, thdt no other Mortal can 
understand, and wherein all their Laws are written, which they take 
special Care to multiply; whereby they have wholly confounded the 
very Essence of Truth and Falsehood, of Right and Wrong; so that it 
will take Thirty Years to decide whether the Field, left me by my 
Ancestors for six Generations, belong to me, or to a Stranger three 
Hundred Miles off."29 It is the prolixity and ambiguity of legal style 
that rankle Swift most, and this is precisely what he had opposed 
years before in A Tale of a Tub. Even then he had seen the connec­
tion between lexical irresponsibility and moral irresponsibility. 
Of course, the special accomplishment of the Tale is Swift's neat 
way of sliding into a demonstration of the kind of thing he objects 
to. 
For, as to the Bar, tho' it be compounded of the same Matter, and 
designed for the same Use, it cannot however be well allowed the Honor 
of a fourth, by reason of its level or inferior Situation, exposing it to 
perpetual Interruption from Collaterals. Neither can the Bench it self, 
tho raised to a proper Eminency, put in a better Claim, whatever its 
Advocates insist on. For if they please to look into the original Design of 
its Erection, and the Circumstances or Adjuncts subservient to that 
Design, they will soon acknowledge the present Practice exactly corre­
spondent to the Primitive Institution, and both .to answer the Etymology 
of the Name, which in the Phoenician Tongue is a Word of great Signif­
ication, importing, if literally interpreted, The Place of Sleep; but in 
common Acceptation, A Seat well bolster'd and cushion'd, for the 
Repose of old and gouty Limbs: Senes ut in otia tuta recedant. Fortune 
being indebted to them this Part of Retaliation, that, as formerly, they 
have long Talkt, whilst others Slept, so now they may Sleep as long 
whilst others Talk. (Pp. 56-57) 
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The Modern is speaking here of the court, and so Swift throws in a 
number of legal terms: "Collaterals," "Claim," "Advocates," and so 
forth. But his parody goes beyond this, and he manages to give the 
passage much of the formality, redundancy, and circumlocution 
common to legal documents in his (or our) period. 
Swift's objection in Gulliver's Travels to the jargon "wherein all 
their Laws are written" suggests that we look there for the target of 
his parody.30 Compare, for example, the style of the above excerpt 
from the Tale with this from The Statutes of the Realm for the year 
1677, the sort of legal document Swift would have had easy access to 
while at Moor Park. 
That all and every Judgment Order and Decree to be made as aforesaid 
shall be good and effectuall both in Law and Equity to all intents and 
purposes and shall be obeyed by all persons concerned therein and shall 
binde and conclude all persons Bodyes Corporate or Politicke notwith­
standing any disability matter or thing to the contrary. And all such 
Builders and persons interessed shall hold and enjoy their Estates Termes 
and Interests soe decreed according to the tenour of such Order and 
Decree notwithstanding any other Estate Right Title or Interest in Law 
or Equity Trust Charge or other Incumbrance whatsoever, and that noe 
Writt or Error or Certiorari shall be admitted or allowed for the reversall 
or removeall of the same.31 
Note the run-on syntax, redundant doublets, and pervasive abstrac­
tion. Swift catches all of this. The sponginess of "Law and Equity to 
all intents and purposes and shall be obeyed by all persons con­
cerned therein" is aptly parodied in "Circumstances and Adjuncts 
subservient to that Design, they will soon acknowledge the present 
Practice exactly correspondent." 
Much of the ironic formality of the Tale derives from the 
Modern's meticulous legalese. Swift is familiar with the terms 
"Right of Presentation" (p. 47), "Scandalum Magnatum" (p. 53), 
"Wills . . . Nuncupatory" (p. 85), "Innuendo" (pp. 114, 169, 186), 
and "separate Maintenance" (p. 121)—all of which he could have 
picked up while a student of divinity.32 But these rather specialized 
terms are padded out with quasi-legal words and phrases like 
"Claimant" (p. 21), "form aforesaid" (p. 47), "positive Precept" (pp. 
85, 87), "sufficient Warrant" (p. 113), "pursuant to which" (p. 121), 
and numerous "whereofs," "thereins," and "whereases." Of course, 
we are meant always to look past the Modern's wordy, circumlocu­
tious style; in the bench passage, for example, the sheer weight of his 
words (to use a Swiftian metaphor) drags him down into nonsense. 
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Swift's point of view is likewise implied in the word "gouty," from 
another lexical field, and in the colloquial, monosyllabic analogy at 
the close of the paragraph. It is interesting that in this instance Swift 
and the Modern are both criticizing the law; but in addition Swift 
cleverly turns the Modern's style into a bad example of the style of 
documents of that profession. Yet somehow we are not bothered by 
the inconsistency. The effect is what Swift is after: the Modern says 
that lawyers and judges use courtrooms to catch up on their sleep— 
and his language shows why they do. Although the satire of A Tale 
of a Tub is not everywhere directed at the law, its pervasively formal, 
quasi-legal style is one of Swift's important satiric techniques. 
In A Letter to a Young Gentleman Swift objects to the compa­
rably dense style of some preachers. "I am apt to put my self in the 
Place of the Vulgar," he says, typically, "and think many Words 
difficult or obscure, which the Preacher will not allow to be so, 
because those words are obvious to Schollars."33 Swift's populist 
bias is apparent here: he is against polysyllables because they sail 
over the heads of vulgar (Swift uses the word in its unprejudicial 
sense) congregations. Although he lists many words he finds too 
"philosophical" or "metaphysical," a couple of them—"Ubiquity" 
(p. 154) and "Phoenomenon" (pp. 60, 165, 167)—he himself uses in 
the Tale. Indeed, much of the Tale is a prime example of the sort of 
aloof, pseudointellectual style the Letter demolishes point by point. 
In a manner analogous to the passage on the bench, Swift in what 
follows is speaking of religious practices, and so echoes the 
language of religious discourse: 
It is from this Custom of the Priests, that some Authors maintain these 
Aeolists, to have been very antient in the World. Because, the Delivery of 
their Mysteries, which I have just now mention'd, appears exactly the 
same with that of other antient Oracles, whose Inspirations were owing 
to certain subterraneous Effluviums of Wind, delivered with the same 
Pain to the Priest, and much about the same Influence on the People. It 
is true indeed, that these were frequently managed and directed by 
Female Officers, whose Organs were understood to be better disposed for 
the Admission of those Oracular Gusts, as entring and passing up thro' a 
Receptacle of greater Capacity, and causing also a Pruriency by the 
Way, such as with due Management, hath been refined from a Carnal, 
into a Spiritual Extasie. And to strengthen this profound Conjecture, it is 
farther insisted, that this Custom of Female Priests is kept up still in 
certain refined Colleges of our Modern Aeolists, who are agreed to receive 
their Inspiration, derived thro' the Receptacle aforesaid, like their 
Ancestors, the Sibyls, (Pp. 156-57) 
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Note the terms "Aeolists" (twice), "Inspiration" (twice), "subter­
raneous," "Effluviums," "Admission," "Oracular," "Receptacle" 
(twice), "Capacity," "Pruriency," "Carnal," "Spiritual," "Extasie," 
and "Conjecture."34 These Latinisms, along with academic 
formulas like "some Authors maintain," "which I have just now 
mention'd," and "it is farther insisted," give the paragraph its 
learned air. But within this group of words the religious terms are 
undermined by other terms that have scientific, even bodily connota­
tions: "subterraneous," meaning in this context not beneath the 
surface of the earth but within a man's bowels (found in Browne); 
"Effluviums," meaning "flatulation" (found in Browne and Boyle); 
"Admission," meaning the fact of being admitted into a human 
body (as opposed to a society or position); "Receptacle," used here as 
a euphemism for "rump," but hinting at "vagina" (cf. "receive" and 
its various religious connotations); and "Pruriency," meaning the 
quality of itching, but also lascivious desire (seems not to have been 
used in this latter sense before Swift). Finally, in this learned context 
the word "Gusts" functions as an earthy synonym for "Effluviums" 
(the irony heightened by the epithet "Oracular")35 and is a good 
example of Swift's subtle qualification of the Modern's rhetoric 
through a momentary shift in lexical field. As a matter of fact, in 
these few pages Swift toys unrelentingly with lexical field, locating 
synonyms for the word "Wind" in classical mythology ("Aeolus"), 
in religious enthusiasm ("Inspiration," "Spirit," and "Breath"), in 
scientific abstraction ("Effluvium"), in poetic diction ("Tempest"), 
and in low colloquialism ("Gusts" and "Belches"). By assembling 
so many hard words, Swift allows the Modern to masquerade as a 
seventeenth-century thinker; but by intermixing religious and 
decidedly nonreligious hard words, and by sliding irreverently from 
lexical field to lexical field, Swift manages to turn the mystery of 
belief into the smell of a fart and the excitement of an orgasm. The 
words "Inspiration" and "Extasie" carry all three connotations. So 
does Swift's Latinate coinage "Aeolist." 
Although Wotton accuses the author of the Tale of a blasphemous 
"Game at Leap-Frog between Flesh and Spirit,"36 Swift has only 
exaggerated a tendency quite apparent in the religious style of his 
day. In fact, examples can be found on every page of Bentley's eight 
sermons delivered as part of the Boyle lectures at Cambridge in 1692. 
Now, mutual gravitation or attraction, in our present acception of the 
words, is the same thing with this; 'tis an operation, or virtue, or 
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influence of distant bodies upon each other through an empty interval, 
without any effluvia, or exhalations, or other corporeal medium to 
convey and transmit it. This power, therefore, cannot be innate and 
essential to matter: and if it be not essential, it is consequently most 
manifest, since it doth not depend upon motion or rest, or figure or 
position of parts, which are all the ways that matter can diversify itself, 
that it could never supervene to it, unless impressed and infused into it by 
an immaterial and divine power.37 
Answering the arguments of atheists, Bentley uses the principle of 
gravitation as a proof for the existence of God. In fact, both the 
Modern ("Mysteries") and Bentley ("divine power") are groping to 
explain an immaterial, apparently unexplainable force, and in so 
doing turn to the material, explainable operations and Latinate 
diction of contemporary science. Of course, whereas Bentley at least 
intends his physical analogy to document the power of God, the 
Modern (like the Aeolists) himself descends into the physical. Yet in 
a sense we may say that both passages debase the spiritual by 
mingling it with the material. The difference is only one of degree: 
even in Bentley one can find such terms as "attraction," "bodies," 
"corporeal," "motion," and "position"; Swift merely permits the 
potential physicality of such words from the religious writing of his 
time to flower into damning double entendres.38 His synonym for 
"Effluviums" is not "exhalations," as in Bentley, but "Gusts." Swift 
is mocking here not only the style of the dissenting preachers, but 
also the absurd conflation of religious argument with the physics of 
Boyle.39 And he satirizes the contradiction of disciplines through the 
juxtaposition of religious and scientific vocabularies. 
As a final example of Swift's device of shifting lexical fields, let us 
turn to what is unquestionably the most famous passage in A Tale 
of a Tub. I have eliminated Swift's original italics and instead have 
italicized those words that stand out because of their decidedly 
colloquial connotations. 
Whereof I have been farther convinced from some late Experiments. Last 
Week I saw a Woman flay'd, and you will hardly believe, how much it 
altered her Person for the worse. Yesterday I ordered the Carcass of a Beau 
to be stript in my Presence; when we were all amazed to find so many 
unsuspected Faults under one Suit of Cloaths: Then I laid open his 
Brain, his Heart, and his Spleen; But, I plainly perceived at every 
Operation, that the farther we proceeded, we found the Defects encrease 
upon us in Number and Bulk: from all which, I justly formed this 
Conclusion to my self; That whatever Philosopher or Projector can find 
out an Art to sodder and patch up the Flaws and Imperfections of Nature, 
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will deserve much better of Mankind, and teach us a more useful Science, 
than that so much in present Esteem, of widening and exposing them 
(like him who held Anatomy to be the ultimate End of Physick.) And he, 
whose Fortunes and Dispositions have placed him in a convenient 
Station to enjoy the Fruits of this noble Art; He that can with Epicurus 
content his Ideas with the Films and Images that fly off upon his Senses 
from the Superficies of Things; Such a Man truly wise, creams off 
Nature, leaving the Sower and the Dregs, for Philosophy and Reason to 
lap up. This is the sublime and refined Point of Felicity, called, the 
Possession of being well deceived; The Serene Peaceful State of being a 
Fool among Knaves. (Pp. 173-74) 
Swift imitates here the manner of late seventeenth century 
writings on anatomy. Th e following excerpt from Thomas Willis's 
Of the Soul of Brutes bears an especially close resemblance to the 
passage from the Tale. 
Anatomical observations plainly prove the contrary. Some time since, 
dissecting the dead Carcase of a Maid, dying of a sudden Leipothymy or 
swooning away, we found in the fleshy part of the Diaphragma a great 
Imposthume, with a bag full of filthy matter, and watery little bladders; 
yet she was not troubled ever with a Delirium or Phrensie. Some time 
since also when we had made an Anatomical Inspection of a Gentleman 
of the University, (of whome we have made mention in a late Tract) who 
dyed of a long spurious Pleurisie, it manifestly appeared, that a great 
Imposthume being ripened in the Pleura, and the intercostal Muscles, 
and broke inwardly, that a vast plenty of matter had flowed forth into the 
cavity of the Thorax, which gnawing the Diaphragma lying under, had 
made a great hole in it; nor was this man however in all his sickness 
Delirious, or Frantick. Wherefore, I think this Distemper scarce ever to be 
produced from such a cause: but that opinion seems to arise from hence, 
because often-times in a true Phrensie, together with a continual raving, 
the motion of the Diaphragma is wont to be hindred or perverted.40 
We must realize that Willis is writing not for laymen but for other 
physicians, and that what may seem shockingly insensitive to us 
would have seemed simply matter-of-fact to those interested in 
anatomy. We would be as shocked today by the tone of an article in a 
medical journal.41 But Swift too was responding as a layman, and he 
recognizes the awful incongruity of talking about the dissection of a 
human being in such cool Latinisms as "Leipothymy," "Diaphrag-
ma," and "Imposthume." Does not "Leipothymy," after all, which 
Willis defines as "swooning away," mean in this case a sudden, 
unexplained death? And does not "Anatomical Inspection of a 
Gentleman" mean cutting up the corpse of a man and analyzing the 
pieces? Willis's diction tends to keep his cadavers at a distance, as 
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does his academic allusion to "a late Tract" and his argumentative 
method, which manages to transform a medical confusion into a 
rhetorical assertion. 
In recounting his experiences with human dissection, the 
Modern, like Willis, tries to keep real phenomena under control of 
mind. He uses big words and a sterile tone in order to desensitize our 
consciences along with his own. And in the first part of the 
paragraph he does pretty well, piling up abstractions like "Propor­
tion," "Wisdom," "Qualities," "Degree," and "Corporeal Beings." 
But as soon as the Modern turns to his real examples, these ration­
alizations give way to diseased cadavers. The generalized time frame 
becomes "Last Week" and "Yesterday." "Fallen under my Cogni­
zance" is replaced by "I saw," "I ordered," and "I plainly 
perceived." And "most Corporeal Beings" turns into "a Woman 
flay'd" and "a Carcass of a Beau." Swift documents this switch from 
the abstract to the particular in part by sliding into a more personal 
tone (the greater frequency of the pronoun "I"), and also by moving 
his emphasis from the safe, fixed noun to the not-so-safe, active verb 
and its intensifying preposition ("fly off," "creams off," and "lap 
up").42 But the chief sign of Swift's attitude toward the Modern's 
intellectualizations is to be found in his momentary shifts from 
polysyllabic Latinisms to monosyllabic colloquialisms. Such shifts 
set up ironies: the colloquialisms describe less dignified things ("the 
Sower and the Dregs") and less prestigious activities ("to sodder and 
patch up"), and clash mightily with the prevailing tone of the other 
words. The word "Carcass," used both by Willis and Swift, points 
up the difference between the two passages: Willis uses it in its 
neutral sense to mean simply the dead body of a man or beast; Swift 
uses it in this sense also, but with more than a side glance at its 
con temp tuousness when applied to the human body.43 He wants us 
to catch the animalism in his use of the word "Carcass," and so he 
echoes it in the verbs "flay'd" and "lap up." In this passage Swift's 
low words undermine the Modern's attempts to gloss over 
unpleasant reality and divert a moral response to that reality. When 
in the last lines the Modern unwittingly acknowledges that he is a 
fool possessed, we have been prepared to agree with him. 
But let us not overlook Willis's several shifts in lexical field. 
Amidst all the polysyllabic Latinisms, "ripened" and "gnawing" 
seem oddly out of place. So too the plain, literal phrases "bag full of 
filthy matter," "watery little bladders," and "had made a great hole 
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in it." Yet we should remember that Willis was writing prior to a 
time when the language of science had clearly and irrevocably split 
off from the language of everyday discourse, and his few Anglo-
Saxonisms would not have struck other scientists as inconsistent. 
Swift, on the other hand, would have perceived in the incongruity of 
Willis's diction a horrifying insensitivity to human life. Indeed, I 
would guess that he would have seen how the casual literalisms only 
make the cold Latinisms more horrifying. Thus what Swift does is 
to assume the disparities he found in seventheenth-century English 
into his own style and then to heighten these disparities so as to 
draw attention to them. Swift's more frequent and more radical 
shifts of lexical field—and, typically, their self-consciousness—force 
upon us an awareness of the incompatible vocabulary as well as the 
incompatible views of what it is to be human. For Swift the 
incongruity of diction in the English of his day was a moral as well 
as a lexical problem. Conveniently, of course, that inherited lexical 
diversity provided him with one of his most powerful satiric 
weapons in the war against the immoralities he saw everywhere. 
"The vulgar dialect," Lord Orrery tells us, "was not only a fund 
of humor for Swift, but I verily believe was acceptable to his 
nature."44 In A Letter to a Young Gentleman Swift explicitly 
opposes the exclusiveness of professional jargon to the direct 
communicableness of everyday speech: "I know not how it comes to 
pass, that Professors in most Arts and Sciences are generally the 
worst qualified to explain their Meanings to those who are not of 
their Tribe: A common Farmer shall make you understand in three 
Words, that his Foot is out of Joint, or his Collar-bone broken; 
wherein a Surgeon, after a hundred Terms of Art, if you are not a 
Scholar, shall leave you to seek. It is frequently the same Case in 
Law, Physick, and even many of the meaner Arts."45 It is clear where 
Swift stands. He thinks of the speech of the common people as a 
kind of norm, a kind of practical touchstone against which one can 
measure the language of scholars. Language is not a matter of big 
words or rhetorical polish, but success of communication; and 
communication is more likely in the mouth of a farmer than in the 
mouth of a lawyer, a preacher, or a physician. Swift, who once 
admitted trying out his poems on his servants,46 acknowledges not 
only the clarity and directness of the speech of the common people, 
but also their assumptions about life. 
Swift's words are values. The Latinate polysyllables that almost 
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run away with A Tale of a Tub imply a desire to subsume particu­
lars under abstractions, an absolute faith in reason, and a moral 
insensitivity to human activities. Swift will have none of this. His 
proportionally sparse colloquialisms are enough to offer us an 
alternate perception of things, and they imply the significance of 
particulars, the danger of overrationalization, and the moral 
importance of every human activity. Swift's readers have been 
confused by the scarcity of positive values in his satire; but if 
nowhere else, those values are to be looked for in his use of 
colloquial English, which for him contains certain assumptions 
about what is good or worthwhile. The cultured few must never 
elevate themselves too far above the uncultured many, for in them, 
as in their language, is an earthy common sense. 
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41. Cf. this recent account of an autopsy: "After that operation the patient's renal 
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examination we found huge lymph nodes throughout the mediastinum. Micro­
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with." 
43. The OED shows that although the contemptuous implications of the word 
date back to the sixteenth century, it continued to be used in its neutral sense until 
about 1750. Cf. "Carcass" (pp. 46, 80,123, 186). Cf. "dead carcase" in the passage from 
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44. John Boyle, Earl of Orrery, Remarks on the Life and Writings of Jonathan 
Swift (1752; facsimile ed., New York, 1974), p. 34. 
45. A Letter, p. 66. Cf. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3. 11. 
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46. Cited in Harold Williams, ed., The Poems of Jonathan Swift (London, 1937), 
l:xxxiv. 

chapter four 
Syntax and Rhythm 
First expostulate the Case, then plead the Necessity of the Rod, from 
great Provocations, and conclude every Period with a Lash. 
"With his extraordinary sensitivity to the effect of the tone of voice 
in writing," says Kathleen Williams of Swift, "style is frequently the 
embodiment of a particular way of thinking which is being set 
before us for our contemplation."1 Thinking is in part caught in the 
syntax of Swift's sentences. It could be argued, of course, that to 
follow any writer's syntax is to follow his thoughts; but in Swift, 
where the actual thinking process is on many occasions more 
important than the thought itself, we must pay particularly close 
attention to the order of the words.2 "Much of the Augustan dance of 
syntax," says one critic, "is based on the stately counter-change of 
antithesis";3 yet although in A Tale of a Tub it is often possible to 
make out a bold antithesis, such symmetry is simultaneously 
obscured by cumulative organization, unfinished antitheses, and 
unrelenting qualification. Many of the sentences in the text are little 
dramas between right and wrong ways of thinking. 
To me it is often more appropriate, however, to speak not of 
syntax (the static structure of a completed thought) but of rhythm 
(the movement of a thought through the mind). Writers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were well aware of prose 
rhythm,4 and Swift seems especially attentive to the subtle effects of 
sound. In the Tale he frequently manipulates syntax, along with 
stress pattern, alliteration, and even meaning, in order to set up a 
quasi-oratorical cadence, which he then breaks in order to suggest a 
more down-to-earth position. This struggle between one syntax or 
rhythm and another is an important aspect of Swift's irony. 
Sometimes in the Tale the formality or informality implied in the 
syntax or rhythm clashes with the subject, diction, or tone; some­
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times there is a sudden drop from a periodic, Ciceronian syntax to a 
loose, Senecan syntax; sometimes a certain prose rhythm is played 
off against a certain syntax, the rhythm suggesting one attitude 
toward the subject, the syntax another; and sometimes there is a shift 
from a formal, rounded rhythm to a shattered, more heavily stressed 
rhythm. Incongruity is at the root of all these devices. The Tale is 
poised precariously between what we might see as the Modern's 
rhetoric, which attempts all the techniques of balance, antithesis, 
and logic, and Swift's own loose, asymmetrical style of actual 
speech. And as with his juxtaposition of lexical field, Swift's juxta­
position of one syntax or rhythm and another implies a clash of two 
approaches to the world: the aloof and artificial, and the immediate 
and conversational. 
As Morris Croll pointed out fifty years ago, the typical Ciceronian 
sentence represents the triumph of grammar and logic, whereas the 
typical Senecan sentence depicts the rhetoric of the mind: one style 
depicts a finished thought, the other a mind thinking.5 To some­
what overstate it, the difference is between the balanced, periodic, 
symmetrical prose of Bacon, Milton, and to some extent Temple, 
and the looser, more cumulative, asymmetrical prose of Burton, 
Browne, and Marvell. "They knew," says Croll of the Senecans, 
"that an idea separated from the act of experiencing it is not the idea 
that was experienced. The ardor of its conception in the mind is a 
necessary part of its truth; and unless it can be conveyed to another 
mind in something of the form of its occurrence, either it has 
changed into some other idea or it has ceased to be an idea, to have 
any existence whatever except a verbal one."6 Swift would agree 
wholeheartedly. Yet although he would seem to object more to the 
extremes of Ciceronianism than the extremes of Senecanism, he 
knew both styles well, and in A Tale of a Tub he exploits both in his 
subtle intermingling of symmetrical and asymmetrical syntax. The 
Modern's unsustained Ciceronian syntax represents his attempt at 
arranging his material in neat packages of ancient and modern, 
right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable; but Swift makes his 
persona slip continually from balance and periodicity into a loose, 
absurdly cumulative rhythm that we ought to understand as his way 
of registering doubt concerning the Modern's proud categorizations. 
A sentence or paragraph in the Tale often begins with a logical 
comparison or contrast but soon gets tangled in its own examples, 
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parentheses, and qualifications and either dwindles away into an 
absurdity or attempts toward the end to reestablish some order or 
point, which is in most cases perversely ironic: "The Conclusion of 
a Treatise, resembles the Conclusion of Human Life, which hath 
sometimes been compared to the End of a Feast; where few are 
satisfied to depart, ut plenus vitae conviva: For Men will sit down 
after the fullest Meal, tho' it be only to doze, or to sleep out the rest of 
the Day" (p. 208). This sentence attempts to say something about the 
conclusion of a literary work, gets sidetracked by a trite analogy to a 
human lifetime, and is then led from there into another analogy to 
large dinners and their soporific effects. The incongruous Latin 
phrase merely underscores the Modern's pretentious attempts at 
meaning. And the end of the sentence is shaped into a homey 
aphorism that seems anticlimactic at best, and in this context 
ridiculously pat. The form of the Modern's aphorism suggests an 
authoritativeness that does not fit the ordinariness of his subject; 
this discrepancy is stressed by the shift in the final clauses to 
monosyllables, by the similar rhythm of the last two phrases, and by 
the sequence of vowels in "tho'," "only," and "doze," which rhymes 
with "Repose" in the next sentence. Here and elsewhere we could 
criticize the Modern for the same reason Swift criticizes Tindall: "He 
affecteth to form a few Words into the Shape and Size of a Maxim, 
then trieth it by his Ear, and according as he likes the Sound or 
Cadence, pronounceth it true."7 Thus what begins as the Modern's 
self-assured, seemingly definitive statement on literary conclusions 
has by the end of the sentence been reduced to a lamely definitive 
statement on the behavior of men after big meals. Swift implies that 
some literary works may put their readers to sleep and, in fact, that 
such works may be deadly. Although there are far more complex 
examples of this type of syntax, the regression in this short sentence 
—from the sublime to the trivial—is a sort of microcosm of the 
whole book.8 
The syntax of the Tale may be profitably set against the typical 
symmetries of seventeenth-century Ciceronianism. Take as an 
example the following sentence from Milton's A reopagitica, which I 
have laid out spatially so as to make its structure more clear. My 
method is a modified version of Francis Christensen's "generative 
rhetoric," where the main clauses or phrases are lined up along the 
left margin, and where each step to the right indicates an increasing 
degree of specificity.9 "For," writes Milton, 
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as in a body, 
when the blood is fresh, 
the spirits pure and vigorous 
not only to vital 
but to rational faculties 
and those in the acutest and pertest operations 
of wit and subtlety 
it argues 
in what good plight and constitution the body is; 
so [in a nation] 
when the cheerfulness of the people is sprightly up, 
as that it has 
not only wherewith to guard well 
its own freedom and safety, 
but to spare, and to bestow 
upon the solidest and sublimest points 
of controversy and new invention 
it betokens us 
not degenerated nor drooping to a fatal decay, 
but casting off the old and wrinkled skin of corruption 
to outlive these pangs 
and wax young again, 
entering the glorious ways 
of truth and prosperous virtue, 
destined to become great and honorable 
in these latter ages.10 
Like other seventeenth-century prose writers, Milton has a keen 
sense of the weight and length of rhetorical members.11 The sentence 
is periodic. It moves forward steadily and carefully, each of its two 
main divisions perfectly balanced: "as in a body . .  . it argues," "so 
[in a nation] . .  . it betokens us." This parallelism is based on the 
familiar analogy between the human body and the body politic, and 
indeed this is only the largest parallelism in the sentence, which is 
based at every level on balance or opposition. The syntax here is the 
picture of a complete thought, orderly, logical, and building 
climactically to an eloquent appeal to the English people (all its 
urgency captured in that final phrase). The sentence is architectur­
ally perfect, its elements balanced down to the smallest detail, even 
alliteration (e.g., "solidest and sublimest") fixing the items in pairs. 
Milton speaks here from a position of sincere assuredness, and the 
neat parallelisms that dominate the sentence, plus its overall peri* 
odic movement, are the form of that assuredness. 
The following sentence from the Tale shows how Swift has effec­
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tively reproduced much of the symmetry of Milton's Ciceronianism, 
while he is at the same time demonstrating the instability of such 
construction. 
Thus furnisht, and set out 
with Gods, 
as well as Devils, 
was the renowned Sect of Aeolists; 
which makes at this Day 
so illustrious a Figure in the World, 
and whereof, that Polite Nation of Laplanders, 
are beyond all doubt, 
a most Authentic Branch; 
Of whom, I therefore cannot, 
without Injustice, 
here omit to make honourable Mention; 
since they appear to be 
so closely allied 
in Point of Interest, 
as well as Inclinations, 
with their Brother Aeolists among Us, 
as not only to buy their Winds 
by wholesale 
from the same Merchants, 
but also to retail them 
after the same Rate and Method, 
and to Customers much alike. 
(P. 160) 
Swift reveals the ruins of Ciceronian symmetry: the opening 
clause sounds deceptively complete in itself, the leadoff "Thus" 
making it appear to be a summary; there are numerous pairs of 
terms here, although they are not as neatly laid out as in Milton; 
paradoxically, although the sentence would seem to pivot on 
logical-sounding conjunctions such as "and whereof," "since," and 
"as not only," the linkages are in fact quite loose and belie its logic 
and syntax;12 and though most of the sentence is based, like Milton's, 
on a comparison, it is in this case difficult to tell exactly what is 
being compared. At first the Modern seems to want to discuss the 
Aeolists, but he then makes "honourable Mention" of the Lap­
landers, who are said to be "a most Au then tick Branch" of the 
Aeolists; in mid sentence, however, he introduces a comparison 
between the Laplanders and "their Brother Aeolists among us," and 
he ends with a list of their similar practices in the buying and selling 
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of winds. Swift means to make fun of the Aeolists as well as of the 
Modern himself (who is one of them), and this attempted classifica­
tion is irrelevant to his argument. One thing seems clear: whereas 
Milton composes by large blocks of argument, Swift composes by 
clauses and phrases. The effect is to give the sentence from the Tale a 
rough, broken quality, a look of shattered unity. 
Notice how Swift's sentence branches, to use Christensen's term, 
much more to the right than Milton's, each clause or phrase refining 
what was said immediately above. Whereas Milton keeps returning 
to, and indeed never gets too far away from, the main line of his 
argument, Swift permits himself to drift farther and farther to the 
right, and he never returns to his point of departure. Over and over 
Swift seems about to move back toward the left margin; after "so 
illustrious a Figure in the World," after "a most Authentic Branch," 
and again after "make honourable Mention," he would seem to be 
required by the conventions of syntax to touch base with his primary 
subject. But no. Here, as elsewhere, the reader of the Tale is 
frustrated. "A work has form," says Kenneth Burke, "in so far as one 
part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by 
the sequence."13 Certainly much the same may be said of the struc­
ture of a sentence. In the sentence from the Tale, however, the logic, 
comparison, and classification attempted by the Modern will not 
hold, because his assuredness ("beyond all doubt") is only as deep as 
his phraseology. His mind works in an essentially paratactic fashion 
and fails to impose form on thought. 
Christensen makes the point that human thought is by nature 
cumulative and that the paratactic style is thus closest to the literal 
operation of the mind.14 But the weakened force of logic and 
periodicity in the Senecan style makes it less appropriate for certain 
subjects. "The extremely loose sentence," advises Virginia Tufte, 
"has given up enough of its controlled patterning to be troublesome 
when its function is to contain a complex, logical thought."15 Surely 
we could criticize the above sentence from the Tale on this ground. 
How can a complex, logical thought be conveyed adequately by 
means of a cumulative, one-plus-one syntax? I might make two 
observations here about Swift's style: it is less apt for projecting a 
fixed thought than it is for projecting a mind thinking (be it his own 
or his persona's); and, more importantly, it is precisely the failure of 
Swift's syntax to contain complex, logical thoughts that is one of his 
key devices for undermining the Modern's ideas.16 Swift's meaning 
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depends upon our picking up this collapse of logic and order. In a 
sense that collapse is his meaning. 
Yet Swift's sentences can branch even more radically (and 
comically) to the right. In the following example, each subsequent 
clause or phrase is a modification of the item I have italicized in the 
clause or phrase immediately preceding. 
I ought in Method, 
to have informed the Reader 
about fifty Pages ago, 
of a Fancy 
Lord Peter took, and infused 
into his Brothers, 
to wear on their Coats 
whatever Trimmings came up in Fashion; 
never pulling off any, 
as they went out of the Mode, 
but keeping on all together; 
which amounted in time to a Medley, 
the most Antick 
you can possibly conceive; 
and this to a Degree, 
that upon the Time 
of their falling out 
there was hardly a Thread 
of the Original Coat to be seen, 
but an infinite Quantity of Lace, and Ribbands, and 
Fringe, and Embroidery, and Points; 
(I mean, only those tagg'd with Silver, 
for the rest fell off.) 
(P. 135) 
Characteristically, the Modern begins here with one single thought, 
but this leads him to another thought, and another, and another; at 
each syntactic crossroad the new direction to be taken is determined 
by some signpost near the end of the previous clause or phrase. The 
Modern ends up wandering some nine modifications to the right of 
his starting point. So far has he strayed from periodicity that he 
concludes the sentence with a parenthesis, a tiny postscript, an 
insignificant addendum to what would seem an already insignifi­
cant detail. Although some of the Modern's phraseology suggests a 
sensitive, responsible author ("I ought in Method," for example), 
this is misleading, for there is little method to the Modern's mad­
ness, and his syntax proves it. This sentence is a good example of 
what Tufte calls "syntactical symbolism," the order of words 
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suggesting a nonverbal analogue for meaning.17 In this particular 
sentence we have a sort of symbol—"demonstration" would be 
better—of the Modern's failure of method; it is likewise a syntactic 
imitation of the absurd accretion ("keeping on all togther") that 
characterizes the brothers' coats. Swift seems to be interested not so 
much in what the Modern says as in how he says it, or, rather, in the 
incongruity between the two. Although in such works as Temple's 
Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning or Swift's Conduct of the 
Allies syntax is the backbone of meaning, in A Tale of a Tub and 
Swift's other satires it is often ironically at odds with the persona's 
meaning and in keeping with Swift's. 
Where did Swift find the model for his mock-Ciceronian syntax? 
Irvin Ehrenpreis argues credibly that for Swift Temple's style served 
as a kind of epitome.18 Certainly one of the chief influences was the 
syntax and rhythm of his mentor's prose, which for the most part 
exhibits the typical symmetries of Ciceronianism, although it 
occasionally drops into a loose, more colloquial style that Swift 
would have found more to his liking. Swift seems to have taken from 
Temple his pervasive syntactic symmetry, then intentionally 
shattered that balanced structure, or played that structure off against 
his own ironic meaning. Compare the two following paragraphs 
horn An Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning and/4 Tale of a 
Tub: 
Besides, few men or none excel in all faculties of mind. A great memory 
may fail of invention; both may want judgment to digest or apply what 
they remember or invent. Great courage may want caution; great 
prudence may want vigour; yet are all necessary to make a great 
commander. But how Can a man hope to excel in all qualities, when 
some are produced by the heat, others by the coldness of brain and 
temper? The abilities of man must fall short on one side or other, like too 
scanty a blanket when you are a bed, if you pull it upon your shoulders, 
you leave your feet bare; if you thrust it down upon your feet, your 
shoulders are uncovered.19 
This will stand as an uncontestable Argument, that our Modern Wits are 
not to reckon upon the Infinity of Matter, for a constant Supply. What 
remains therefore, but that our last Recourse must be had to large 
Indexes, and little Compendiums; Quotations must be plentifully 
gathered, and bookt in Alphabet; To this End, tho' Authors need be little 
consulted, yet Criticks, and Commentators, and Lexicons carefully must. 
But above all, those judicious Collectors of bright Parts, and Flowers, 
and Observanda's, are to be nicely dwelt on; by some called the Sieves and 
Boulters of Learning; tho' it is left undetermined, whether they dealt in 
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Pearls or Meal; and consequently, whether we are more to value that 
which passed thro', or what staid behind. (Pp. 147-48) 
Temple and Swift develop their paragraphs in similar ways. Each 
begins with a general assertion, which is then supported by a series 
of parallel clauses and tied up with a balanced, aphoristic, quite 
homey metaphor. Temple's parallelism is neater and more perva­
sive; speaking for the moment only of structure, however, the para­
graphs have a comparable shape, and these shapes are typical. But 
what about the differences? For all his symmetry, Temple manages a 
fairly straightforward, natural-sounding appeal to his readers. On 
the other hand, with the exception of the first proud sentence, Swift 
breaks up the Modern's thoughts with numerous caesuras (twenty­
three, compared to Temple's fifteen), so much so that the rhythm of 
the paragraph is not balanced at all, but uneven, halting.20 Swift's 
clausal and phrasal composition gives the paragraph an uncertain 
movement, and thus the Modern's symmetrical syntax is crossed by 
an opposing, broken sort of rhythm that discredits him. By the time 
we reach "and consequently," Swift's rhythm has destroyed the 
Modern's syntax altogether. 
Contrast the conclusions of the paragraphs. Whereas Temple's 
analogy serves as a charming, human summary of his argument, 
Swift's rings false. The rhythm of Temple's paragraph gradually 
builds to the analogy; the rhythm of Swift's breaks up, splinters, and 
at last arouses our interest more in the analogy than in the thought 
it is supposed to illustrate. The Modern cites both sieves and 
boulters (fishing lines with several hooks) as metaphors for learn­
ing, drops the latter, alludes to sieves used in straining seawater for 
pearls, then to sieves used in straining meal, and finally tantalizes us 
(see the italics) into speculating on the relative value of "that which 
passed thro', or what staid behind." Paradoxically, though Swift, 
who in the Tale defends Temple, models his own syntax on his 
mentor's, he uses it for diametrically opposed purposes. Temple's 
syntax is the basis of a calm, orderly, carefully reasoned argument. 
Swift's syntax in the end functions ironically as a faint reminder of 
order, and thus as a way of highlighting the unreason of his 
persona. 
Temple's prose rises at times to a high, formal pitch, and at other 
times settles into an easy style approximating real speech; but in 
either vein his writing is powerfully and consciously rhythmical. Ac 
early as 1698 John Hughes contrasted Temple with L'Estrange this 
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way: "There is the same Difference in the Styles of the two, as in 
those of Cicero and Terence in the Latin; in the first you find more 
of the Orator, and in the latter more of the Englishman."21 "Sir 
William Temple," remarked Johnson to Boswell, "was the first 
writer who gave cadence to English prose. Before his time they were 
careless of arrangement, and did not mind whether a sentence ended 
with an important word or an insignificant word, or with what part 
of speech it was concluded."22 The question of what Swift culled 
from the rhythm of Temple's prose is a difficult one, but it would 
seem that he learned from it the effects of rhythmical clauses at the 
ends of paragraphs, the role of parallelism and alliteration in 
establishing a rhythm, and the possibilities inherent in shifting 
stress patterns. Of course, as he did with every other element of 
Temple's style, Swift gave his mentor's cadences an ironic turn: 
whereas in Temple rhythm always echoes sense, in A Tale of a Tub 
they often contradict one another ironically. 
Temple's style is almost as symmetrical as Milton's.23 Although 
he is perfectly willing to break out of his formal syntax, and 
although in spite of the frequent symmetry he never achieves the 
neat profile of the more formal Ciceronians, it is clear that Temple's 
mind skips forward, typically, from one to another set of paired 
terms. Consider the following sentence, which I have set out spa­
tially, so as to draw attention to its balances.24 
Such, 
I am sure, 
Lucretius esteems 
and describes 
Epicurus to have been, 
and to have risen, 
like a prodigy of invention 
and knowledge, 
such as had not been before, 
nor was like to be again; 
and I know not why others of the ancients may not be allowed 
to have been as great in their kinds, 
and to have built as high, , 
though upon different schemes 
or foundations.25 
The sentence is structured around a parallel between Epicurus, who 
is esteemed as a prodigy, and other ancients, whom Temple believes 
to be prodigies of different sorts. Every part of the sentence dwells on 
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a pair of terms; every major noun, verb, or preposition calls forth a 
second term parallel to it. Interestingly, not one of these terms is in 
opposition to its sister term, which suggests that Temple is in his 
pairs amplifying ideas, not qualifying them. Three of the pairs 
move from an initial literal statement to a subsequent figurative 
one; "to have risen," "to have built as high," and "foundations" 
develop a single metaphor that serves to unify this architecturally 
structured sentence around an unobtrusive architectural image. The 
heavy use of parallelism gives the sentence a click-clack, click-clack 
rhythm, which is emphasized by like stress ("been before'V'be 
again") and slant rhyme ("been"/"risen," "kinds'V'high"). As 
with Milton, the overriding impression of order is the form of an 
apparent assuredness, and this is implied in Temple's "I am sure" 
and "I know not why others." 
Swift's sentences are in his satires never as balanced as this one of 
Temple's. Yet it is often possible to discern a leaning toward balance 
and antithesis that is subtly knocked askew by the presence of certain 
asymmetrical elements—what Croll calls the "baroque"—in the 
same sentence. 
I hold myself obliged 
to give as much Light as is possible, 
into the Beauties 
and Excellencies of what I am writing, 
because it is become the Fashion 
and Humor 
most applauded among the first Authors 
of this Polite 
and Learned Age, 
when they would 
correct the ill Nature of Critical, 
or inform the Ignorance of Courteous Readers. 
(P. 130) 
Like Temple, Swift would seem to display a predilection for balance 
and antithesis. But we must not forget that this is the Modern 
speaking. His coupled terms are just as redundant as Temple's 
("Beauties'V'Excellencies"), just as rhythmical and alliterative 
("Critical''/"Courteous"), and perhaps more trite and expected. The 
most notable difference between Temple's and Swift's sentences is 
that whereas in the former balance and antithesis form the rhetorical 
pattern on which the sentence is built, in the latter these devices are 
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in effect mere rhetorical flourishes. In fact, Swift works just as hard 
to topple his balance and antithesis as he does to set it up. This is 
clearest in the neat parallelism that ends the sentence. Superficially, 
the last two phrases almost fall into the form of a couplet; Swift 
emphasizes his syntactic parallelism by means of rhythm, allitera­
tion, and capital letters. On the other hand, notice how the parallel­
ism does not here reinforce the Modern's meaning so much as it 
underscores the pride of the Modern and his put-down of the reader. 
The concluding syntax works ironically: although the sentence ends 
with a seemingly minor point, a mere dependent clause, this point is 
expressed in a neat parallelism that gives unwarranted emphasis to 
the idea. As it turns out, the Modern is not so much interested in his 
"obligation" or "the fashion" as he is in belittling the ill-natured or 
ignorant reader of A Tale of a Tub. Swift's sensitive readers, on the 
other hand, hate the Modern for his pride, resent his put-down, and 
generally see through his pat assertion at the end of the sentence. As 
in one of Pope's neat couplets, order is formally affirmed, only to be 
denied by some rhetorical incongruity. 
In Swift's satire the complexity of relationship between form and 
meaning is connected to his characteristic complexity of point of 
view. We may read the above sentence as if a persona were speaking: 
though we are perhaps seduced by the sound of what the Modern 
says, we end up admiring the beauties and excellencies not of his 
rhetoric but of Swift's, which successfully undermines his persona's 
pretentiousness. Or we may read the sentence as if Swift himself 
were speaking: while agreeing with his ridicule of ill-natured or 
ignorant readers, we must at the same time remember that he did not 
write A Tale of a Tub for them anyway, but for attentive readers like 
ourselves. 
Swift's ear was throughout his life attuned to the sound and 
rhythm of language. He is in all of his works attentive to allitera­
tion, to the pattern of stressed syllables in a sentence, and, more 
generally, to the relationship between such sound devices and his 
intended meaning.26 Swift's little language in the Journal to Stella is 
based on the sound of words: "Do you know that every syllable I 
write I hold my lips for all the world as if I were talking in our own 
little language to MD."27 In The Publick Spirit of the Whigs Swijt 
says of Steele: "He hath a confused Remembrance of Words since he 
left the University, but hath lost half their Meaning, and puts them 
together with no Regard, except to their Cadence."28 Similarly, in 
Syntax and Rhythm 83 
The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit he complains that "in 
Spiritual Harangues, the Disposition of the Words according to the 
Art of Grammar, hath not the least Use, but the Skill and Influence 
wholly lye in the Choice and Cadence of the Syllables."29 And in A 
Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English 
Tongue Swift speaks of "that Roughness of our Language," which 
he traces to its numerous monosyllables, the modern tendency 
toward contractions, and the absence of feminine softness from the 
professional, political, and business affairs of men.30 And finally, 
perhaps most telling, is Faulkner's account that in 1735 Swift 
required that "the Editor should attend him every Morning, or when 
most convenient, to read to him, that the Sounds might strike the 
Ear, as well as the Sense the Understanding."31 As we can see from 
these comments, Swift objected to the empty cadence, the cadence 
dissociated from meaning, and found the frequent harshness of the 
language disturbing. Yet it is not surprising that the Modern, like 
Steele, frequently slides into a cadence devoid of meaning, nor that 
Swift uses the abruptness of his native language as a way of inter­
rupting the rounded tones of the Modern. As in most other matters, 
what Swift mocks in one place is what in another becomes for him a 
powerful satiric technique. 
Swift's fascination with sound as an echo of sense is felt through­
out A Tale of a Tub.32 Of Fame, the Modern says that "her Trumpet 
sounds best and farthest, when she stands on a Tomb, by the 
Advantage of a rising Ground, and the Echo of a hollow Vault" (p. 
186), and the balanced phrases and assonance at the end of the 
sentence set up an echo of their own. Swift's keen sensitivity to 
rhythm is clear from this wonderful instance: "Or, whether Fancy, 
flying up to the Imagination of what is Highest and Best, becomes 
over-shot, and spent, and weary, and suddenly falls like a dead Bird 
of Paradise, to the Ground" (p. 158). Swift here manipulates 
rhythm, as well as the sound of words, so as to match them to his 
meaning. Beginning hesitantly, the sentence speeds up after the 
word "Fancy" and runs on for a number of words without a caesura, 
then itself becomes overshot, wavers, and drops down with a series of 
heavy stresses, coming to rest on the word "Ground." 
A further example of Swift's careful handling of sound occurs in 
the passage on Restoration theaters: "The whining Passions, and 
little starved Conceits, are gently wafted up by their own extreme 
Levity, to the middle Region, and there fix and are frozen by the 
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frigid Understandings of the Inhabitants. Bombastry33 and 
Buffoonry, by Nature lofty and light, soar highest of all, and would 
be lost in the Roof, if the prudent Architect had not with much Fore­
sight contrived for them a fourth Place, called the Twelve-Peny 
Gallery, and there planted a suitable Colony, who greedily intercept 
them in their Passage" (p. 61). First, note in a general way how in 
these two sentences heavy "b " sounds are made to mingle with 
liquid "1" sounds, and how, more specifically, the paradox of 
"Bombastry and Buffoonry, by Nature lofty and light" is a phonetic 
demonstration of Swift's ironic meaning. Second, note how the 
alliteration of "fix" (active verb), "frozen" (passive verb), and 
"frigid" (adjective) suggests the freezing action itself. And third, 
note how the second sentence seems to escape the demanding 
caesuras for one longish clause, but is slowed down again, and 
intercepted at last by the insistent near-rhyme of "Gallery," 
"Colony," and "greedily." In the Tale Swift's imitative rhythms and 
sounds are fully as effective as Pope's in Windsor Forest and The 
Rape of the Lock. 
A final, rather specialized but nonetheless very important 
phonetic device used by Swift in A Tale of a Tub is his intentional 
creation of and subsequent destruction of the cadences of classical 
and biblical oratory. It would be impossible here to summarize the 
difficult theory of cadence, its influence on seventeenth-century 
writers such as Browne and Milton, and the method of scansion used 
by Saintsbury, Tempest, Croll, and others.34 Suffice it to say that the 
theory evolved from the practice of orators like Cicero, who, for 
emphasis, followed a certain few rhythmical patterns at the end of a 
large percentage of their clauses or phrases. It has been shown that 
the general effect of the cursus forms was closely adhered to in the 
Book of Common Prayer and the Authorized Version, although 
English cadences are somewhat less rigid than Latin.35 The three 
major cadences, counting stressed syllables from the end of the 
clause or phrase, are as follows: 
Planus: 5-2 ("help and defend us") 
X X / X X X / X 
6-2 ("supplications of thy people") 
Tardus: 6-3 ("governed and sanctified") 
7-3 ("acknowledging our wretchedness") 
Velox: 7-4-2 ("punished for our offences") 
8-4-2 ("defended by thy mighty power")36 
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Not coincidentally, Swift in A Proposal for Correcting, Improv­
ing and Ascertaining the English Tongue cites the Prayer Book and 
Bible as paragons of simple native eloquence, which, "being 
perpetually read in Churches, have proved a Kind of Standard for 
Language, especially to the common People."37 Although Temple 
at times displays an awareness of the cursus, Swift's sensitivity to the 
oratorical cadences must have come to him more directly, through 
the rhythms of the two books he read every day and read aloud every 
Sunday morning. Cadencing in Swift's work is found where we 
would expect it—in passages of his sermons, in his three prayers for 
Stella, and in parts of The Conduct of the Allies. I have discovered 
little cadencing in Gulliver's Travels.38 But Swift's sensitivity to 
rhythm and sound led him to see the potential effects of following 
the cursus forms in especially formal, pseudoserious passages of A 
Tale of a Tub; such cadencing is never sustained, but does for the 
moment prop up the Modern's swelling oratory, setting him up for 
a fall. 
In a paragraph of the "Epistle Dedicatory" to the Tale, Saints-
bury finds "a sort of grave oratorical rhythm—or a quiet caricature 
thereof."39 I hope to show, as Saintsbury does not, just how Swift 
manages to create such a caricature. I give here only the first part of a 
paragraph, which I have set out clause by clause or phrase by 
phrase,40 marking with an asterisk each sentence member that 
contains a cursus and italicizing the phrases where Swift has 
jammed two or more emphatic stresses up against one another. 
•I profess to your Highness, (5-2) 
in the Integrity of my Heart, (6-1) 
that what I am going to say (4-1) 
•is literally true this Minute I am writing: (6-2) 
*What Revolutions may happen (5-2) 
•before it shall be ready for your Perusal, (7-4-2) 
I can by no means warrant: (4-3-2) 
•However I beg You, (5-2) 
to accept it as a Specimen of our Learning, (7-3-2) 
our Politeness and our Wit. (5-1) 
I do therefore affirm (4-1) 
upon the Word of a sincere Man, (6-2-1) 
•that there is now actually in being, (6-2) 
a certain Poet called John Dryden, (4-3-2) 
•whose Translation of Virgil (5-2) 
was lately printed in a large Folio, (4-3) 
well bound, (2-1) 
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and if diligent search were made, (3-2-1) 
for ought I know, (3-2-1) 
is yet to be seen. (4-2-1) 
(P. 36) 
Swift plays here with the Latin cadences. He opens the paragraph 
with a seeming commitment to the cursus (five out of the first eight 
endings); but he soon shows a preference for the stronger endings (4­
1, 5-1, 6-1) that Norton Tempest calls "native cadences";41 and he 
turns increasingly toward compounded stresses like "no means 
• X  / / / X ' ' ' 
warrant," "called John Dryden," and "ought I know." This shift in 
rhythm very subtly supports the intended effect of the passage, 
dropping it rather suddenly from the Modern's high-blown rhetoric 
down to Swift's commonsense meaning. "I profess to Your High­
ness," the Modern begins, in a phrase reminiscent of "Most merciful 
Father," which starts one of his prayers for Stella. But this 
supplicating cadence, though never completely abandoned, becomes 
more and more clogged with proper names,42 initials, parentheses, 
caesuras, and a large number of compounded stresses. Although 
near the end of the paragraph there is a return to cadencing in the 
phrases "I vow to Your Highness" (5-2), "Friend of Your Gover­
nor" (6-3), and "utmost Politeness and Civility" (7-3)—it comes far 
too late to recover much of the Modern's previous formality. Swift's 
intentional undermining of his persona's oratorical cadences by 
means of his own arhythmical elements43 proves the Modern's 
supplicating tones to be only the polite conventions of a very proud 
man. Like the subtle shifts in lexical field discussed in another 
chapter (note "Rheams" and "Squable" in this very proper para­
graph), the subtle intermingling of knee-bent, trochaic cadences and 
self-assured, demanding spondees is an important element in the 
stylistic incongruity of A Tale of a Tub. 
With the exception of the "Epistle Dedicatory" and perhaps the 
"Dedication to Lord Somers," however, Swift depends upon the 
cursus in the Tale for purely local effects. Thus in section 4, where 
the subject is Peter's proud politeness, Swift mixes the formal 
rhythms of the Latin cursus with the abrupt rhythms of English 
monosyllables in order to expose the pretentiousness of Peter as well 
as of the Modern. 
In which Guise, (2-1) 
whoever went to take him by the Hand (5-1) 
#in the way of Salutation, (6-2) 
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Peter with much Grace, (3-2-1) 
•like a well educated Spaniel, (6-2) 
would present them with his Foot, (5-1) 
*and if they refused his Civility, (6-3) 
then he would raise it as high as their Chops, (4-1) 
and give them a damn'd Kick on the Mouth, (4-1) 
which hath ever since been call'd a Salute. (4-1) 
Whoever walkt by, (4-2-1) 
•without paying him their Compliments, (7-3) 
having a wonderful strong Breath, (5-2-1) 
he would blow their Hats off into the Dirt. (5-1) 
(P. 115) 
It is no accident that the cadences here all occur in phrases that refer 
to Peter's civility; though Swift employs the cursus sparingly in this 
passage, he uses it where it will have the most satirical force. What 
we hear are really two rhythms, each struggling for dominance: on 
X >C ' X X X * X 
the one hand, the polite cadences of "in the way of Salutation," and 
' X X X '  X X 
"paying him their Compliments"; on thexother, the more heavily 
stressed, monosyllabic "damn'd Kick on the Mouth," and "would 
blow their Hats off into the Dirt." Swift is again juggling lexical 
fields (e.g., "Salutation" is equated with "Kick on the Mouth"), but 
the ironic juxtaposition of vocabularies is strengthened by the 
similarly ironic juxtaposition of prose rhythms. Simultaneously, 
Swift devotes his rhetorical energies to creating, if only for this 
moment, two styles, credible down to their quite different pacings 
and stress patterns. In documenting Peter's—and the Modern's— 
extreme civility, he employs a higher percentage of polysyllables, 
uses less emphatic endings, and depends upon a fairly slow, rounded 
sort of clausal and phrasal rhythm; in pointing up the superficiality 
of Peter's—and the Modern's—civility, he favors monosyllables, 
uses more emphatic endings, and lets the more frequent stresses 
break the longer rhythmic patterns. Swift's spondaic rhythms— 
what Albert Clark calls "hammer-stroke rhythm"44—throw the 
cadenced politeness into question. Shifting from one rhythm to 
another effectively jars our expectations (one of Swift's favorite 
games), sets up an ironic tension, and makes us catch the full impact 
of the deflating monosyllables. 
Although in the above passage the emphatic rhythms of real 
speech win out, typically, over the stilted cadences of social graces, 
both have been felt by the reader. The compression Swift achieves 
here and elsewhere is remarkable: two rhythms, cleverly inter­
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mingled so as to suggest not just two ways of talking, but two 
approaches to life—the aloof, pseudopolite and the physical, 
impolite. Swift's ironic meaning is neither of these, and his peculiar 
sense of the absurd is what results from the incongruous mixing of 
these two styles as well as these two value systems, as in the simile 
"like a well educated Spaniel." The simile refers to Peter, but is just 
as apt for Swift himself, who under the "Guise" (the word is his) of 
civility presents us with his foot. 
Let me end with a more general point. Don Cameron Allen 
suggests a direct connection between an author's rejection of 
periodicity and his philosophical uncertainty.45 Not that I mean to 
use Swift's loose style as evidence of his skepticism. In his case the 
fragmentation of syntax and crisscrossing of rhythms are not signs 
of a personal lack of confidence but rather techniques for creating a 
voice separate from his own. Whereas a formal, balanced, periodic 
style—such as Milton's or to some extent Temple's—reminds us 
contantly of the author's aesthetic triumph over real life,46 Swift's 
style tells us that the putative author has been unable either to sort 
out his experience or to control his literary form. The proud, 
authoritative tone of most Swiftian narrators is belied by their 
casual, drastically loose style; Swift's seemingly cavalier attitude 
toward form is his way of calling into question his assumed roles. 
Thus the giddy, incongruous rhythms of A Tale of a Tub contradict 
the Modern's attempts at logical and syntactic order, his know-it-all 
tone, and his staunch belief in the absolute efficacy of his master­
piece. The uncertainty implied in the style of the Tale is one of 
Swift's best devices for exposing the pretentiousness of his persona. 
But we can go further. What for the Modern is unclear thinking is 
for Swift a means of exploring complex ideas from several points of 
view. By contradicting the Modern's formal, pseudological style 
with the abrupt, broken style of real speech, Swift is able to look at 
the same idea, simultaneously, from at least two points of view. The 
Modern's uncertainty is Swift's complexity. 
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chapter five 
Language and Madness 
It is usually conceived, that the Elder Brutus only personated the 
Fool and Madman, for the good of the Pub lick. 
While reading, in another context, some contemporary studies of the 
language patterns and thinking processes of schizophrenic patients, 
I was struck by the fact that the major symptoms exhibited by those 
patients would serve well as a description of the major character­
istics of the style of A Tale of a Tub. Transcriptions of schizo­
phrenic language often sound like passages of the Tale. Although 
from this recognition I have been led back to studies of madness in 
the seventeenth century,1 as well as to speculations on Swift's 
possible acquaintance with the language of madness, my approach 
remains essentially the one with which I began: the results of 
twentieth-century investigations of schizophrenic language and 
thinking can be used as a tool for describing and better understand­
ing the style (and the thinking processes it depicts) of Swift's 
confusing satire.2 
Swift is not, as some earlier readers believed, himself a madman; 
but neither is he, as our persona-critics would have it, clearly 
distinct from his Modern Author.3 Although the Modern is often the 
butt of the joke, he is sometimes Swift himself, or at least he 
represents a point of view Swift could agree with. After all, Swift is 
—quite literally—a modern author,4 and he has, in writing the Tale, 
explored his likeness to his persona as well as his difference from 
him, and also the ancient associations between madness and 
wisdom, pathology and creativity.5 I share absolutely John 
Traugott's distaste for critics who argue away "the human condi­
tion that the living man risked his very sanity to think on."6 Swift's 
choice of persona is all-important: in opting to deliver himself 
through the mind of a madman, and thus to tie himself to that 
persona's digressiveness, illogicality, and layered metaphors, Swift 
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has, paradoxically, liberated his own mind. The madness of the 
Modern Author enables Swift to get at meanings he could not have 
otherwise. Focusing on the schizophrenic style of A Tale of a Tub 
can provide us with an awareness of the ambivalent relationship 
between Swift and his persona. 
Swift and madness are often linked. There is, of course, the old 
legend that he was himself insane.7 This view was in part spawned 
by Swift's fascination with the subject in his satires. "Madness," says 
Michael DePorte, "is their obsessive theme; they expose and isolate 
one source of insanity after another, and taken together they contain 
an alarming gallery of lunatics."8 It is a fact that Swift was elected a 
governor of Bethlehem Hospital on 26 February 1714. And in later 
years he became concerned that Dublin had no public asylum like 
London's and resolved to use his modest fortune at his death to 
endow such a hospital.9 But more interesting is Swift's knowledge of 
madness, along with its causes, effects, and cures, as displayed as 
early as A Tale of a Tub. Much of this knowledge reflects current 
seventeenth-century views of insanity and is specific enough to 
suggest that Swift's reading extended beyond Hobbes and Locke and 
into medical treatises such as Thomas Willis's Practice of Physick 
(translated in 1684), which included his historic Anatomy of the 
Brain.10 
But Swift must also have gotten a good deal of his descriptive 
detail from firsthand observation at Bedlam, which had become by 
his day a popular Sunday tourist attraction. Note this entry in the 
Journal to Stella: 
At Night. Lady Kerry, Mrs. Pratt, Mrs. Cadogan, and I, in one coach; 
Lady Kerry's son and his governor, and two gentlemen in another; maids 
and misses, and little master (lord Shelburn's children) in a third, all 
hackney's, set out at ten o'clock this morning from Lord Shelburn's 
house in Picadilly to the Tower, and saw all the sights, lions, &c. then to 
Bedlam, then dined at the Chophouse behind the Exchange; then to 
Gresham College (but the keeper was not at home) and concluded the 
night at the Puppet-Shew, whence we came home safe at eight, and I left 
them.11 
Distasteful as we may find the idea of Swift's visit to the King's 
menagerie, Bedlam, and a puppet show in a single day, it was in no 
1 2way uncommon.  Th e sheer casualness of his account to Stella 
suggests both that this trip to Bedlam was not uniqu e and that he 
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was confident Stella would not be shocked by it; so too we may infer 
that Swift's appointment to a governorship was due to an interest in 
the hospital that was well known. At any rate, specific details in the 
Tale such as the "woodden Window" (p. 177) of one of Bedlam's 
cells argues for Swift's close attention during visits there. Although 
the Modern's cell-by-cell tour of the hospital has literary antecedents 
such as that in Ned Ward's London-Spy (1700), it may well be a thin 
fiction based on Swift's actual experience. 
In Swift's era madness was commonly defined as an extreme 
subjectivity, as imagination beyond control of reason. One of its 
symptoms—and perhaps its cause—was seen to be pride.13 DePorte 
suggests that the Augustans' association of madness and subjectivity 
was owing to their preoccupation with epistemology. "They were 
disturbed," says DePorte, "by the arguments of Descartes, Hobbes, 
and Locke that the secondary qualities of objects—their colors, 
smells, and tastes—were not inherent. The question of how much of 
what we perceive in things is inherent and how much a construct of 
the mind unsettled them. If normal experience involved such mental 
constructs must one not be on guard against further impositions? 
Might it not, in fact, be the mind's inclination to impose?"14 
Swift in particular seems to have recognized the intimate con­
nection between an understanding of madness and the theory of 
knowledge; no one work illustrates these concerns of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries better than A Tale of a 
Tub, which combines so closely the problem of madness with the 
problem of epistemology. "For whatsoever in this state," argues the 
humanitarian Thomas Tryon in 1695, "is represented unto the Soul 
by the uncontrolable and unbounded Imagination, is essential unto 
them, whether it be good or evil."15 Similarly, the psychiatrist 
Silvano Arieti has said recently that "what for us are truth and error 
share for the patient equal right to existence, inasmuch as they are 
both acts of consciousness."16 Ignoring both sense data and moral 
dicta, madness was in the Augustan age usefully exploited as an 
example of our tendency toward mental distortion, or at least as a 
metaphor for such distortion. Swift uses it as both. "How fade and 
insipid do all Objects accost us that are not convey'd in the Vehicle 
of Delusion?" (p. 172), exclaims the Modern, and his rhetorical 
question betrays his madness as well as the unempirical basis of his 
epistemology; in fact, the former becomes a metaphor for the latter. 
To speak more generally, madness is for Swift the cause of the 
96 Language and Reality 
Modern's ridiculous modernism as much as it is the effect of that 
modernism, and also a convenient symbol for the pervasive errors of 
his time. 
"The central issue for Swift is cognition," says Martin Price.17 
"Swift's typical mode, therefore, is the ironic dramatization of the 
mind that chooses not to see. Such a mind may, and in fact usually 
does, have great energy. It is prompted by strong passions which 
capture the imagination, freeing it from the control of reason and its 
adherence to truth. (The relationship of imagination to truth may 
be oblique, but its existence remains, for the Augustans, a test of all 
serious art.) Once the imagination is given rein, its fertility is 
enormous and its energy untiring."18 In A Tale of a Tub Swift 
interweaves the style of madness with the style of reason and 
discovers that there is often truth in the former and error in the 
latter. The sheer energy of the Tale's style results from the dramatic 
interplay between the rational, commonsensical Swift and the 
irrational, jumble-headed Modern Author. Yet both are Jonathan 
Swift. No wonder we find the meaning of the Tale to be so elusive: 
what we have is the inconsistent style of a madman, or rather, the 
electric current that jumps incessantly, unpredictably, between 
Swift's style and point of view and the Modern's.19 The result seems 
to fit one of Jerome S. Bruner's "conditions of creativity": "I would 
like to suggest that it is in the working out of conflict and coalition 
within the set of identities composing the person that one finds the 
source of many of the richest and most surprising combinations."20 
The Modern's insanity becomes for Swift a means to a brilliant 
creativity. In writing the Tale Swift confronted the madness not 
only in the world but also in himself, and discovered there a source 
of great inspiration.21 
The warp and woof of the Tale are a logical, step-by-step, 
"vertical" way of thinking and an analogical, associative, "hori­
zontal" way of thinking. The difference between these two modes of 
thinking is the difference between what Freud calls "primary" and 
"secondary" processes.22 Primary process thinking is pleasure-
oriented thinking characteristic of the child and is dominated by the 
untroubled coexistence of opposites, thinking by allusion or 
metaphor, and the absence of any apparent intellectual goal. 
Secondary process thinking, on the other hand, is thinking char­
acteristic of the mature adult and is dominated by the rules of 
Aristotelian logic, conventional syntactic patterns, and a sense of 
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working toward some goal. Primary thinking is inborn, private, and 
unconscious; secondary thinking is learned, socialized, and alto­
gether conscious. 
Of course, as Freud pointed out, primary process thinking is not 
restricted to the yet-to-be-socialized child but is dominant also in 
dreams, jokes, slips of the tongue, and certain forms of mental 
illness.23 The artist likewise taps into this more primitive kind of 
thinking. Thus Brendan A. Maher sees in schizophrenic writing 
examples of "the literary imagination gone mad": "It would seem, 
therefore, that the mental substrata in which certain kinds of poetry 
are born probably are associative in a more or less schizophrenic 
way.... The intelligence that shapes, cuts, edits, revises and erases is 
fed by many unconscious sources, most of them cultural; but the 
wellsprings seem to be, as poets have been telling us for centuries, 
sort of divine and sort of mad."24 In "A Digression on Madness" 
Swift deliberately explores this connection between the artist and the 
madman. The Modern Author admits that he was formerly an 
inmate of Bedlam: "that honourable Society, whereof I had some 
Time the Happiness to be an unworthy Member" (p. 176).25 His 
writing is a kind of therapy: "My Friends will never trust me alone, 
without a solemn Promise, to vent my Speculations in this, or the 
like manner, for the universal Benefit of Human kind" (p. 180). 
In A Tale of a Tub Swift simultaneously exhibits two styles and 
two sorts of thinking, the secondary or logical and the primary or 
analogical. Swift in principle mocks both the Modern's logic and 
his redundant, farfetched metaphors; however, though he in effect 
demonstrates the absurdity of formal logic, he utilizes the Modern's 
crazy metaphors for his own purposes. Swift undermines both the 
socialized style of secondary thinking and the eccentric style of 
primary thinking. But many of the satiric meanings of the Tale are 
found in the Modern's associative, metaphorical madness, which we 
can understand only if we ourselves respond on a primary level.26 
A general awareness of the distinction between primary and 
secondary thinking existed in Swift's day and is found especially in 
seventeenth-century discussions of the differences between madness 
and dreams on the one hand and sane, waking life on the other. To 
Hobbes and Locke the distinction is between a runaway "Trayne of 
Thoughts" (Hobbes) or "Association of Ideas" (Locke) and those kept 
in check by judgment.27 "Without Steddinesse, and Direction to 
some End," argues Hobbes, "a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; 
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such as they have, entring into any discourse, are snatched from 
their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so 
many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly 
lose themselves."28 Locke traces madness to the uncontrolled 
connection of ideas in the mind: "I shall be pardoned for calling it 
by so harsh a name as madness, when it is considered that opposi­
tion to reason deserves that name and is really madness; and there is 
scarce a man so free from it but that, if he should on all occasions 
argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be 
thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation."29 Locke's view of 
madness as a mere exaggeration of perfectly normal thought 
patterns is a bold departure from earlier accounts of mental illness 
and one that may have influenced Swift. But for the moment we 
ought to notice the distinction in both Hobbes and Locke between 
rational and irrational thought, between disproportionate ideas and 
unconventional connections on the one side and orderly, propor­
tionate, conventional thinking on the other. 
Imagination must be restrained always by reason, as in the 
Modern Author it is not: "I my self, the Author of these momentous 
Truths, am a Person, whose Imaginations are hard-mouth'd, and 
exceedingly disposed to run away with his Reason, which I have 
observed from long Experience to be a very light Rider, and easily 
shook off" (p. 180).30 Swift in part may be talking here about 
himself; after all, it is his galloping imaginations we meet in A Tale 
of a Tub, Gulliver's Travels, and his other works. As G. S. Rousseau 
says of Addison, Swift, and Pope, "the role of imagination in liter­
ature was perhaps the most vexing aesthetic problem of their 
time."31 By exploring the nature of madness in the Tale, and by 
making his mad persona also a writer, Swift faces this problem 
head-on. As an artist Swift knew, as did Freud, that primary process 
thinking is not the sole property of children, dreamers, and 
madmen. 
As we have seen, Hobbes and Locke suggest that the difference 
between a sane man and an insane man is often a difference in 
speech patterns. This distinction is made even more explicitly by 
Thomas Tryon, that independent-minded merchant and sometime 
student in physic who wrote in his Treatise of Dreams and Visions: 
"The one speaks and forms every thought into words: having ndt 
the Bridle of sense nor Reason to restrain him; the other often times 
cuts off such and such thoughts and Imaginations in the Budd, or at 
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least shuts the grand Gate, the Mouth, and keeps those Stragglers in, 
not suffering the Organs and Properties of Nature to form them into 
Articular Expressions."32 Swift makes a very similar distinction in 
Some Thoughts on Free-Thinking: 
Discoursing one day with a prelate of the kingdom of Ireland, who is a 
person of excellent wit and learning, he offered a notion applicable to the 
subject, we were then upon, which I took to be altogether new and right. 
He said, that the difference betwixt a mad-man and one in his wits, in 
what related to speech, consisted in this: That the former spoke out 
whatever came into his mind, and just in the confused manner as his 
imagination presented the ideas. The latter only expressed such 
thoughts, as his judgment directed him to chuse, leaving the rest to die 
away in his memory. And that if the wisest man would at any time utter 
his thoughts, in the crude indigested manner, as they come into his head, 
he would be looked upon as raving mad.33 
Again I am reminded of Freud's primary and secondary process 
thinking. The madman, and to some degree the artist, speaks as his 
imagination prompts him; the mature,"normal," properly social­
ized man speaks only those ideas his judgment chooses from among 
the many presented by the imagination. In A Tale of a Tub Swift 
shows over and over the collapse of the Modern's judgment and 
demonstrates thereby the positive and negative effects of alogical, 
unconventional, and digressive speech and thinking. 
Swift's fascination with the language of schizophrenia is apparent 
in his emphasis on speech throughout "A Digression on Madness." 
The Modern refers to philosophers as "Persons Crazed, or out of 
their Wits, having generally proceeded in the common Course of 
their Words and Actions, by a Method very different from the vulgar 
Dictates of unrefined Reason" (p. 166)—and the italicization only 
heightens Swift's irony.34 Philosophers, enthusiasts, and critics in 
this digression all deliver their doctrines in unconventional 
language. And in the Modern's tour of Bedlam, each inamte is 
marked by a peculiar style of speech: one is "eternally talking, 
sputtering, gaping, bawling, in a Sound without Period or Article" 
(p. 176); another is "in much and deep Conversation with himself" 
(p. 177); another "has forgot the common Meaning of Words, but an 
admirable Retainer of the Sound'1 (p. 178); and yet another is "very 
sparing in his Words, but somewhat over-liberal of his Breath" (p. 
178). Swift must have paid close attention to the speech patterns of the 
madmen he encountered inside—as well as outsidel—Bedlam, and he 
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seems to have modeled his style in A Tale of a Tub as much on what 
he heard there as on the style of the Anatomy of Melancholy or The 
Rehearsal Transpros'd. It is not hard to see that the speech habits of 
the Bedlamites in "A Digression on Madness" are characteristic also 
of the style of the Modern Author himself. 
I introduce here two recent examples of what John D. Benjamin 
terms "schizophrenic pseudo profundity."35 Their relevance to a 
study of the mad style of the Tale is readily apparent: 
The players and boundaries have been of different colors in terms of 
black and white and I do not intend that the futuramas of supersonic 
fixtures will ever be in my life again because I believe that all known 
factors that would have its effect on me even the chemical reaction of 
ameno acids as they are in the process of combustronability are known to 
36 me.
The subterfuge and the mistaken planned substitutions for that 
demanded American action can produce nothing but the general results 
of negative contention and the impractical results of careless applica­
tions, the natural results of misplacement, of mistaken purpose and 
unrighteous position, the impractical serviceabilities of unnecessary 
contradictions. For answers to this dilemma, consult Webster.37 
As psychiatrist Maria Lorenz says of the language of one of her 
patients: "The words swell with an implication of meaningful 
thought. But the full fruition of a thought, a meaning, does not 
occur."38 There is in both passages a veritable rush of ideas, too 
many ideas for too few sentences. "In my head," explained one 
patient after recovery, "there ran like an endless clockwork of a 
compulsive, torturing, uninterrupted chain of ideas. Naturally, they 
were not too sharply defined or clearly developed. There were joined 
idea upon idea in the most remarkable and bizarre associations 
although there was always a certain definite or inherent connection 
from link to link."39 This rush of ideas is behind the associational 
quality of most schizophrenic language and is the source of the 
chaining effect such as that in the latter half of the second passage 
above. 
Another major characteristic of these passages is that described by 
Eugen Bleuler (who in 1911 first introduced the term "schizo­
phrenia") in his groundbreaking Dementia Praecox or the Group of 
Schizophrenias: "The wording is preferably bombastic; indeed tt is 
not so merely in the passages which are intended to convey emphasis 
or feeling. The patients utter trivialities using highly affected 
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expressions as if they were of the greatest interest to humanity."40 As 
schizophrenics often are, the authors of these two passages are proud 
in their belief that they are communicating something of immense 
importance: the signs of that self-satisfaction are the pseudo­
scientific polysyllables ("futuramas," "supersonic," "subterfuge") 
and vague Latinisms ("reaction," "contention," "applications"), 
plus the phrase "all known factors . .  . are known to me" in the first 
paragraph and the cocky reference to Webster in the second. 
Although the effect here is of the presence of great meaning, or at 
least potential meaning, none emerges because the patients feel the 
pressure of too many ideas, or ideas of overblown significance, and 
are unable to edit some of them out, judge their relative importance, 
or bring them together into a unified whole.41 "The schizophrenic," 
says Norman Cameron, "is shooting at the target with a verbal 
shotgun where he should be sighting along a rifle."42 That every­
thing I have said here concerning these two examples of schizo­
phrenic writing would apply as well to the Modern's style in A Tale 
of a Tub is, I suggest, no mere coincidence: Swift put his keen ear for 
speech to good use on his visits to Bethlehem Hospital. 
But there are other similarities between the language of madness 
and the style of the Tale. Schizophrenics often give undue emphasis 
to the mere verbalization of words,43 as in the second of the above 
passages, where there is a toying with prefixes (e.g., "subterfuge" 
and ".substitution," "mistaken" and "misplacement"), and where 
the reference to Webster shows that the lexicographical nature of the 
passage even hits the patient himself. And there is in each paragraph 
a neologism, typical in schizophrenic language:44 "combustron­
ability," a noun where an adjective is required, seems to mean 
"combustible" but looks like an inaccurate fusion of "combustion" 
and "ability"; "serviceabilities," an adjective converted to a noun, 
seems in fact to mean simply "service," and like "combustron­
ability" it demonstrates the schizophrenic's unconventional play 
with words and parts of words. Moreover, the reason in each case for 
the patient's heightened concern for expression is helpful in under­
standing the Modern's similar concern. In The Divided Self R. D. 
Laing points out that the schizophrenic is desperately afraid of 
being exposed and thus spends most of his energy maintaining a 
"false-self system" for keeping others at a distance; one aspect of the 
patient's cultivated persona or personas (he frequently adopts more 
than one) is his kaleidoscopic, fragmented, intentionally misleading 
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talk, what Laing calls "red-herring speech."45 When one of the 
patients quoted above says, "I do not intend that the futuramas of 
supersonic fixtures will ever be in my life again," he is for a split 
second revealing his terrible fear and also attempting to hide that 
fear behind a string of big words. Analogously, in the Tale the 
insane Modern Author distances his readers by means of his con­
tinual verbal flamboyance;46 yet we are meant to discover behind his 
deflecting style Swift's very sane meanings. The Modern—like many 
schizophrenics—has little more than a verbal existence. In this 
powerfully paradoxical work, Swift pretends to be psychotic, and 
the Modern is a sort of grotesque caricature of himself,47 just as the 
style of the Tale, though essentially Swift's own, is in fact a 
caricature of that style. 
As a basis for discussing these characteristics of the style of A Tale 
of a Tub in greater detail, here is a paragraph from "A Digression in 
the Modern Kind": 
To this End, I have some Time since, with a World of Pains and Art, 
dissected the Carcass of Humane Nature, and read many useful Lectures 
upon the several Parts, both Containing and Contained; till at last it 
smelt so strong, I could preserve it no longer. Upon which, I have been at 
a great Expence to fit up all the Bones with exact Contexture, and in due 
Symmetry; so that I am ready to shew a very compleat Anatomy thereof to 
all curious Gentlemen and others. But not to Digress farther in the midst 
of a Digression, as I have known some Authors inclose Digressions in 
one another, like a Nest of Boxes; I do affirm, that having carefully cut 
up Humane Nature, I have found a very strange, new, and important 
Discovery; That the Publick Good of Mankind is performed by two 
Ways, Instruction, and Diversion. And I have farther proved in my said 
several Readings, (which, perhaps, the World may one day see, if I can 
prevail on any Friend to steal a Copy, or on certain Gentlemen of my 
Admirers, to be very Importunate) that, as Mankind is now disposed, he 
receives much greater Advantage by being Diverted than Instructed; His 
Epidemical Diseases being Fastidiosity, Amorphy, and Oscitation; 
whereas in the present univeral Empire of Wit and Learning, there seems 
but little Matter left for Instruction. However, in Compliance with a 
Lesson of Great Age and Authority, I have attempted carrying the Point 
in all its Heights; and accordingly throughout this Divine Treatise, have 
skilfully kneaded up both together with a Layer of Utile and a Layer of 
Duke. (Pp. 123-24) 
In this paragraph the seemingly knowledgeable Modern speaks first 
of his dissection of human nature (which has died?) and how4ie 
reassembled the bones "with exact Contexture, and in due Sym­
metry." For all his talk of symmetry, however, he soon catches 
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himself digressing, apologizes for it, then wanders off into further 
digressions. "Their Phantasies or Imaginations," says Willis of 
madmen, "are perpetually busied with a storm of impetuous 
thoughts."48 The Modern is plagued with so many thoughts—the 
dissection, the symmetry of bones, the problem with digressions, his 
other writings, his friends, his admirers, and so forth—that he cannot 
work them into a coherent whole. Like the symmetry of human 
nature, the symmetry of this paragraph breaks down and its 
meaning becomes confused. Although the Modern speaks in the 
aloof, bombastic language of the intellect, and although he has an 
overweaning pride in the efficacy of his book ("this Divine 
Treatise"), his arguments have little direction, and he proceeds from 
one association to another with very little logic. The Tale is 
fractured at every level—chapters, paragraphs, and sentences— 
because Swift intends to give the impression of a fractured authorial 
consciousness. The Modern lacks integrity in part because his 
creator does not mean for him to be a full-bodied, consistent 
character like Gulliver; but Swift must also have realized that a 
madman lacks integrity and is apt to flip from one false self to 
another. 
Swift in addition recognized that an overemphasis on verbaliza­
tion is a characteristic feature of a madman's speech. Notice how the 
Modern's ideas cease to have much beyond a purely lexical signifi­
cance: a dissected corpse becomes the italicized "Humane Nature"; 
there is a play on the words "Containing" and "Contained," from 
Wotton;49 the Modern takes times out for a consideration of literary 
digressions; he draws attention to his writings on the subjects (as if 
they were new!) of instruction and diversion; the words "Fastidi­
osity" and "Amorphy" are the Modern's neologisms;50 and the 
concluding aphorism is a lexical absurdity cooked up from a 
classical writer. In schizophrenia even the autonomy of words may 
be disrupted, as when the three brothers (two of whom are mad) 
break up the word "knot" into its constituent letters so as to 
manipulate its meaning the way they want (pp. 82-84). "A word," 
says Lorenz, "is denatured and neutralized by converting it into an 
alphabetical object,"51 just as, in a more general way, troubling 
reality is denied by converting it into a purely verbal phenomenon. 
As Freud tells us, for the schizophrenic "word-presentation" 
replaces "object-presentation."52 Nothing truer could be said of 
Swift's Modern Author. 
104 Language and Reality 
But so far I have not commented on one of the chief features of this 
and other passages of the Tale: the Modern's loose handling of 
categories and his inability to distinguish between the literal and the 
figurative, the particular and the general. "Such qualities as being 
fictitious, metaphorical, potential, assumed, and presumed," says 
Arieti, "are not always possible for schizophrenic ideation."53 There 
is an unnerving imprecision to the Modern's thinking processes. For 
example, though he alludes to what would seem to be a real autopsy 
of a real corpse, this corpse is called "Humane Nature" and would 
thus seem to be an abstraction, and the dissection a metaphor for a 
rigorous study of mankind. But the Modern subsequently admits 
that "at last it smelt so strong, I could preserve it no longer," thereby 
reasserting the real existence of a certain overripe corpse. "Having 
carefully cut up Humane Nature," a phrase that follows the 
Modern's short digression on digressions, jams the literal and 
figurative up against one another, the verb suggesting the one, the 
noun the other. By the time we get to the Modern's discovery itself— 
"that the Publick Good of Mankind is performed by two Ways"—we 
are unsure what to think, although the second half of the paragraph 
would suggest that "Humane Nature" is indeed to be understood in 
its generic sense; even here, however, the term "Epidemical 
Diseases" implies a literal corpse. And more generally, when at the 
end of the paragraph the Modern refers to his "Compliance with a 
Lesson of Great Age and Authority" (note the Milnesque use of 
capitals), we can only wonder why he has been making so much of 
his inductive method, when he has in fact been working deductively 
from some ancient principle. 
As psychiatrists frequently have pointed out, schizophrenics lack 
the capacity to make generalizations and tend to jump quickly from 
the hypothetical to the real. Maurice J. Quinlan has shown that the 
literalization of metaphor is one of Swift's favorite rhetorical 
devices;54 but it is in the Tale that he first discovered the satirical 
virtues of this trick, and it may be that his attempt to duplicate the 
language of madness inspired him to it.55 Like most schizophrenics, 
the Modern exhibits a concrete attitude toward his ideas and seems 
incapable of making an unreal assumption or of accepting a 
fictitious situation.56 One of the most pervasive and disturbing 
features of the style of the Tale is this slippage of meaning between 
the general and the particular, the metaphorical and the literal. The 
tiniest instances of such slippage are the schizophrenic's character­
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istic punning,57 such as the Modern's word "Layer" at the end of the 
above passage; together with the verb "kneaded up " (here meaning 
"molded" or "shaped"), "Layer" (used frequently at this time with 
reference to cookery) suggests a sort of Horatian layer cake. 
This ambiguity between the literal and the figurative infuses the 
Tale at every level, even affecting its structure: Arieti says that in an 
advanced stage of schizophrenia a patient may think of some people 
who once came to visit him, and as he does so he quite literally sees 
those people before his eyes;58 similarly, as the Modern, who was 
once an inmate of Bedlam, begins to speak of the hospital, he 
suddenly seems to be there and slides into an account of his tour 
through the building—in the present tense—as if he were walking 
through it at that very moment. "At once confounding things past 
with things present, or to come," says Willis of madmen.59 As in the 
Modern's case, a patient may confuse the present place—"the very 
Garret I am now writing in" (p. 169)—with somewhere else, or the 
present time—"what I am going to say is literally true this Minute I 
am writing" (p. 36)—with some future or past occurrence. Thus 
while writing in his garret the Modern (should we say Swift?) may 
imagine he is touring Bethlehem Hospital, his presence there 
neither past nor future, but right now; like one of the schizophrenics 
Laing describes whose life is totally contemporaneous,60 for him a 
thing is modern or it is nothing. Confusing fact with fiction at every 
level, the speech of the schizophrenic Modern is Swift's epitome of 
modern man's epistemological daydreaming, which is a kind of 
madness. 
Another passage will shed more light on the relation between fact 
and fiction—and how each relates to Swift's satiric "truth"—in A 
Tale of a Tub. This amazing sentence takes up an entire paragraph 
of section 11 and is nevertheless only the second half of the 
Modern's extended comparison of riding and writing. Swift puns on 
"rides." 
On the other side, when a Traveller and his Horse are in Heart and 
Plight, when his Purse is full, and the Day before him; he takes the Road 
only where it is clean or convenient; entertains his Company there as 
agreeably as he can; but upon the first Occasion, carries them along with 
him to every delightful Scene in View, whether of Art, of Nature, or of 
both; and if they chance to refuse out of Stupidity or Weariness; let them 
jog on by themselves, and be d-n'd; He'll overtake them at the next 
Town; at which arriving, he Rides furiously thro', the Men, Women, and 
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Children run out to gaze, a hundred noisy Curs run barking after him, of 
which, if he honors the boldest with a Lash of his Whip, it is rather out 
of Sport than Revenge: But should some sourer Mungrel dare too near an 
Approach, he receives a Salute on the Chaps by an accidental Stroak from 
the Courser's Heels, (nor is any Ground lost by the Blow) which sends 
him yelping and limping home. (Pp. 188-89) 
At the start the sentence would seem to be following a certain logical 
form: "when a Traveller"; "when his Purse"; "[then] he takes the 
Road." It is only with the phrase "but upon the first Occasion" that 
we get the first alteration of direction of the Modern's thinking; by 
the time we reach the clause "and if they chance to refuse," however, 
we have relinquished logic altogether. This disturbance of the 
logical function is one of the most frequently mentioned symptoms 
of schizophrenic thinking; recent studies indicate that such dis­
turbances are the result of lapses in the person's attentional abil-
ities.61 Maher explains the proliferation of associational linkages in 
this way: "The schizophrenic in his use of language may therefore 
be seen as suffering from a process whereby irrelevant associations 
reach a strength equal to those of relevant associations, leading to a 
breakdown in the discriminations necessary to the precise use of 
words."62 Notice how the Modern's logic shatters precisely at the 
moment his tone changes from polite ("every delightful Scene in 
View") to antagonistic ("out of Stupidity or Weariness"); when he 
thinks of a possible objection to a rider's—or writer's—meander-
ings, the Modern gets angry, and logic is replaced by concrete 
narrative. 
Having once left rational argument behind, the mere mention of 
the next town leads the Modern to describe his traveler's reception; 
his reference to men, women, and children compels him to think 
also of barking dogs; and barkings dogs prompts him to consider 
how such beasts should be dealt with. By the conclusion of the 
sentence the Modern has been foolishly derailed by his own 
thoughts into an account of a single rider's dealings with a single 
dog.63 What begins as a quite general argument concerning a 
typical, hypothetical traveler has by the middle of the paragraph 
slipped into a pseudoautobiographical adventure story, which, 
finally, dwindles into a parenthetical phrase and a dependent 
clause.64 The Modern has difficulty dealing with the hypothetical 
and tends to concretize his arguments. Yet it is important to 
recognize that it is the Modern alone who loses his rational grip; 
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Swift temporarily gives over his style to his persona but himself uses 
the Modern's lapse into concrete narrative as a way of laying bare his 
own satiric truth. Since writing is like riding, the movement of the 
sentence demonstrates both the dangers and the possibilities of a 
spontaneous approach to traveling and, likewise, to the digressive 
approach to writing. The image of the dogs barking at the ego­
centric rider-writer has a double function: it is Swift's hint as to how 
we should respond to the Modern and his runaway imagination; it is 
also his prognostic nose-thumbing at anyone who dares criticize his 
way of writing. To say this, however, is not to turn Swift into a great 
compromiser, but rather to suggest that he suspects logic and relies 
instead on concrete situations chock full of implications to get 
across his meanings.65 Above all we should not overlook the fact that 
it is the Modern's craziness that allows Swift to make his points, and 
brilliantly. 
Swift makes fun of formal logic. The Modern says, seemingly 
satisfied with the Aeolists' reasoning: "First, it is generally affirmed, 
or confess'd that Learning puffeth Men up: And Secondly, they 
proved it by the following Syllogism; Words are but Wind; and 
Learning is nothing but Words; Ergo, Learning is nothing but 
Wind" (p. 153).66 Swift here shows how one can prove anything at 
all by logic. Although the structure of the syllogism—it follows the 
form Barbara—is impeccable, its major premise is absurd, and thus 
what results is a formally valid conclusion that is nevertheless in its 
content quite unacceptable. 
Swift may have lifted a page here from Aristotle. In the Tale he 
alludes disparagingly to Aristotle's Dialectica, "and especially that 
wonderful Piece De interpretation, which has the Faculty of 
teaching its Readers to find out a Meaning in every Thing but it 
self" (p. 85). The reference to the Dialectica, however, is apparently 
to any compendium of Airstotle's logical treatises, including De 
sophisticis elenchis, which contains a collection of logical fallacies 
like the following: 
There must be sight of what one sees. 
One sees the pillar. 
Therefore, the pillar has sight.67 
As Aristotle explains it, the problem here arises from a verbal 
ambiguity or "amphiboly," for the word "sight" in this syllogism 
may refer either to that which sees or that which is seen. It is interest­
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ing that many of the Modern's supposedly logical arguments are 
betrayed by the double meaning of words, as above "wind" means 
both "breath" and "hot air." In such instances the reader must catch 
the pun in order to catch Swift's irony. "It is a general rule in 
dealing with arguments that depend on language," says Aristotle, 
"that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on which 
the argument turns."68 This is sound advice for the unraveler of 
Swift's fallacious logic in the Tale. 
But beyond this, though Swift seems to have despised every 
minute of his enforced two years of logic at Trinity College, he 
seems also to have remembered many of its forms and phrases.69 As 
with so much in the Tale, we are led back ultimately to Swift's 
simultaneous dislike of and fascination with the same rhetorical 
device. Imagine Swift's frustrated endeavors at Trinity to make sense 
of such labyrinthine scholasticism as this from De interpretatione: 
Yet from the proposition "it may be" it follows that it is not impossible, 
and from that it follows that it is not necessary; it comes about therefore 
that the thing which must necessarily be need not be; which is absurd. 
But again, the proposition "it is necessary that it should be" does not 
follow from the proposition "it may be," nor does the proposition "it is 
necessary that it should not be." For the proposition "it may be" implies 
a twofold possibility, while, if either of the two former propositions is 
true, the twofold possibility vanishes.70 
On the other hand, what earlier had been a student's frustration was 
transformed in the Tale into a budding writer's pseudoacademic 
parody of the subject he hated most. Swift gets the last laugh. Yet the 
Modern's stubborn attempts to reason through literally everything 
by means of Aristotelian logic—or a semblance of it—is in truth not 
Swift's parody of Aristotle but of the discipline of logic, which he 
saw as so much hot air. Whether he is recalling Aristotle directly or 
the manual of logic written by his teacher Narcissus Marsh, Swift 
surely was aware of the absurdity of a speculative science that busied 
itself with logical and linguistic paradox rather than confronting 
the world's very real contradictions. 
Swift would have found equally absurd Antoine Arnauld's 
popular La logique ou I'art de penser (Paris, 1662),71 a so-called 
Cartesian logic that departed from scholastic logics in its emphasis 
not on the memorization of forms but on the usefulness of logic in 
the real world. "Had we written," says Arnauld, "an arid logic 
employing the ordinary examples of animal and horse, however, 
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precise and methodical our book, it would have served only to 
increase the world's already overabundant supply of such texts— 
none of them read."72 Instead Arnauld aims to furnish examples 
"which allow a student to see both the principle and the practice of 
logic at one and the same time." He offers a practical as opposed to a 
speculative science, a logic that might be applied to everyday 
experience.13 Since a great deal of the satire of A Tale of a Tub is 
directed at attempts to apply logic to real circumstances, this may 
represent Swift's parody of L'art de penser. Recall, for example, the 
Modern's several rationalizations of a reeking human carcass, Peter's 
"thundring Proof" that a crust of bread is a leg of mutton, and 
Jack's spontaneous logicalizations upon knocking his head against 
a post. 
But Swift goes well beyond parody of formal logic. Again and 
again he shows the Modern drawing on the grammar of logic 
without being able to maintain its logical force. 
The True Criticks are known by their Talent of swarming about the 
noblest Writers, to which they are carried meerly by Instinct, as a Rat to 
the best Cheese, or a Wasp to the fairest Fruit. So, when the King is a 
Horse-back, he is sure to be the dirtiest Person of the Company, and they 
that make their Court best, are such as bespatter him most. (P. 103) 
The following Maxim was of much Weight; That since Wind had the 
Master-Share, as well as Operation in every Compound, by Consequence, 
those Beings must be of chief Excellence, wherein that Primordium 
appears most prominently to abound; and therefore, Man is in highest 
Perfection of all created Things. (P. 151) 
And therefore, I the Author of this miraculous Treatise, having hitherto, 
beyond Expectation, maintained by the aforesaid Handle, a firm Hold 
upon my gentle Readers; It is with great Reluctance, that I am at length 
compelled to remit my Grasp; leaving them in the Perusal of what 
remains, to that natural Oscitancy inherent in the Tribe. (P. 203) 
Although in each case the Modern's pseudosyllogistic thinking 
works ploddingly but correctly from a questionable premise toward 
some conclusion, which, if arrived at at all, is scarcely worth the 
trouble, he at the same time slips repeatedly into an analogical way 
of thinking that is the source of many of his misconceptions. In the 
above passages the Modern gets sidetracked by analogies that 
obviously strike him as more compelling than his logic. His 
analogies are for him quite literal: court flatterers are critics; wind is 
human breath; and readers are held by handles. In I. A. Richards's 
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terms, the Modern is repeatedly seduced by his own rhetoric into 
mistaking "vehicles" for "tenors." Secondary process thinking in 
the Tale keeps regressing to that primary process thinking charac­
teristic of madmen and artists. 
We are now in a position to consider in greater detail the nature of 
logical dysfunction in the Tale. As a point of departure, I introduce 
a transcription of an interview with a schizophrenic patient who 
seems to have some of the same difficulties with language as the 
Modern Author: 
In the, the halls of the Justice Department there is an understanding of a 
bona fide agreement between any people scheduled to meet within 
government circles, within government triangles, within government 
rectangles or any place else. It is hard to speak with a language which has 
an idiom of opposition. I mean insofar as there are so many bulwarks in 
historical content representative of a, the revolutionary victory won over 
an English prosidium. It's made this country great in its self-
containment. It might be of interest but it's hard to understand what I 
mean through a nonutilization of English grammar books. A small 
faction usually arises to call themselves leaders, forever after apologizes 
for it, who oppose learning. I don't know whether that's wholly correct 
or not, but Jimmy Cagney in one of his movies specified the fact that 
people who come up from the depths usually have a right to authority. 
The depths of the Anglo-Saxon language has no use for anything that is 
nonutilized, that is nonutility. What I mean is that progress is foolish 
when you consider the fact that through language and leadership you 
can augment the process of future generations being of foreign 
parentage.74 
Irvin Ehrenpreis speaks of the Modern's "gestures of logic," a 
phrase reminiscent of Julius Laffal's reference to the schizophrenic's 
"show of logic."75 Although in the above passage there is a hint of 
logical argument—or perhaps of more than one—that argument 
never comes off. The characteristic markers of rational discourse are 
here ("I mean insofar as," "It might be of interest," "when you 
consider the fact that," for example), as are a proliferation of 
intellectual-sounding, quite separable phrases that seem as if they 
ought to mean something ("understanding of a bona fide agree­
ment," "bulwarks in historical content," "the depths of the Anglo-
Saxon language"). But the connectives only give the illusion of 
connection, and the fine phrases jangle in their contexts. Although 
we can discern two major themes—language and governmeniv-in 
the passage, we cannot make out their relationship, nor exactly what 
the speaker is attempting to say about each of them. These two 
Language and Madness 111 
subjects come together at several points in the paragraph, most 
notably in the alliterating "language and leadership" and the 
neologism "prosidium," which could be a pun on "presidium" and 
"prose idiom."76 Is the speaker saying that politics has so corrupted 
our language that it is difficult to make meaning out of it? Or is he 
perhaps praising the American conquest of the English language? 
Although his words tantalize us with potential meaning, the patient 
would appear to be totally illogical and this passage a good example 
of what is commonly termed schizophrenic "word salad." 
But to describe this passage and others like it as illogical is too 
easy. What we have here is not illogical so much as it is alogical or 
/>aralogical—a way of thinking quite apart from the rules of 
Aristotelian logic.77 In primary process thinking there is no such 
thing as a logical contradiction, and a proposition may both be and 
not be at the same time.78 Thus in this paragraph the patient seems 
simultaneously to be praising the American system while condemn­
ing it, applauding revolution while lamenting it, and attempting to 
bring his two subjects together while keeping them safely apart. 
Much of the difficulty here stems from the patient's failures to 
maintain accepted grammatical connectives and his dependence 
instead on purely associative, often emotional linkages that have 
meaning only within the private world of the schizophrenic himself; 
for example, the allusion to Jimmy Cagney in the midst of such a 
serious argument seems quite out of place and entirely personal to 
the speaker. Other associations are equally idiosyncratic: there is a 
playful repetition of words ("nonutilization," "nonutilized," and 
"nonutility"); a linkage due only to the application of a word 
within different contexts ("people who come up from the depths," 
"depths of the Anglo-Saxon language"); and an absurd instance of 
what David Rapaport calls "phrase completion" ("within govern­
ment circles, within government triangles, within government 
rectangles").79 The schizophrenic typically gets trapped in word, 
phrase, or sound associations that he cannot repress and that 
completely override any logic he may be pretending to. 
Schizophrenic thinking is primary process thinking, and if we 
manage to identify in a patient's speech some fragments of society's 
logic, his thinking is nevertheless at its core decidely eccentric and 
egocentric. In this passage it is not even clear that government and 
language are both real topics for the patient, for it is possible that 
one may exist in his mind as a metaphor for the other. Yet through 
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the verbal smoke screen we can make out a desperate concern for 
communication: "It is hard to speak with a language that," "it's 
hard to understand what I mean," and "I don't know whether that's 
wholly correct or not." There is in this passage a tension between a 
terrible desire to be understood and a terrible fear of being 
understood. 
Willis says that the madman's speech contains "contrary or 
opposite things" and that "some evilly joined or wonderfully 
divided, are confounded with others, the imagination suggests 
manifold Phantasms, and all of them only incongruous."80 In the 
following passage from "A Digression on Madness" we find some of 
the same incongruities we discovered in the speech of the schizo­
phrenic discussed above: 
For, if we take a Survey of the greatest Actions that have been performed 
in the World, under the Influence of Single Men; which are, The Estab­
lishment of New Empires by Conquest: The Advance and Progress of 
New Schemes in Philosophy; and the contriving, as well as the 
propagating of New Religions: We shall find the Authors of them all, to 
have been Persons, whose natural Reason hath admitted great Revolu­
tions from their Dyet, their Education, the Prevalency of some certain 
Temper, together with the particular Influence of Air and Climate. 
Besides, there is something Individual in human Minds, that easily 
kindles at the accidental Approach and Collision of certain Circum­
stances, which tho' of paltry and mean Appearance, do often flame out 
into the greatest Emergencies of Life. For great Turns are not always 
given by strong Hands, but by lucky Adaption, and at proper Seasons; 
and it is of no import, where the Fire was kindled, if the Vapor has once 
got up into the Brain. For the upper Region of Man, is furnished like the 
middle Region of the Air; The Materials are formed from Causes of the 
widest Difference, yet produce at last the same Substance and Effect. 
Mists arise from the Earth, Steams from Dunghils, Exhalations from the 
Sea, and Smoak from Fire; yet all Clouds are the same in Composition, as 
well as Consequences: and the Fumes issuing from a Jakes, will furnish 
as comely and useful a Vapor, as Incense from an Altar. Thus far, I 
suppose will easily be granted me; and then it will follow, that as the 
Face of Nature never produces Rain, but when it is overcast and 
disturbed, so Human Understanding, seated in the Brain, must be 
troubled and overspread by Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties, 
to water the Invention, and render it fruitful. Now, altho1 these Vapours 
(as it hath been already said) are of as various Original, as those ef the 
Skies, yet the Crop they produce, differs both in Kind and Degree, meerly 
according to the Soil. I will produce two Instances to prove and Explain 
what I am now advancing. (Pp. 162-63) 
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The Modern gives the superficial impression of being rational; 
like Swift he has learned his logical figures well. Indeed, the whole 
argument is laid out in a formally acceptable fashion: the Modern 
suggests first a survey of new systems, says the authors of these 
systems were all mad, traces the origin of such madness to his 
theory of vapors,81 and draws a series of analogies for their effect on 
the brain.82 "Thus far," he interjects, "I suppose will easily be 
granted me," apparently convinced that the mere appearance of 
logic will pass as honest thought. But Swift's irony is that though 
formally we may accept the Modern's argument, we ought to be 
dubious about his conclusion—"then it will follow"—that vapors, 
like rain, water the invention and bring it to positive fruition. 
Madmen, says Locke, "do not seem to have lost the faculty of 
reasoning, but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, 
they mistake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right 
from wrong principles."83 In this passage from the Tale it is not the 
form of the Modern's argument that we question, but rather his 
assumptions concerning the value of new systems, the validity of 
such a meteorological analogy, and perhaps the existence of bodily 
vapors in the first place. When at the end of the paragraph the 
Modern says, "I will produce two Instances to prove and Explain 
what I am now advancing," we realize that such proofs and explana­
tions will be no more valid than the Modern's premises. It takes a 
madman to argue so forcefully from a purely surface similarity 
between weather conditions and the human understanding. 
Ernst von Domarus has said that the difference between logical 
and paralogical thinking is that whereas in the former there is argu­
ment from identical subjects, in the latter there is argument from 
identical predicates.84 It is the difference between this logic: 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
and this: 
Butterflies are beautiful. 
Helen is beautiful. 
Therefore, Helen is a butterfly. 
In the first syllogism the identical concept is the subject "man"; in 
the second the identification is made on the basis of the predicable 
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"beautiful" as it is shared by two subjects. "The paralogical 
thinker," says von Domarus, "finds identity of subjects whenever 
and wherever he finds identity of predicables."85 Of course, the 
second "syllogism" is not really a syllogism at all, but an example of 
argument by analogy. Thus the schizophrenic discussed above 
would seem to confuse language and government simply because he 
discovers that they have "opposition," "revolution," or "nonutiliza­
tion" in common, just as, coincidentally, the words "language" and 
"leadership" have a sound in common, or "circles" have something 
in common with other geometric figures. 
But for our purposes what is important is this: that whereas the 
true syllogism yields no new knowledge (since the concept "man" 
belongs by implication to Socrates, and he thus by definition shares 
man's common mortality),86 the paralogical "syllogism" yields an 
absurdity that is in its way quite new, creative, and incisive (since it 
brings together, within a single context, two things not ordinarily 
thought of together). It is interesting that Freud cited wit as an 
example of the working of primary thinking and showed how its 
success often depends upon a short-circuiting of logic.87 To say that 
language is like government—or is government—is perhaps 
illogical, but it is at the same time fresh, jarring, and full of possi­
bilities. Analogies can sometimes grasp things that syllogisms 
cannot: Helen is a butterfly. 
I find von Domarus's account of this feature of schizophrenic 
thinking to be especially useful in discussing the faulty reasoning in 
the Tale. The Modern Author's mind works in a dangerously 
predicative way. "The Hack is quite literally a crazy man with a 
metaphor," says Ronald Paulson.88 Thinking of vapors rising from 
some source, he connects mists rising from dung hills, exhalation 
from the sea, smoke from a fire, fumes from a jakes, and incense 
from an altar. What matters to the Modern is neither the differences 
between "mists," "exhalations," "smoke," "fumes," and "incense" 
nor those between "dung hills," "sea," "fire," "jakes," and "altar"; 
because he senses a similarity in the outward effects—the predicables 
—of vapor rising in each case, he identifies the quite different types 
of vapors and also the quite different sources of vapors.89 Moreover, a 
larger confusion is the Modern's mixing of meteorology with the 
workings of the human understanding, which is again based on a 
few predicative parallels between the two. Having mentioned near 
the beginning of the passage that one's reasoning abilities art 
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determined by "the particular Influence of Air and Climate," the 
Modern cannot let this idea go; he introduces more and more 
references to the weather—"at proper Seasons," "Clouds are the 
same in Composition," and so forth—as he proceeds, until at last 
the idea overtakes him, and he concludes with an explicit, fully 
developed, and quite absurd analogy between the weather and the 
human understanding. What begins as a minor point becomes for 
the Modern a subject equal to his real subject. Notice how he uses 
weather metaphors for describing human beings ("to water the 
Invention, and render it fruitful") as freely as he uses personification 
in describing the weather ("as the Face of Nature never produces 
Rain"). In all of these instances the error is one of treating mere 
predication as if it were identification, of confusing what is predi­
cated of a subject with the subject itself. As we can see here the 
madness of the Modern is not so much his failure with logic as it is 
his inability to see differences between things.90 
Thus in the Tale there is an interweaving of the logical, syllo­
gistic approach to knowledge and the paralogical, analogical 
approach. However, though each seems to be satirized, and though 
it is clear that we are meant to see the fallacies inherent in each, we 
must recognize that it is not logical but analogical thinking that 
makes possible many of the powerful meanings of Swift's satire. His 
view of logic is comparable to Locke's: "I am apt to think that he 
who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of 
syllogisms will discover very little of that mass of knowledge which 
lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature, and which, I am apt 
to think, native rustic reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to 
open a way to and add to the common stock of mankind rather than 
any scholastic proceeding by the strict rules of mode and figure."91 
Swift uses the Modern's ridiculous analogies as a way of getting at 
some of these meanings beyond logic. As Paulson says, Swift 
"exploits resemblance for all it is worth, but makes us see the 
difference; his metaphors reveal rather than overcome difference."92 
For example, he wants us to see the resemblance between fumes from 
a jakes and incense from an altar (for that metaphor contains a 
swipe at Catholicism), but he likewise intends for us to see the 
difference between the two and thereby to separate him trom his 
crude persona: the odor of incense is indeed pungent, and its value 
as a spiritual cleanser suspect; but Swift wants us to identify neither 
fumes with incense nor a jakes with a Catholic altar. The analogy is 
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true in one sense and certainly untrue in another. Thus we can see 
how the effect of this passage depends not upon the force of its 
specious logical argument, but upon a whole array of imaginative 
associations and counterassociations: aside from the analogies them­
selves, we are meant to see that Swift is continuing the "air" theme 
of the previous section, that the mere use of the words "Dunghils" 
and "Jakes" in connection with the human understanding 
ironically degrades reason's confidence in its own powers, and that 
the Modern's mental leapfrogging demonstrates that his own brain 
has become vaporized. Swift typically makes the Modern's difficulty 
in fixing reality our difficulty as well. Confusions between fact and 
fiction are simultaneously mad and poignant. 
Metaphors compress judgments into simple and instantaneous 
perceptions of things.93 Swift uses them boldly in the Tale, forcing 
on us perception after perception, a mass of tiny judgments, each 
one containing a great deal of the Modern's fiction, but more than a 
little of Swift's satiric truth. As readers we must be willing to go 
some distance with the Tale's primal metaphors without rejecting 
them out of hand as mere symptoms of the Modern's madness. I 
think we can say of Swift's persona what Arieti says of other para-
logical thinkers: "In a certain way the universe of the schizophrenic, 
of the primitive, and of the child is closer to the immediate 
perception, to the phenomenological world, at the same time it is 
farther from the truth than ours because of its extreme sub-
jectivity."94 Paradoxically, the solidest reality in the Tale is to be 
found in its metaphors. Fumes, jakes, razors, cheese, maggots, 
hemp, ladders, horses, barking dogs, wasps, asses, stockings, and 
corpses: these things are in effect not metaphorical at all, but 
pinprick realities employed by Swift to deflate his persona's high-
flying argumentation. 
In the madness of his Modern, Swift discovered a freedom from 
propriety, conventionality, and single-mindedness. Tryon sees in 
madmen something of the innocence of children, for "they no 
longer remain under a Mask or Disguise, but appear even as they 
are, which is very rare to be known in any that retain their Senses 
and Reason."95 And in The London-Spy one of Ned Ward's 
Bedlamites tells him: 
Prithee come and Live here, and you may talk what you will, and no 
Body will call you in Question for it: Truth is persecuted every where 
Abroad, and flies hither for Sanctuary, where she sits as safe as zKnavr in 
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a Church, or a Whore in a Nunnery. I can use her as I please, and that's 
more than you dare do. I can tell Great Men such bold Truths as they 
don't love to hear, without the danger of a Whipping-Post, and that you 
can't do: For if ever you see a Madman Hang'd for speaking the Truth, or 
a Lawyer Whip'd for Lying, I'll be bound to prove my Cap a Wheel-
Barrow.96 
The Modern's unwitting contradictions, perfectly acceptable in a 
madman, permit Swift to explore his subjects from several points of 
view at the same time; like Picasso in his cubist period, he can argue 
simultaneously for something and against it, make fun of the 
Modern and speak through him. So too his persona's insane 
running together of the specific and the general, the literal and the 
metaphorical, and the accidental and the substantial allows Swift to 
raise the questions: What is real? What is fiction? Why is it so 
important to distinguish between them? Furthermore, the liberation 
of opinion in the madman is precisely the position the satirist 
requires: when the Modern speaks of "the Art of exposing weak 
Sides, and publishing Infirmities" (p. 172), he is talking about the 
art of satire, which is, perhaps, nothing but the art of impersonating 
the madman. But of course that impersonation can never be 
complete. "In listening to a schizophrenic," says Laing, "it is very 
difficult to know 'who' is talking";97 this is precisely the difficulty 
we have in reading A Tale of a Tub. DePorte suggests that Swift 
utilized the seventeenth-century notion of the madman's "lucid 
intervals" as a model for the style of the Tale.98 The importance of 
this symptom for Swift is that is allows him to speak out in his own 
voice without destroying the credibility of his persona. Yet Bedlam 
gave him something more: I suggest that Swift's tours of the asylum 
demonstrated to him the peculiar flux of mad talk, and that he 
intentionally reproduced this effect in creating one of the most 
brilliant, difficult styles in English. 
Swift does not advocate—as does the Modern Author—the release 
of all inmates of Bedlam; but neither does he share the paranoia of 
many of his contemporaries concerning the insane. As Michel 
Foucault has shown, the so-called Age of Reason feared unreason 
more than anything else." The sane locked up the insane in asylums 
like Bedlam and kept them out of sight except on tour days, when 
they could be viewed through a grate or watched as if they performed 
before an audience or jury of "normal" people. Even Willis was able 
to write that in hospitals for the insane we "may behold, not 
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without wonderful spectacle, as it were a new and monstrous nation 
of men, contrary to rational people, as it were our Antipodes."100 
Swift's view was closer to Locke's and Tryon's. Locke saw that 
sanity and insanity were not antipodes but were on a spectrum, and 
Tryon asked: "Are not all those Intemperances, Violence, Opres­
sion, Murder, and savage Evil, and Superfluities deservedly to be 
accounted the worst Effects of Madness? As also Lying, Swearing, 
vain Imaginations, and living in and under the power of Evil 
Spirits, more to be dreaded than the condition of those that want the 
use of Senses and Reason; and therefore are esteemed Mad?"101 
The Modern argues that Epicurus, Lucretius, Descartes, and 
others, "if they were now in the World, tied fast, and separate from 
their Followers, would in this our undistinguishing Age, incur 
manifest Danger of Phlebotomy, and Whips, and Chains, anddark 
Chambers, and Straw" (p. 166). Of course, at least part of Swift 
would have thought that these thinkers, in the cause of good sense, 
should be used this way. But I take "this our undistinguishing Age" 
to be Swift talking, for the failure to distinguish, as we have seen, is 
the Modern's chief error.102 The boldest technique of A Tale of a 
Tub—Swift's partial identification of himself with his mad 
persona—by itself proves that he did not care to write about modern 
insanity from the safe position of modern sanity. The responsibility 
for distinguishing between sanity and insanity, truth and error, is in 
the Tale turned over to us; the Modern, himself insane, cannot do it, 
and Swift does it only indirectly, through irony. Swift agreed with 
Dryden that "Great wits are sure to madness near allied": he chose a 
madman as his persona and used the style and perceptions of that 
persona in order to score his own points—or, rather, in order to force 
us to experience an alternate, quite mad approach to a quite mad 
world. 
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chapter six 
Reality and the Limits of Mind 
With Relation to the Mind or Understanding; 'tis manifest, what 
mighty Advantages Fiction has over Truth. 
Critics in our century show a naive reluctance to acknowledge the 
crucial place of A Tale of a Tub—or Gulliver's Travels, for that 
matter—in the history of the English novel. Our tendency to treat 
satire and novel as separate genres has divided Swift from Defoe, 
Richardson, and even Fielding. But Swift's first satire offers us the 
unique opportunity of watching a major English writer wrestling in 
the 1690s with some of the literary-philosophical issues implied in 
the form of the novel itself. For Swift the very act of creating a work 
of art raised the question of the correspondence between that work 
and external reality—what Ian Watt calls "essentially an epistemo­
logical problem."1 
The Tale is an odd combination of satiric fiction and philo­
sophical tract. Some twenty years before Robinson Crusoe, Swift 
turned out what is in effect an antinovel not unlike Sterne's 
Tristram Shandy, Beckett's Watt, or Barth's Lost in the Funhouse.2 
In the Tale, as in these works, the frustrated endeavor to tell a story, 
to make order and sense out of the raw materials of fiction, is 
inseparable from the endeavor to comprehend the world, to make 
order and sense out of physical and intellectual experience. Working 
through the madness of the Modern Author, Swift pushes himself 
(and us with him) to the outer reaches of thinking, into that strange 
territory where art and life, meaning and absurdity, rationality and 
irrationality border on one another, mixing freely. In that rarified 
atmosphere narrative order fails; but in the failure of his narrative 
Swift manages to question the effects of literary form, the relation­
ship between form and reality, and beyond—the very limits of 
human knowledge. 
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All of Swift's satire rests on a suspicion of speculative philosophy. 
"The Philosopher's Way in all Ages," he says in A Tale of a Tub, 
"has been by erecting certain Edifices in the Air" (p. 56). The 
Modern Author twice refers to himself as a philosopher (pp. 57, 71) 
and is in a sense a caricature of the philosophical rationalist who 
builds such unfounded systems. Surely the point is Swift's when the 
Modern asks rhetorically: "For, what Man in the natural State, or 
Course of Thinking, did ever conceive it in his Power, to reduce the 
Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length, and Breadth, 
and Height of his own? Yet this is the first humble and civil Design 
of all Innovators in the Empire of Reason" (pp. 166-67).3 In the 
Tale the plot concerning the three brothers is minimal and trite, and 
Swift's Modern philosopher becomes—like Descartes in the Medita­
tions on First Philosophy—essentially a disembodied mind grind­
ing away impassively at all that is nonmind. But to see the world in 
terms of a personal intellectual system is to ignore the separable 
"facts" of experience, or at least to distort these facts in order to 
make them fit preexisting pigeonholes. 
A Tale of a Tub turns in general on the opposition between the 
Cartesian rationalism of the Modern and the Lockean empiricism of 
Swift himself.4 Swift's quasi novel focuses on the problematic trust­
worthiness of the medium of print, the danger of forcing history 
into literary form, the relation between mathematics and style, the 
paradox of the Modern's verbose nothingness, and the possibility of 
finding truth in a work of fiction. In all of these matters—each of 
which has for Swift its epistemological implications—the Modern 
Author presumes one answer while Swift suggests another. Proceed­
ing like Descartes, Swift's persona builds a "Romantick System" (p. 
167) of concepts and words and touches on real experience simply as 
a sort of analogy to his ideas. Swift, on the other hand, repeatedly 
undermines such Cartesianism and implies that the Modern 
stupidly ignores the "ocular Conviction" (p. 36) of concrete objects 
of perception. 
Swift follows Locke in holding that the external world is real, that 
our senses give a true report of it, and that truth can be discovered by 
the individual through his senses. "Perception," says Locke in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, "is the first operation of 
all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our 
minds."5 Swift would agree. "In truth," says Locke elsewhere in the 
Essay, "the matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all 
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our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars."6 Again 
Swift would agree. And Swift's philosophical position suggests the 
basis of his satiric technique: he continually undermines the 
Modern's categorizing, generalizing mind with images of particular 
things and everyday experiences described with sensory precision. As 
we have seen in preceding chapters, throughout the Tale things 
eventually overcome mere words, low style interrupts high style, and 
the rhythm of speech shatters the Modern's more formal cadences. 
Behind the Modern we sense always a larger consciousness: to reason 
with him, Swift seems to say, is to turn life into a purely intellectual 
construct, to create, literally, nothing out of something. 
A Tale of a Tub is a satiric dramatization of the type of mind that 
denies everything outside the mind.7 Neither the woman flayed nor 
the carcass of the beau per se troubles the Modern; these phenomena 
scarcely exist until interpreted. If the Modern can only transmute his 
two corpses into a neat generalization on outsides versus insides, he 
will be able to relax, conscience and sensation safely under control 
of intellect. The Tale is marked by strange denials of the facts of 
physical experience. Jack's encounter with a post is a good 
example:8 
He would shut his Eyes as he walked along the Streets, and if he 
happened to bounce his Head against a Post, or fall into the Kennel (as 
he seldom missed either to do one or both) he would tell the gibing 
Prentices, who looked on, that he submitted with entire Resignation, as 
to a Trip, or a Blow of Fate, with whom he found, by long Experience, 
how vain it was either to wrestle or to cuff; and whoever durst undertake 
to do either, would be sure to come off with a swinging Fall, or a bloody 
Nose. It was ordained, said he, some few Days before the Creation, that 
my Nose and this very Post should have a Rencounter; and therefore, 
Nature thought fit to send us both into the World in the same Age, and to 
make us Country-men and Fellow-Citizens. Now, had my Eyes been 
open, it is very likely, the Business might have been a great deal worse; 
For, how many a confounded Slip is daily got by Man, with all his 
Foresight about him? Besides, the Eyes of the Understanding see best, when 
those of the Senses are out of the way; and therefore, b UndMpn are observed 
to tread their Steps with much more Caution, and Conduct, and Judgment, 
than those who rely with too much Confidence, upon the Virtue of the 
visual Nerve, which every little Accident shakes out ojOrder, andaDrop, or 
a Film, can wholly disconcert. (Pp. 192-93) 
We get a page and a half of Jack's mad philosophizing; and, 
tellingly, the Modern praises "the Force of his Reasoning upon such 
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abstruse Matters" (p. 194). What, we might ask, is abstruse about a 
post? 
Jack hardly notices what has occurred to him, nor learns anything 
from his experience. He pretty much ignores what happens to his 
body, so anxious is he to fit this particular, physical event into some 
sort of rational schema. He explains it away (1) by identifying this 
blow as simply one in a series of blows, and (2) by interpreting the 
whole series as evidence for the workings of "Fate" or "Nature."9 
Yet to rationalize the arbitrary is ridiculous; the boys who laugh at 
Jack have the right idea. Notice how Jack never gets around to 
asking "Why?" or evey "Why me?" What we have here is a sort of 
archetype of the absurd Sisyphus; for Swift he is a stoic clown-
philosopher—like the Modern himself—who responds to physical 
stimulus as if it were rational meaning. And Jack's experience is not 
unique: it is relevant how often sheer things in the Tale, despite 
man's efforts to control them, knock him down, make him look 
foolish, and assume mastery over him; clothes, wills, nuts, barrels, a 
crust of bread, and of course paper and the printer's type all defeat 
man in one way or another. 
Nor does Swift keep himself clear of the comedy. A Tale of a Tub 
belongs to that strange breed of introverted novel that assumes as 
one of its chief subjects the writing of the novel. Swift associates 
himself with his narrator simply by turning that narrator into a 
peculiarly self-conscious author.10 At the same time, the equation of 
author and pseudoauthor is denied by the pseudoauthor's difficulty 
in composing his own story. Or does this difficulty in fact underline 
the equation? Typically, in Swift things are ambivalent, double-
edged; thus in the Tale the ventriloquist is simultaneously incrim­
inated by his dummy and excused because he is the manipulator of 
him. Kathleen Williams says: "Swift, with his restless energy, the 
inexhaustible inventiveness which produced the Tale itself and the 
fabulous voyages of Gulliver, knew only too well the seductiveness 
of undisciplined speculation, and his delight in it, as well as his 
disapproval of it, is made to contribute to satiric effect."11 The 
author of the Tale has arranged things in such a way that he can 
satirize his speaker's mismanaged narration and at the same time 
recognize the irony of his own struggles. One of Swift's most 
winning traits is his ability to laugh at himself. 
Swift repeatedly draws attention to the epistemological problems 
inherent in telling a story in a book. Although the Modern distin­
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guishes between an idea "wholly neglected or despised in 
Discourse" and "its Preferment and Sanction in Print" (p. 210), 
Swift refutes this claim on every page of the Tale.12 He denies the 
likelihood of fixing ideas into any kind of black-and-white 
assertiveness. 
The Ladder is an adequate Symbol of Faction and of Poetry, to both of 
which so noble a Number of Authors are indebted for their Fame. Of 
Faction, because
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* * * * * * * Of Poetry, because its orators 
do perorare with a Song; and because climbing up by slow Degrees, Fate is 
sure to turn them off before they can reach within many Steps of the Top: 
And because it is a Preferment attained by transferring of Propriety, and 
a confounding of Meum and Tuum. (Pp. 62-63) 
It is possible that such blank spaces may be Swift's literalization of 
Locke's description of the beginning mind as "white paper void of 
all characters."13 At any rate, it is no coincidence that at precisely the 
moment when the Modern is speaking of a "Symbol"—a literary 
device for fixing meaning—his manuscript itself gives way. One 
effect of such blank spaces in the text is to demonstrate that ideas 
committed to paper are guaranteed no certainty. A few of Swift's 
footnotes point up the same thing. For example, one tells us that the 
"O. Brazile" mentioned in the text is only a figment of the cartog-
rapher's imagination: "This is an imaginary Island, of Kin to that 
which is call'd the Painters Wives Island, placed in some unknown 
part of the Ocean, meerly at the Fancy of the Map-maker"(p. 125).14 
And another footnote undermines our faith in the informative 
nature of footnotes themselves: "I cannot conjecture what the 
Author means here, or how this Chasm could be fill'd, tho' it is 
capable of more than one Interpretation" (p. 179). Such footnotes 
caution us that at one level the Tale too is only a figment of the 
Modern's imagination, and that if he is saying anything, what he is 
saying is open to more than one interpretation. Swift sees that 
thoughts are for the most part too complicated, variable, and sub­
jective to be fixed by mere ink and paper. It is interesting that the 
story of Peter, Jack, and Martin is itself about the fate of a manu­
script; what fixity is there in writing if a document can be 
interpreted any way at all? 
The persona's difficulties with the book as book draw attention to 
the tangential connection between history and truth. The Modern 
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attempts to convince us of his accuracy: he refers three times to his 
keeping of a commonplace book (pp. 54, 148, 209); and his use of 
such phrases as "Here the Story says" (p. 74), "says my Author" (p. 
115), and "By what I have gathered out of antient Records" (p. 151) 
imply that he is working from various earlier sources. But 
depending upon sources, no matter how meticulous one may be, 
opens up the possibility of several sorts of errors. Swift reminds us of 
this throughout the story of the three brothers, but nowhere more 
specifically then in his satire of Jack's reliance on his father's will: 
"Having consulted the Will upon this Emergency, he met with a 
Passage near the Bottom (whether foisted in by the Transcriber, is 
not known) which seemed to forbid it" (p. 191). Jack may depend 
entirely on his father's words, but if those words are written down, 
they are not to be trusted absolutely.15 
The Modern's own manuscript was severely damaged before it 
reached the bookseller. In addition to the visible gaps in the text, we 
have this marginal note to tell us so: "The Title Page in the 
Original was so torn, that it was not possible to recover several 
Titles which the Author here speaks of" (p. 71). Thus the Modern's 
mangled, incomplete, tampered-with history of the three brothers is 
a perfect example of the impossibility of arriving at a true or factual 
account of some past occurrence. Swift's apparently half-serious talk 
in the "Apology" of how his corrected papers got out of his control 
(p. 12), how the bookseller published from a surreptitious copy (p. 
17), and how his go-between took the liberty of expunging a few 
passages (p. 21) all suggest his very real mistrust of print as a vehicle 
of truth. We are throughout the Tale reminded that we are at several 
removes from what was, and that the truth may never be recovered 
by any means. 
Despite the haphazard appearance of A Tale of a Tub, its effects 
are carefully calculated by its real author. The formlessness of the 
book is meant to reflect the trouble the Modern encounters in his 
attempts to make literary sense out of the mishmash of actual events 
and personal opinions. Whereas in Robinson Crusoe and most of its 
successors reality is accepted pretty much at face value, and literary 
form is worked out on the basis of this assumption,16 the Tale has a 
raggedy profile precisely because its author has arrived at no such 
easy assumption on which to build. It is as if we have been carried 
back to some primitive stage in order to be shown how things are 
during the transformation into art. We are invited to watch the 
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Modern Author actually making numerous Ur-decisions—while 
Swift makes different ones—in which he opts not only for one way 
of telling the story of the brothers over another but for one view of 
reality over another. Thus the Tale is not fiction in the ordinary 
sense, but rather a book about the folly of assuming that one can 
freeze evanescent reality into fictional form. In Madness and 
Civilization Michel Foucault, mentioning Swift, speaks of that 
unique type of literature that exposes that "central incertitude where 
the work of art is born."17 Swift in this respect prefigures Sterne, 
Beckett, and Barth, all of whom have given us disordered works of 
art and tentative explorations of knowledge. 
• In this context Swift's handling of the beginning, ending, and 
chapter divisions of his book takes on special importance. Thus the 
multiple embarcations ("Apology," "Dedication," "Bookseller to 
the Reader," and so on) are so many false starts; similarly, the book 
simply winds down, as the Modern (the reader too) simply gets tired, 
despairs of inserting anything more from his "laborious Collection 
of Seven Hundred Thirty Eight Flowers" (p. 209), and concedes that 
"there seems to be no Part of Knowledge in fewer Hands, than That 
of Discerning when to have Done" (p. 208). But the problems 
inherent in organizing a narrative are best shown in the following 
passage, where the Modern's typically poor memory has gotten him 
into difficulty: "The Necessity of this Digression, will easily excuse 
the Length; and I have chosen for it as proper a Place as I could 
readily find. If the judicious Reader can assign a fitter, I do here 
empower him to remove it into any other Corner he pleases. And so I 
return with great Alacrity to pursue a more important Concern" (p. 
149). The Modern is so mixed up that he expresses a willingness to 
surrender authorship to his reader. Although a desire for propriety 
and symmetry is an understandable human trait, it cannot be ful­
filled. As Swift's bad example, the Modern is intensely concerned 
about matters of organization, but his book is a record of his 
repeated organizational catastrophes. The mock-serious tone of this 
passage should not obscure a basic idea: it is ultimately impossible 
to squeeze contingent reality into neat beginnings, endings, and 
chapter divisions; by permitting contingency to enter between the 
covers of his book, Swift underscores not only the arbitrariness of 
literary form but also, by extension, the arbitrariness of judgments 
about the world.18 
Narrative art has always been balanced uneasily between fact and 
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fiction: a narrator desires to describe what happened at the same 
time that he feels pressure to shape, to improve, and to embellish his 
story.19 Storytelling is in a sense the art of compromising between 
these two extremes. Before Swift this nervous and vibrant compro­
mise was explored most self-consciously—and inconsistently—in 
Don Quixote. Although Swift's toying with point of view in A Tale 
of a Tub surely owes a good deal to Cervantes, his contribution was 
to spotlight in England at this particular time the problem of 
narrative strategy.20 
In a joking but nevertheless quite serious way Swift mocks his 
narrator's insistence on playing both Lodge and Locke: "I have 
placed Lord Peter in a Noble House, given Him a Title to wear, and 
Money to spend. There I shall leave Him for some Time; returning 
where common Charity directs me, to the Assitance of his two 
Brothers, at their lowest Ebb. However, I shall by no means forget 
my Character of an Historian, to follow the Truth, step by step, 
whatever happens, or where-ever it may lead me" (p. 133). The 
Modern Author is suspended precariously between the roles of 
careful historian and God-like creator. Thus he can describe himself 
at one point as mere Secretary of the Universe (p. 123), while 
employing elsewhere the storyteller's formula, "Once upon a Time" 
(p. 73), and peppering his narrative with the editorializations "I 
cannot but bewail" (p. 125), "I record it with Tears" (p. 138), and the 
like. But Swift's irony should not deceive us. Just as philosophically 
the Tale depends from beginning to end on an opposition between 
the empirical and rationalistic views of life, so too Swift's novelistic 
concern with the opposition between narrator as historian and 
narrator as fabricator is crucial to his conception of the work. 
Swift likewise questions the possibility of discovering meaning 
through the method of the philosophical rationalists. The Modern 
is typically sober and reasonable: he argues in a meticulous, point-
by-point fashion, often separating an idea into its components for 
more intensive study; he supplies a plethora of information about 
every subject that comes up, taking time out to explain here and 
qualify there. Of course, this is not enough. The following discus­
sions of the paradoxical notions of "empty" and "full"—from 
Descartes and Swift—are amazingly alike in method, not to mention 
subject matter, and demonstrate how effectively Swift has caugbt the 
mind that believes it can make significance out of anything at all. 
Descartes takes issue with the philosophical view of vacuum—"a 
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space in which there is no substance"—because he cannot conceive 
that anything, even space, should not possess extension and thus be 
a substance. "When we take this word vacuum in its ordinary 
sense," argues Descartes, "we do not mean a place or space in which 
there is nothing, but only a place in which there are none of those 
things which we expected to find there." 
And if, in place of keeping in mind what we should comprehend by these 
words—vacuum and nothing—we afterwards suppose that in the space 
which is termed vacuum there is not only nothing sensible, but nothing 
at all, we shall fall into the same error as if, because a pitcher is usually 
termed empty since it contains nothing but air, we were therefore to 
judge that the air contained in it is not a substantive thing.21 
Descartes stoutly defends the paradox that nothing is something, 
that emptiness is in fact fullness; Swift turns the paradox around to 
show how we mistake the dark of emptiness for the dark of fullness: 
I conceive therefore, as to the Business of being Profound, that it is with 
Writers, as with Wells; A Person with good Eyes may see to the Bottom of 
the deepest, provided any Water be there; and, that often, when there is 
nothing in the World at the Bottom, besides Dry ness and Dirt, tho' it be 
but a Yard and half under Ground, it shall pass, however, for wondrous 
Deep, upon no wiser Reason than because it is wondrous Dark. 
(Pp. 207-8)22 
The Modern sounds good. But there is a flabby virtuosity to both 
arguments, resulting partly from the twists and turns of mind, but 
also from the fact that both deal not with objects but with concepts 
—indeed, with words. In both instances the solid, physical world of 
real containers is brought in as mere analogy for the ideas of 
emptiness and fullness. But note the all-important difference: 
whereas Descartes assumes, by definition, that something is in the 
pitcher although there appears to be nothing, Swift argues that 
although we are sometimes tricked into thinking that a well 
wondrous dark is a well wondrous deep, this is not always the case. 
Swift, in other words, like Descartes, says that what appears to be so 
—even to a "Person with good Eyes"—may not be so; but whereas 
Descartes uses analogy to support his frail preconception 
concerning vacuums, Swift's analogy undercuts the Modern's 
equally frail argument, showing that some dark authors, like some 
dark wells, are truly deep and others are quite empty. Although 
Swift's method is close to Descartes's method, his analogy is in effect 
not secondary to his argument but the basis of it. Don't be fooled by 
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the apparent depth of modern wells, Swift warns; they are not 
necessarily full, as Descartes would tell us, simply because philo­
sophically we refuse to acknowledge the possibility of emptiness. 
Notice in the above passage from the Tale how the effect of logical 
conjunction and careful qualification quickly breaks down; the 
Modern's "therefore," "however," and "because" fail to screen the 
basically cumulative nature of his argument.23 Throughout the Tale 
he asserts that a thing means this, or this, or perhaps this, but the 
multiplicity of his interpretation suggests to us that whatever the 
thing means, its meaning is beyond the mind of the speaker. 
Kenner's comment on Beckett's Watt might be applied as aptly to A 
Tale of a Tub: "The detached, encyclopaedic style more and more 
evidently rehearses not facts but possibilites, not evidence but 
speculation."24 
Swift is veritably obsessed with logical probability, a subject very 
much in the air in the latter half of the seventeenth century.25 In the 
Tale sentence segments and words are commonly grouped in series 
of three, four, five, or more; beyond this, Swift seems fascinated by 
the notion of infinite series (the word "infinite" appears fre­
quently). And the Modern concludes many of his lists with trailers 
such as : "forty other Qualifications of the like Stamp, too tedious to 
recount" (p. 75); "two and thirty Points, wherein it would be too 
tedious to be very particular" (p. 151); and "these Events, I say, and 
some Others too long to recite" (p. 183). In fact, open-endedness 
pervades the work at every level. Toying with the idea of infinite 
series, Swift sneaks "Etcaetera the Elder" and "Etcaetera the 
Younger" into his family tree of critics (p. 94). The Modern Author 
admits to Prince Posterity that he is nothing more than the most 
recent modern and can claim only that "what I am going to say is 
literally true this Minute I am writing" (p. 36). On a couple of 
occasions he even threatens us with other books. The series that 
crowd every page of Swift's satire are further indications of the 
failure of the Modern's categorical thinking; no matter how many 
items in a series, that series remains incomplete, at least theoret­
ically open to one more item. In De sophisticis elenchis Aristotle 
suggests that in order "to exhaust all possible refutations we shall 
have to have scientific knowledge of everything"; in the Discourse 
on Method Descartes expresses a similar aim "to make enumerations 
so complete and reviews so general that I could be certain of having 
omitted nothing."26 For Swift, to aim at exhausting all possible 
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refutations or enumerating all factors involved in a situation is an 
unrealistic goal. A Tale of a Tub satirizes all such hopes for 
assembling complete evidence on any subject. 
The Modern Author uses mathematics the same way he uses 
rational argument—as a tool for systematizing experience; and the 
greater abstraction of number promises that it will succeed in 
quieting reality where logic, print, and literary form have not. The 
Modern loves to quantify. He suggests that the Grub Streeters' worth 
might be calculated by hiring an arithmetician (if he had "Capacity 
enough") to count their books (p. 64). "It is intended that a large 
Academy be erected," he says elsewhere, "capable of containing nine 
thousand seven hundred forty and three Persons; which by modest 
Computation is reckoned to be pretty near the current Number of 
Wits in this Island" (p. 41). And he advocates meditation on the 
mystical numbers27 seven, nine, and especially three: "Now among 
all the rest, the profound Number THREE is that which hath most 
employ'd my sublimest Speculations, nor ever without wonderful 
Delight. There is now in the Press, (and will be publish'd next 
Term) a Panegyrical Essay of mine upon this Number, wherein I 
have by most convincing Proofs, not only reduced the Senses and the 
Elements under its Banner, but brought over several Deserters from 
its two great Rivals SEVEN and NINE" (pp. 57-58). Reduced the 
senses! The Modern's overweening pride, his reference to a forth­
coming publication, and his conflation of "Panegyrical Essay" and 
"convincing Proofs" are all Swift's means of divorcing himself from 
what his persona is saying. The trouble with mathematics is that it 
gives us the abstract outlines of things, or turns things into symbols, 
and thus makes sense only if we happen to be more interested in 
outlines or symbols than in things themselves.28 The man in the 
Tale who stops in th'e street to take the dimensions of ordure is truly 
out of his mind (p. 93); to turn excrement into science is to deny 
reality. 
The mathematics of A Tale of a Tub is related to one of its most 
important themes—that of nothingness.29 As if his book has not 
demonstrated it well enough, in "The Conclusion" the Modern 
Author admits the failure of his imagination, even passes it off as a 
sort of modern virtue: "I am now trying an Experiment very 
frequent among Modern Authors; which is, to write upon Noth­
ing; When the Subject is utterly exhausted, to let the Pen still 
move on; by some called, the Ghost of Wit, delighting to walk after 
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the Death of its Body" (p. 208). By Swift's time there was a minor 
tradition of writings on the subject of nothing.30 But what the 
Modern says here is perhaps related to the "method of exhaustion" 
developed by Archimedes, the so-called founder of infinitesimal 
analysis.31 Elsewhere Swift's persona denies the infinity of matter (p. 
147) and seems shocked to learn that all of the moderns' previous 
writings should have disappeared, the paper itself becoming 
"wholly annihilate" (p. 35). Swift was clearly fascinated by the 
intangible notions of infinity, vacuum, and annihilation. In A 
Tritical Essay upon the Faculties of the Mind (1704) he makes fun of 
those philosophers who dispute endlessly the existence of vacuums 
and those scientists who devote their lives to the search for perpetual 
motion.32 Counting on his reader's general awareness of these 
standard topics of seventeenth-century mathematics, logic, and 
science, Swift utilizes them as analogies for the vacuity of his mad 
Modern Author. Swift's position is this: "There is no inventing 
Terms of Art beyond our Idea's; and when Idea's are exhausted, 
Terms of Art must be so too" (p. 50). With no ideas to start with, the 
Modern should never have picked up a pen—what he writes is so 
many words. 
The Tale is an attempt at fictional meaning that must fail because 
it has at its core an unconquerable nonmeaning. Near the end of his 
book the Modern graciously interjects a few "Innuendo's"33 to assist 
our interpretation of his ideas: "And First, I have couched a very 
profound Mystery in the Number of O's multiply'd by Seven, and 
divided by Nine. Also, if a devout Brother of the Rosy Cross will 
pray fervently for sixty three Mornings, with a lively Faith, and then 
transpose certain Letters and Syllables according to Prescription, in 
the second and fifth Section; they will certainly reveal into a full 
Receit of the Opus Magnum" (pp. 186-87). Surely Swift senses the 
irony of his equation: 
X x O x 7 
U 
What is "couched" here is more than the Modern knows. Even the 
"O " of "Opus" echoes Swift's playful hint to the reader that the 
meaning of his persona's Tale of a Tub is zero, nothing.5? The 
talkative Modern has nothing whatsoever to say: his blather about 
prayers, syllables, and vague prescriptions as much as proves it. The 
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Modern talks and talks and talks, sounding as if he is saying 
something but in fact saying nothing at all. Swift pushes the art of 
tedium about as far as it will go. Minus the continuous hints in the 
Tale that he himself knows full well what is going on, we would not 
read much more than a page. 
In the Tale the theme of nothingness is paralleled by a couple of 
other ideas, like the notion of wind or breath. Aeolists of the past, we 
are told, while at sea stored wind in casks or barrels (p. 155); we are, 
of course, meant to see the connection with the tub itself. There are 
likewise in the Tale numerous references to silence, as when the 
Modern criticizes "the Silence of Authors" (p. 96) and insists on 
filling the quiet. At the same time noise is tied paradoxically to 
nothingness; arriving at the city, the three brothers "Rhymed, and 
Sung, and Said, and said Nothing" (p. 74).35 Moreover, we ought to 
view the disintegration of the manuscript and the proliferation of 
word blanks in the Tale as physical demonstrations of (or glimpses 
into) the nothingness lurking behind the thousands of words that 
make up the text; these lacunas are, quite literally, holes in the 
Modern's thinking. Wind, silence, and white paper become in 
Swift's satire metaphors for nothingness, which is itself a metaphor 
for madness. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that 
madness becomes a metaphor for nothingness. 
For all his rationalism the Modern is unmistakably irrational; and 
if irrationality is the absence of meaning, then he is nothing. 
Foucault points to the paradox of madness: 
Joining vision and blindness, image and judgment, hallucination and 
language, sleep and waking, day and night, madness is ultimately 
nothing, for it unites in them all that is negative. But the paradox of this 
nothing is to manifest itself, to explode in signs, in words, in gestures. 
Inextricable unity of order and disorder, or the reasonable being of things 
and this nothingness of madnessl For madness, if it is nothing, can 
manifest itself only by departing from itself, by assuming an appearance 
in the order of reason and thus becoming the contrary of itself.36 
I cannot imagine a better description of the fullness-emptiness 
paradox at the heart of A Tale of a Tub. The Modern explains his 
title: "Sea-men have a Custom when they meet a Whale, to fling him 
out an empty Tub, by way of Amusement, to divert him from laying 
violent Hands upon the Ship" (p. 40). Swift mocks here the 
Modern's Tale of a Tub (but not his own), which is empty, and also 
the mind that produced such a book. The Tale is chock-full of 
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images, ideas, metaphors, numbers, allusions, jokes, quotations, 
and especially words; but its copiousness paradoxically betrays its 
absolute emptiness. Of course Swift subtly communicates some­
thing through his crazy persona. Madness masquerades as reason; 
then, ironically, madness becomes intelligible. 
As a coalition of the various lacunas in Swift's satire, Bedlam is its 
climactic metaphor. It is more than a single image standing for the 
madness of the Modern, Jack, Wotton, and the others; it becomes a 
sort of ship of fools, an extremely open, suggestive symbol for all 
that is rotten in philosophy, religion, science, politics, criticism, and 
literature. And since madness is in the Tale a brimful nothingness, 
Bedlam becomes an epitome not only of the madness of the modern 
world, but also of its meaninglessness, and even, from Swift's point 
of view, its nothingness. 
Michael V. DePorte speakes of "the great fascination throughout 
most of the eighteenth century with testing the limits and possi­
bilities of reason."37 A Tale of a Tub does just that. Swift's interest 
in the boundaries of the mind was perhaps fanned by a reading of 
Locke, who in book 4 of An Essay Concerning Human Understand­
ing devotes an entire chapter to "The Degrees of Our Knowledge" 
and another to "The Extent of Human Knowledge." With Locke 
Swift questions the assumption that reason can locate verifiable, 
fixed, certain meanings about things; he depicts a mind repeti­
tiously and ridiculously sifting experience through language, logic, 
and mathematics; finally, he shows the futility of expecting to make 
rational sense out of the facts of everyday experience, or, much more, 
the ultimate meaning of life. 
"If Truth be not fled with Astrea," Swift says in A Tritical Essay, 
"she is certainly as hidden as the Source of the Nile, and can be 
found only in Utopia"; in the same work he makes the point that 
Socrates, "who said he knew nothing, was pronounced by the Oracle 
to be the wisest Man in the World."38 Significantly, Swift's sermon 
On the Trinity argues that religious mysteries (like some earthly 
mysteries) are beyond human reason and must remain essentially 
mysterious, acceptable only on grounds of faith.39 We have seen how 
the Tale has at its comic and epistemological core an obsession with 
awful, limitless every things that prove to be, paradoxically, mere 
nothings. As Rosalie Colie says of such paradoxes: "At either end of 
the conceptual scale, 'nothing' and 'infinity' both bring man to the 
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same impassable intellectual position, where he is himself by 
definition no longer the measure of all things, nor even the measure 
of anything at all."40 Swift dramatizes rational man's failure when 
he is confronted with the complex, the subtle, and the basically 
irrational. 
In this paragraph the Modern discusses the limits of the mind 
and, ironically, exceeds those limits himself.41 
And, whereas the mind of Man, when he gives the Spur and Bridle to his 
Thoughts, doth never stop, but naturally sallies out into both extreams 
of High and Low, of Good and Evil; His first Flight of Fancy, commonly 
transports Him to Idea's of what is most Perfect, finished, and exalted; 
till having soared out of his own Reach and Sight, not well perceiving 
how near the Frontiers of Height and Depth, border upon each other; 
With the same Course and Wing, he falls down plum into the lowest 
Bottom of Things; like one who travels the East into the West; or like a 
strait Line drawn by its own Length into a Circle. Whether a Tincture of 
Malice in our Natures, makes us fond of furnishing every bright Idea 
with its Reverse; Or, whether Reason reflecting upon the Sum of Things, 
can, like the Sun, serve only to enlighten one half of the Globe, leaving 
the other half, by Necessity, under Shade and Darkness: Or, whether 
Fancy, flying up to the imagination of what is Highest and Best, becomes 
over-shot, and spent, and weary, and suddenly falls like a dead Bird of 
Paradise, to the Ground. Or, whether after all these Metaphysical 
Conjectures, I have not entirely missed the true Reason. (Pp. 157-58) 
A brilliant paragraph. Careful reading makes the gist of Swift's (not 
the Modern's) argument quite clear. The mind of man "naturally" 
attempts too much, believes it can wrap up the world in neat 
packages of high and low, light and dark, good and evil, and fools 
itself into thinking it can achieve order and perfection. Boldly, Swift 
allows his mad narrator to score points for him: the Modern tells us 
what Swift would tell us, that man puts too much faith in his own 
reasoning, tries to reach understandings impossible for him, and 
overlooks the existence of paradox in the world. After all, is not east 
sometimes west? High sometimes low? Good sometimes evil? While 
speaking through the Modern, Swift simultaneously uses the 
Modern to demonstrate the ridiculous, dangerous pitfalls of 
thought. Notice how the pairing of terms suggests a nice balance of 
ideas at the same time that the fragmented, run-on style undermines 
such facile organization. In considering why we see mental alterna­
tives, the Modern slides into an or-or-or syntax that is itself an 
example of exactly what he is talking about; and the last sentence 
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explodes the series, the Modern admitting that this sequence of 
explanations is incomplete and perhaps infinite. 
Swift's point is that the world is beyond easy schematization and 
is apt to be disturbingly paradoxical. The heavy, metaphorical 
quality of the passage finally gets the best of the Modern's high-
flying argument and throughout keeps us aware of an opposing 
world of real objects and real experiences. The circle image (rein­
forced by the globe) suggests at once everything and nothing.42 It is 
at the start an ironic metaphor for "what is most Perfect, finished, 
and exalted" but has become, by the time we reach the last sentence, 
a metaphor for the circular reasonings of modern man, which "doth 
never stop."43 Perhaps we may take the circle as a metaphor for the 
circularity of A Tale of a Tub as a whole, for its copiousness, 
nothingness, and paradox. 
In the Tale Swift disparages unempirical "Belief in Things 
invisible" (p. 169) and cautions us against those who "advance new 
Systems with such an eager Zeal, in things agreed on all hands 
impossible to be known" (p. 166). This is his persona's way. 
Throughout the Tale the Modern pigeonholes real experience into 
genus and category, transforms real things into aphorisms and 
maxims, and argues everything into abstract system, analogy, or 
personal theory. Swift's position is clear: rationalist philosophers, 
he would say, are like "Men in a Corner, who have the Unhappiness 
of conversing too little with present Things" (p. 97). 
It is no coincidence that what strikes us most forcefully in A Tale 
of a Tub is not the mental configurations stamped by the Modern 
over the face of palpable reality but that reality itself. Although we 
come away from the Tale with little sense of the Modern Author as a 
real person, we retain a keen memory of a ladder, a post, a ragged 
coat, a rotten cheese, a barrel, a well, a crust of bread, a bellows, a 
cadaver, and a Bedlamite dabbling in his own urine. The Modern's 
rationalism is likewise undermined by Swift's moments from every­
day life: a child whipped with a birch, a man splattered by the horse 
ahead of him, a fly feeding first on a honeypot and then on excre­
ment, and many other things. The sheer accumulation of these 
various empirical fragments is itself an appeal to the reader's 
common sense; on every page they call into question the Modern's 
purely intellectual approach to the world. It is perhaps true, as Wan 
says, that in 1709 the Tatler was being ironic when it introduced 
Swift's "Description of the Morning" as a work where the author 
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had "run into a way perfectly new, and described things as they 
happen."44 But by the late 1690s Swift had already made a commit­
ment to empiricism, a commitment that is at the roots of that formal 
realism characteristic of the novels of Defoe, a good deal of 
Gulliver's Travels, and the genre of the novel itself.45 
But what does such a commitment mean to Swift? After all, the 
objects of sense perception themselves change, and two people may 
be able to agree on very little. At one point the Modern remarks on 
"the transitory State of all sublunary Things" (p. 66) and says in his 
"Epistle Dedicatory": 
If I should venture in a windy Day, to affirm to Your Highness, that there 
is a large Cloud near the Horizon in the Form of a Bear, another in the 
Zenith with the Head of an Ass, a third to the Westward with Claws like a 
Dragon; and Your Highness should in a few Minutes think fit to 
examine the Truth, 'tis certain, they would all be changed in Figure and 
Position, new ones would arise, and all we could agree upon would be, 
that Clouds there were, but that I was grossly mistaken in the Zoography 
and Topography of them. (P. 35)46 
Swift is here making fun of man's attempt to label configurations of 
insubstantial air. For what "Truth" is there amidst the ever-
changing objects of our sense perceptions? Yet such sensory data is 
all we have to go on. Although the empirical world sometimes plays 
tricks on our senses (recall the dark but shallow well), Swift would 
tell us that our eyes and other sense organs are nevertheless the 
source of what knowledge we have and the gatherers of that evidence 
we must base our judgments on, if we are to agree at all. Thus items 
of real experience become the lowest common denominators of A 
Tale of a Tub and Swift's other satires: empirical touchstones 
against which all else must be tested. 
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Glossary for A Tale of a Tub 
What follows is a select glossary of neologisms, archaisms, and odd 
usages to be found in the Tale. Although the list pretends to no 
completeness, it does include all of Swift's coinages that I have been 
able to discover, plus examples of his various other word games in 
this work. As a whole the Glossary amply documents Swift's Janus-
like parody of, and participation in, the virtual lexical explosion of 
the previous half century. 
I have of course relied heavily on the The Oxford English Dic­
tionary, but I have also consulted: Henry Cockeram, The English 
Dictionarie; or, An Interpreter of Hard English Words (1623; 4th ed., 
London, 1632); Thomas Blount, Glossographia; or, A Dictionary, 
Interpreting all such Hard Words . .. as are now used in our refined 
English Tongue (London, 1656); Edward Phillips, The New World 
of Words, Or a General English Dictionary (1658; 4th ed., London, 
1678); Thomas Blount, Nomo-Lexicon: A Law Dictionary (1670; 
facsimile ed., Los Angeles, 1970); Elisha Coles, An English 
Dictionary (1676; 10th ed., London, 1678); B. E., A New Dictionary 
of the Terms Ancient and Modern of the Canting Crew (1690; rpt. 
London, 1906); John Harris, Lexicon Technicum; or An Universal 
English Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1704; facsimile ed., New 
York, 1966); John Kersey, Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum; or, A 
General English Dictionary (London, 1708); Nathan Bailey, An 
Universal Etymological Dictionary (1721; 3rd ed., London, 1726); 
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755; rpt. 
London, 1822); and Eric Partridge, A Dictionary of Slang and 
Unconventional English, 2 vols. (1937; 5th ed., London, 1970). Two 
other books have been especially useful: De Witt T. Starnes and 
Gertrude E. Noyes, The English Dictionary from Cawdrey to 
Johnson, 1604-1755 (Chapel Hill, 1946); and W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., 
Philosophic Words: A Study of Style and Meaning in the "Rambler" 
and "Dictionary" of Samuel Johnson (New Haven, 1948). I have, of 
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course, checked the words recorded here against the two volumes of 
the supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary published to date. 
ABORTION (p. 206). The OED gives the first use in a figurative sense 
as 1710, meaning "a failure of aim or promise." This is Swift's 
meaning, although the sexual imagery of the previous section, 
plus the puns in this very sentence ("Going too short," "Labors 
of the Brain") keep us aware at the same time of the earlier 
medical meaning of the term. 
ACADEMY (p. 166). One of Swift's frequent puns. He means both a 
university and a brothel, a low sense of the word found in B. E.'s 
Dictionary of the Canting Crew. Thus the "Academy of Modern 
Bedlam" becomes a very open symbol of corruption of all sorts— 
simultaneously a madhouse, a university, and a brothel. Accord­
ing to Partridge, "academy" as a colloquialism came to mean 
"lunatic asylum" ca. 1730-90. 
ADAPT (p. 172). Swift's adjectival use is cited first in the OED, which 
suggests that the word was developed on the basis of an analogy 
with others like "content," "distract," and "erect," all of which 
are "in form identical with verbs, though really adaptations of 
Latin participles in -tus." Yet there is no Latin "adaptus"\ Cf. 
"Afflatus" and "Inflatus" (p. 151). 
AEOLIST (p. 150 and elsewhere). Swift's use is unique. The term is 
derived from "Aeolus," the Greek god of winds. 
AMORPHY (p. 124). Swift's use of the word is cited in the OED as the 
first in English. It is derived from either the French "amorphie" 
or the Greek word for "shapelessness." Cf. "amorphous," the 
adjective, which apparently did not come into being until 
sometime in the 1720s or 1730s. 
ANNEXT (p. 87). An example of the sort of contraction Swift objected 
to in the Tatler, no. 230, and A Proposal for Correcting, 
Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue. On the same 
page the word is spelled "annexed"; perhaps, despite his 
theoretical objection to that foolish opinion "that we ought to 
spell exactly as we speak," Swift was himself less than consistent. 
Or was he satirizing the instability of spelling by using both 
forms on the same page? Cf. "shipwreckt" (p. 107), "fatning" (p. 
169), and especially "bantring" (p. 19), which appears in the 
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"Apology," though in an ironic context. It is significant that in 
his Reflections on Dr. Swift's Letter to Harley (1712) John 
Oldmixon criticizes the intentionally absurd contractions of 
Swift's "Humble Petition of Frances Harris" (1701). 
ANNIHILATE (pp. 35, 43). Although the verb "to annihilate" (p. 32) 
and the noun "annihilation" were common in the seventeenth 
century, the adjective seems to have been quite rare. In the 
eighteenth century "annihilate" was replaced by the past 
participle "annihilated." Note how Swift heightens the irony in 
each case by prefixing a humorously redundant intensifier: 
"wholly annihilate" and "utterly annihilate." 
ASTRIDE (p. 171). The OED lists this as the first figurative use of an 
older word, and Swift's italics draw attention to it. The word 
appears in its literal sense in Hudibras: "Does not the Whore of 
Bab'lon ride/Upon her horned Beast astride?" Swift is fond of 
riding metaphors: cf. "Man, when he gives the Spur and Bridle to 
his Thoughts" (p. 157), and "a Person, whose Imaginations are 
hard-mouth'd" (p. 180). 
BANTRING (p. 19). This instance is cited in the OED as the first use of 
this form of the word, and Swift's attitude toward it is clear: "Of 
this Bantring as they call i t . . .  " The mock—or is it?—etymology 
of "Banter" immediately above may well suggest that both words 
were common in speech long before they appeared with any 
frequency in print. Cf. "Banter" (pp. 13, 19, 207), a word Johnson 
described as "barbarous." In the Tatler, no. 230, Swift refers to 
"Banter" as a word "invented by some Pretty Fellows" that is 
"now struggling for the Vogue." According to Partridge, 
"banter" was slang in 1688 but during the eighteenth century 
came gradually to mean "harmless raillery." Cf. Glossary under 
"annext." 
BATE (p. 148). This verb is defined in the OED as "to omit, leave out 
of count, except," and Swift's use is cited as the last in this 
particular sense. Cf. Glossary under "flesht." 
BIGOTTED (p. 122). The OED defines this word as "blindly attached 
to some creed, opinion, or party" and gives its first use in the 
construction "bigotted to [something]" as 1704. In this 1710 
footnote Swift is apparently employing a brand new phrase. 
BOMBASTRY (p. 61). "Bombastry" did not come in until the fifth 
edition of 1710. True to the first four editions, Guthkelch and 
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Smith opt for "Bombast" and explain: "evidently a printer's 
coinage due to assimilation with 'Buffoonry.' No other instance 
of this form appears to be known." But Swift was clearly behind 
most of the changes in the fifth edition and probably liked the 
ironic rhythm of "Bombastry and Buffoonry"; cf. "Clergy, and 
Gentry, and Yeomantry" (p. 181). Later in the Tale Swift refers to 
Paracelsus as "Bumbastus" (p. 152), a humorous abbreviation of 
the alchemist's name, Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus 
Bombastus von Hohenheim; with "Bumbastus" Swift puns on 
"bum-baste," which Partridge defines as "to beat hard on the 
posteriors." Swift is speaking here of flatulation, and thus it is 
relevant that Partridge further notes that "bum" probably had an 
echoic origin and cites the Italian "bum," the sound of an 
explosion. 
BONAE NOTAE (p. 68). Lois M. Scott-Thomas, "The Vocabulary of 
Jonathan Swift," Dalhousie Review 25 (1946): 445, points to this 
as one of the foreign terms that owes its introduction into English 
to Swift. Cf. Swift, "Introduction" to Polite Conversation: "I did 
therefore once intend, for the Ease of the Learner, to set down in 
all Parts of the following Dialogues, certain Marks, Asterisks, or 
Nota Bene's (in English, Mark-well's) after most Questions, and 
every Reply or Answer." 
BOTTOM (p. 191). On the surface Swift means simply the "bottom" 
of the page, but the excremental context ("urgent Juncture," 
"Way to the Backside," "Make himself clean again") suggests 
that he is implying also the posteriors, although in the OED 1794 
is the earliest citation in this sense. Cf. Glossary under 
"Occasion," which occurs in the same passage. 
BOUTADE (p. 115). Although the first OED reference is to Bacon's 
King James (1614), Swift felt the need of an explanatory note: 
"This Word properly signifies a sudden Jerk, or a Lash of an 
Horse, when you do not expect it." Wotton's note on the word in 
his personal copy of the Tale likewise underscores its strangeness: 
"Any Body but Sr W. Temple would have said Sally" (Guthkelch 
and Smith, p. 314). And for Swift "Boutade" must have held some 
novelty even as late as 1734, when in a letter he explained to his 
friend Mrs. Pendarves: "It is, you know, a French wonj, and 
signifies a sudden jerk from a horses hinder feet which you did 
not expect, because you thought him for some months a sober 
animal." 
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BRIGUING (p. 65). The OED gives the substantive "brigue" two 
meanings: (1) "strife, quarrel, contention," which was adopted 
from the Italian "briga" in the fourteenth or fifteenth century; 
and (2) "intrigue, faction," which was adopted from the French 
"briguer" around 1700 and was much used in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. This second meaning is Swift's. Guthkelch 
and Smith note that the word is used by Rabelais and occurs 
frequently in Bernier's Histoire du grand mogol (1670), which 
appears in Swift's list of books read in the year 1697. Kersey marks 
the word as an archaism; neither "brigue" nor "briguing" are 
found in Johnson. 
BULLY (pp. 19, 140, 165). In the Tatler, no. 230, Swift calls this one of 
"the modern Terms of Art." Etymologically complicated, this 
word had since the sixteenth century meant "sweetheart," had 
recently taken on the meaning "swash-buckler," and about this 
time began to refer to a hired protector of prostitutes. Cf. Swift's 
use: "The very same Principle that influences a Bully to break the 
Windows of a Whore, who has jilted him . . .  " (p. 165). 
CACKLING (p. 66). Another of Swift's obscene puns. He means both 
the chittering of a hen and farting, a low sense of the word found 
in B. E.'sNew Dictionary. According to Partridge, "cackling fart" 
was at this time slang for an egg; Swift is clearly toying with this 
meaning without using it per se. 
CHOCOLATE-HOUSES (p. 74). The first references in the OED are to 
1694 and 1695, the latter to Congreve's Love for Love. 
CLAIMANT (p. 21). A word that does not appear in any seventeenth-
century dictionaries, although Phillips defines the root word 
"claim" in this way: "A Law term, is a challenge of interest in any 
thing that is out of ones possession, as Claim by Charter, or 
descent, &c." Johnson gives "claimant" a more general applica­
tion: "He that demands any thing, as unjustly withheld from 
him." The first OED citation is 1741. Cf. Glossary under 
"Innuendo." 
CLEANLILY (p. 192). The first OED reference is 1698. In the edition of 
1711 this apparently rather rare form was altered to "cleanly." Cf. 
"cleanly" (p. 93). 
CLINAMINA (p. 167). The OED cites this as the first use in English. 
Guthkelch and Smith observe that the word comes from 
Lucretius, who used it to mean "the bias or deviation from a 
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straight line which was supposed to explain the concourse of 
atoms." 
CLOSE IN WITH (p. 188). Meaning "to draw near to, or advance into 
contact with," this use is the first cited in the OED. But it is 
Swift's frequent practice to intensify ironic verbs by the addition 
of prepositions, as in "spy out" (p. 93), "kneaded up" (p. 124), 
"twirl over" (p. 131), "hymning out" (p. 156), "falls down plum 
into" (p. 158), and "fly off upon" (p. 174). 
CONTRIVANCE (p. 61). Although the word is found in Browne's 
Vulgar Errors, John Woodward's Natural History of the Earth 
(1695) is the first place it appears in the sense of an "adaptation of 
means to an end"; Swift owned a copy of theNatural History in a 
1714 Latin edition but may well have read it earlier. Woodward's 
phraseology seems to be echoed in the Tale: "Proofs of 
Contrivance in the Structure of the Globe," says Woodward; 
"there is something yet more refined in the Contrivance and 
Structure of our Modern Theatres," says Swift. 
COTEMPORARY (p. 38). In his Dissertation upon the Epistles of 
Phalaris (1697) Bentley calls this form "a downright barbarism." 
Under "contemporary" the OED gives a discussion of the 
etymology of the two words and their relationship. 
COURT-CUSTOMERS (p. 177). Apparently a coinage, this word 
represents Swift's parodic echo of the virtual flood of new 
combinations such as "court-favorite" (1647), "court-ladies" 
(1661), and "court-poet" (1697). Barbara Strang, "Swift's Agent-
Noun Formations in -£r," in Wortbildung, Syntax, und 
Morphologie: Festschrift Zum 60. Geburtstag von Hans 
Marchand, ed. Herbert E. Brekle and Leonhard Lipka (The 
Hague, 1968), pp. 217-29, points out that although there is only a 
normal frequency of such formations in Swift, these instances 
attract attention precisely because they are dispensable, because 
they have quite obviously been chosen over the constructions 
"one who" or "those who." See "Answerer" (p. 11), "Opposer" 
(p. 12), "Arbiter" (p. 31), "Undertaker" (p. 41), "Peruser" (p. 44), 
"Deliverer" (p. 52), "Smatterers" (p. 130), "Hatcher" (p. 177). 
"Rectifier" (p. 183), and so forth. In all of these cases Swift creates 
an ironic class name in order to put someone he dislikes into it. 
CRITICK (p. 209). First found as a verb in Dryden's Virgil (1697): 
"Those who can Critick his Poetry, can never find a blemish in 
his Manners." 
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DEFAULTS (p. 132). A noun meaning a defect, a blemish, or simply a 
fault. Both Temple and Swift are cited in the OED, although the 
word appears by the early eighteenth century to have been used 
rarely in this sense. 
IN DEFERENCE TO (p. 61). Although "deference" first appeared some 
forty years earlier, Swift may have been the first writer to employ 
the phrase "in deference to," which the OED does not cite before 
the mid nineteenth century. 
DELICATESSE (p. 80). A French word not entirely naturalized into 
English. The first use in an English text was in Vanbrugh's 
Provoked Wife (1698). Swift had a special dislike of John 
Vanbrugh and may be mocking him here: his poems "Vanbrug's 
House" (1703), "The History of Vanbrug's House" (1706), and 
"V 's House" (1708-9) all deal with his shortcomings both as 
an architect and as a dramatist. As elsewhere, Swift seems to have 
been attracted to the sound of "abundance of Finesse and 
Delicatesse." Words of French origin heighten the impact of the 
story of the effete brothers; cf. Glossary under "Amorphy," 
"Boutade," and "Briguing." 
DEPRECATORY (p. 92). The OED cites Swift's use as the first in the 
sense of "expressing a wish or hope that something feared may be 
averted." Typically, the rhythm of "Expostulatory, Supplicatory, 
or Deprecatory" must have appealed to Swift. Cf. "-tory" in the 
OED. And cf. Glossary under "Bombastry" and "Yeomantry." 
DIRT-PELLETS (p. 10). Swift's use is the single citation in the OED. 
But various analogous combinations existed before; for example, 
"dirt-pie"—meaning "mud pie"— dates from 1641 and appears 
in Congreve's Love for Love. Cf. Swift's use of the verb "to dirt" 
in his Thoughts on Various Subjects (1706): "111 Company is like 
a Dog, who dirts those most whom he loves best" (altered to 
"fouls" in Works, 1735). 
DISPLODING (p. 155). Swift's use is cited, but the first reference in the 
OED is to Milton, Paradise Lost: "In posture to displode their 
second tire/Of thunder." Perhaps Swift was the first author to 
use the word in its "-ing" form. 
DISPOSETH (p. 171). One of the intentionally archaic forms used by 
Swift in the Tale to heighten the formality of the Modern; cf. the 
proverb (originally from Thomas a Kempis) "Man proposeth but 
God disposeth." Henry C. K. Wyld, in A History of Modern 
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Colloquial English (New York, 1956), p. 334, says that by Swift's 
day the "-eth" ending had an archaic feel about it; see also 
Thomas Pyle, The Origins and Development of the English 
Language (1964; 2d ed., New York, 1971), pp. 216-17. In addition, 
Swift once uses the form "doth" (p. 157) and often uses "hath" 
(pp. 10, 19, 60, 66, 69, 77, and elsewhere). Barbara Strang, "Swift 
and the English Language: A Study in Principles and Practice," 
in To Honor Roman Jakobson: Essays on the Occasion of His 
Seventieth Birthday (The Hague, 1967), p. 1956, says that at least 
in Swift's correspondence "hath" becomes increasingly the mark 
of formality and coldness. 
DOZEN (pp. 68, 210). John Oldmixon, in his Reflections on Dr. 
Swift's Letter to Harley (1712), objects to Swift's imprecise 
"Affection to the Word Dozen": "I have several good Reasons 
why, if I were to be of this Academy, I would banish the word 
Dozen out of our Dictionary, and the Doctor has no doubt his to 
be fond of it, and fixing it there forever." 
DUPE (p. 171). The OED suggests that the use of this word in the 
substantive sense began with Temple and credits Swift with the 
first use of the verb, meaning "to make a dupe of; to deceive, 
delude, befool." 
EXANTLATION (p. 67). One of Swift's frequent, quite self-conscious 
hard words in the Tale. In their "Introduction" Guthkelch and 
Smith say this word was apparently suggested by its use in 
Browne's Vulgar Errors. Phillips defines the term as "an over­
coming with much labour and difficulty"; but according to the 
OED it was usually employed in the figurative sense of "the 
action of drawing out, as water from a well." Swift's phrase "to 
draw up by Exantlation" reminds his reader of the well 
metaphor. 
EX CATHEDRA (p. 90). Another of the foreign terms that owes its 
introduction into English literature to Swift. It means literally 
"from the chair" and refers to the Pope's infallible pronounce­
ments on matters of dogma—cf. "infallibly" (p. 110). Cf. Glossary 
under "bonae notae." 
EXCHANGE-WOMEN (p. 140). The first OED reference is 1697, 
although "exchange-man" and "exchange-wench" go .back 
further. This is a good illustration of Swift's delight in 
hyphenated nouns: "Chocolate-Houses," "Dirt-Pellets," "Meal-
Tubs," "Shop-lifters," "Snap-Dragon," "State-Arcana/1 and 
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such. These words force the reader to pay special attention to their 
etymologies. 
EXPEDITION (p. 145). There are two major definitions in the OED: 
(1) "the action of expediting, helping forward, or accomplish­
ing," which apparently died sometime around the middle of the 
seventeenth century; and (2) "a sending or setting forth with 
martial intentions," which has been current since the Middle 
Ages. Interestingly, although the context ("Army," "Martial 
Discipline," "Muster") points to the second meaning, the phrase 
"abundance of Expedition" makes it clear that the word is really 
being used in its first, obsolete sense. This is a good example of 
Swift's tendency to squeeze every drop of meaning out of a word's 
etymology. 
FASION (p. 76). An ironic use of an older spelling of "Fashion" that 
the OED suggests had not been common since the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries; elsewhere (pp. 80, 81, 84, for example) Swift 
spells the word in its currently acceptable way. Swift was con­
cerned about the cavalier attitude toward spelling in his day, and 
in the Tale he argues ironically for establishing a Spelling School 
(p. 41). In a Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining 
the English Tongue, he says: "It is sometimes a difficult Matter to 
read modern Books and Pamphlets; where the Words are so 
curtailed, and varied from their original Spelling, that whoever 
hath been used to plain English, .will hardly know them by 
Sight." Cf. Glossary under "annext" and "tho\ " 
FASTIDIOSITY (p. 124). The word means "disdainfulness" as well as 
"squeamishness." Guthkelch and Smith say that this is "a 
humorously pedantic form, not found before Swift." Of course 
"fastidious" existed before, and in coining "Fastidiosity" Swift 
followed the transformation of a word like "curious," which had 
led to "curiosity," or "fastuous," which had recently given birth 
to "fastuosity." "Fastidiosity" even sounds like an extreme 
fastidiousness. 
FLESHT (p. 101). Johnson says "to flesh" means "to initiate: from the 
sportsman's practice of feeding his hawks and dogs with the first 
game that they take, or training them to pursuit by giving them 
the flesh of animals." The OED adds to this meaning—"to render 
inveterate; harden (in wrong doing)"—and cites the Tale as the 
last example in this sense. Swift may have been intentionally 
employing a word that was practically out of vogue. Cf. the 
154 Glossary 
probable archaisms "thither" (p. 26), "bequeath" (p. 38), "ye" 
(pp. 118, 193), and "Arse" (p. 197). But Swift is also playing on 
another meaning of the word, "to make fleshy, to fatten." 
FOOL (p. 174). In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the words 
"fool" and "knave" were often linked, either as synonyms or as 
opposites. William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words 
(1951; rpt. Ann Arbor, 1967), p. 110, suggests that the modern use 
of "fool" gets its power from an effect of nausea in the presence of 
a lunatic; Empson points to Swift's use as the first that has this 
feeling to it, although "the whole horror of his style was required 
to fix such an emotion to the word here, because in itself the 
sentence could carry the amiable complex of Erasmus." 
GEAR (p. 195). Partridge identifies "gear" as a slang word for the 
male or female genitalia. Cf. Troilus and Cressida: "And Cupid 
grant all tongue-tied maidens here/Bed, chamber, Pandar to 
provide this gear!" 
GOOD FOR NOTHING (p. 173). The OED cites the Journal to Stella as 
the first use: "We reckon him here a good-for-nothing fellow." 
Swift uses the phrase also in Polite Conversation: "Fye, Miss, you 
said that once before; and you know, too much of one Thing is 
good for nothing." Odd as it may seem, the first use of this cliche 
in literature may be here in the Tale; but its inclusion in Polite 
Conversation would suggest that it had earlier currency in speech. 
GRUBAEAN (p. 66). The OED cites this as the first use of the word in 
its adjectival form. Grub-street, says Johnson, was "originally the 
name of a street, near Moorfields in London, much inhabited by 
writers of small histories, dictionaries, and temporary poems." 
Swift's delight in awful puns leads him here to play on the 
italicized word "Worm" at the end of the preceding sentence. 
HERD (p. 171). The OED points to this as the first use of the verb in 
the sense "of things: to come together, assemble." But surely this 
is Swift's figurative use of the word in the older sense of the 
congregating of animals, here employed derogatorily in reference 
to ideas. Cf. Wycherley, The Country Wife (1675): "Stand off.... 
You herd with the wits, you are obscenity all over." Cf. also 
Swift's "Ode to the Athenian Society" (1691): "Our good 
brethren .. ./Must e'en all herd us with their kindred fools." 
HERMETICALLY (p. 126). Appearing as early as 1605, this word is 
found in Bentley'sFo//y and Unreasonableness of Atheism (1692). 
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"To seal a Glass Hermetically," says Kersey, "is to heat the Neck 
of it, till it be just ready to melt, and then with a Pair of red-hot 
Pincers close it together." This is just one of Swift's many ironic 
uses of mechanical terminology in a nonmechanical context. Cf. 
Glossary under "Machine." 
HISTORI-THEO-PHYSILOGICAL (p. 137). Swift's use is surely a first. He 
is mocking through exaggeration the new science's penchant for 
hyphenated terms, as in Boyle's New Experiments Physico-
Mechanical, Touching the Spring of Air and Its Effects (1661). 
See Glossary under "Physico-logical." 
INCLEMENCIES (p. 56). The first OED citation is 1699; but the 
singular form goes back to 1559. Phillips defines "inclemency" as 
"rigor, sharpness, a being without pity or compassion." The 
phrase "inclemency of air" was common in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. 
INFLATUS (p. 151). Blount defines "inflation" as "a breeding of wind 
in the body, a puffing up, or a windy swelling." The OED's 
single citation is 1861. On the same page Swift uses the Latin 
words "Spiritus," "Animus," "Afflatus," and "Turgidus." 
INNUENDO (pp. 114, 169, 186). Defined in Blount's Law Dictionary: 
"a Law term, most used in Declarations and other pleadings; and 
the office of this word is onely to declare and design the person or 
thing which was named uncertain before; as to say, he (innuendo 
the Plaintiff) is a Thief; when as there was mention of another 
person." On the status of this and other legal terms in Swift's day, 
see C. R. Kropf, "Libel and Satire in the Eighteenth Century," 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 8 (Winter 1974-75): 153-68. The 
OED says "innuendo" means by extension an "interpolated or 
appended explanation of, or construction put upon a word, 
expression, or passage" and cites Defoe, 1701, as the first author to 
use the word in this sense. Swift draws special attention to this 
meaning of the word in Gulliver's Travels, "A Letter from 
Captain Gulliver": his plain-speaking narrator complains of his 
cousin's fear of people in power, who "were apt not only to 
interpret, but to punish every thing which looked like an 
Inuendo (as I think you called it)." In Swift's usage in the Tale, 
the word seems also to suggest sly, perhaps lewd, hints, as in the 
"Introduction" to Polite Conversation: "I can therefore only 
allow Innuendoes of this kind to be delivered in Whispers, and 
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only to young Ladies under Twenty, who being in Honour 
obliged to blush, it may produce a new Subject for Discourse." 
INTERCOURSE (p. 60). The primary meaning here is simply that there 
is a perpetual conversation among orators in pulpits, on ladders, 
and on stage itinerants. But the context ("Engine," "erected," 
"Seminary") suggests that Swift is implying also sexual congress, 
although in the OED 1798 is the earliest citation in this sense. 
INVESTS (p. 77). The OED gives the first use of the verb in this sense— 
"clothe, cover, adorn"—to Swift. But his intransitive verb is not 
essentially different from the older transitive one. 
JILTED (p. 165). As a verb employed by Wycherley, Congreve, and 
Locke, this word is described by Blount in the 4th edition of his 
Glossographia (1674) as "a new canting word, signifying to 
deceive and defeat ones expectation, more especially in the point 
of Amours." 
LANTHORN (pp. 36, 141, 192, 193). Guthkelch and Smith suggest 
(p. 192) erroneously that this is Swift's coinage. In the OED it is 
listed as an alternate spelling of "lantern"; the spelling 
"lanthorn" appears in Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, and Locke. 
"It is by mistake often written lanthorn," says Johnson. But Swift 
may be playing again on the composition of a word, for the OED 
comments that "the form lanthorn is probably due to popular 
etymology, lanterns having formerly been almost always made of 
horn"; after all, the phrases "ocular Conviction" and "Windows 
of a Bawdy-house, or a sordid Lanthorn" (p. 36) show that Swift, 
in at least one of these passages, is talking about the transparency 
of material. Of course, he may simply be using the older spelling 
in order to heighten the pomposity of the Modern, as with 
"Rarieties" (p. 110) and "inclose" (p. 24). 
LAYINGS OUT (p. 102). Not recorded in the OED or any of the early 
dictionaries, this noun is apparently Swift's coinage, developed 
from the verb "to lay out," a common usage in the seventeenth 
century. Cf. "laid out" (p. 61). 
LETTERED (p. 126). Swift's is perhaps a first instance of this word. 
The first citation in the OED of the verb "to letter" in the sense of 
"to affix a name or title in letters upon" is 1712; 1707 is the first 
citation of the participle in the sense of a book "having the tkle, 
etc. on back in gilt or coloured letters." 
LEVITY (pp. 61, 140). A term from physics that signifies an inherent 
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property of a body that causes it to rise. Swift apparently uses it 
here for the first time in a figurative sense. Cf. Glossary under 
"Machine." 
LIFTINGS (p. 129). Partridge defines "lifting" as a colloquialism for 
"theft"; cf. "Shop-lifters" (pp. 140, 177). Perhaps Swift also 
intends something mock-religious here; cf. the various biblical 
uses of "lifting," as in "lifting up." And perhaps he intends 
something sexual; recall the double entendres of section 8, and 
note the words "Turns and Flowings" immediately above. Cf. 
"Gripings" (pp. 154, 156) and "Loppings" (p. 201). 
LOPPINGS (p. 201). Swift must have been aware of the political 
connotations of this cant term, which had been used, according to 
the OED, by the Rye House conspirators to refer to the killing of 
the King and the Duke of York. 
MACHINE (pp. 56ff., 164). This word was being used in various new 
senses by the end of the seventeenth century. Swift seems to follow 
a recent distinction between simple machines such as the ladder 
(p. 59) and compound machines with two or more moving parts 
(p. 164). Partridge says that as a low colloquialism "machine" 
referred to the male or female genitalia, but not until the nine­
teenth century; Swift in this second instance, however, is clearly 
making a double entendre: "It was afterward discovered, that the 
Movement of this whole Machine had been directed by an absent 
Female, whose Eyes had raised a Protuberancy, and before 
Emission, she was removed into an Enemy's Country." Cf. 
Glossary under "gear." Here and elsewhere Swift is parodying 
rationalist philosophers like Descartes, who often compared men 
with machines. 
MICRO-COAT (p. 78). A humorous neologism. Swift's footnote 
explains his pun: "Alluding to the Word Microcosm, or a little 
World, as Man hath been called by Philosophers." In reducing 
the Renaissance "Microcosm" to the Restoration "Micro-Coat," 
Swift has encompassed a whole century. Cf. "Man's little World" 
(P- 154). 
IN MIGNATURE (p. 38). This spelling of "miniature" was common 
during the seventeenth century. But the phrase "in miniature" — 
meaning on a small scale—was apparently new; the OED cites 
Swift and gives the first reference as 1700. 
MOBILE (p. 141). An abbreviated form of the Latin mobile vulgus, 
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first so shortened by Shadwell in 1676. "Mobile" was sub­
sequently contracted to "mob," one of those words that Swift 
hated but that was, according to Guthkelch and Smith, fast 
gaining currency. In the Tatler, no. 230, Swift writes: "I have 
done my utmost for some Years past, to stop the Progress of 
Mobb and Banter, but have been plainly born down by Numbers, 
and betrayed by those who promised to assist me." 
MODERNISTS (p. 169). Swift is the first authority in the OED for this 
meaning: "A supporter or follower of modern ways or methods; 
in the 18th century, a maintainer of superiority of modern over 
ancient literature." Cf. the word "Modern" itself, which may 
contain a powerful pun on an apparently obsolete sense (frequent 
in Shakespeare) meaning everyday, ordinary, or commonplace. 
MONSTER-MONGERS (p. 131). Swift's coinage. He has taken an 
apparently fading sense of "monster," meaning a "prodigy, a 
marvel" (last OED reference, 1710), and combined it with 
"monger," a very old word meaning "merchant." The construc­
tion itself was not new; "fly-monger," "water-monger," "iron­
monger," and other such words were available in 1704. The OED 
suggests the tone of these compounds: "In formations dating 
from the middle of the 16th century onwards '-monger' nearly 
always implies one who carries on a contemptible or discreditable 
'trade' or 'traffic' in what is denoted by the first element of the 
compound." 
NATURALS (p. 29). "In one's [its] naturals" was a common phrase in 
the seventeenth century; the OED defines it as "in a purely 
natural condition, not altered or improved in any way." In this 
sense the word was apparently almost dead by 1704. Swift may be 
punning again: a "natural" was in his day an old word for a half­
witted person; as contemporary slang, Partridge says the word 
also meant "harlot." 
NUNCUPATORY (p. 85). This is a rare word extant only during the 
seventeenth century; and this use is the last cited in the OED. 
Swift exposes his fascination with etymology by incorporating 
the Spanish and Portuguese "nuncupatorio"—the source word— 
into the linguistically scrambled phrase that follows. "Nun­
cupatory" means simply "oral" or "verbal," but Swift's footnote 
explains his special reference to the Catholic Church: "By this is 
meant Tradition, allowed to have equal Authority with the 
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Scripture, or rather greater." In his Law Dictionary, Blount says 
"a Will Nuncupative, is when the Testator makes his will by 
word of mouth (not by writing) before sufficient witnesses." 
OBSERVANDA (pp. 148, 210). A Latin word meaning "something to be 
observed or noted." The OED cites Swift as the only authority for 
this term in English. 
OCCASION (p. 191). The word means here simply "situation," 
although in this excremental context Swift perhaps intends also 
to suggest "occasions," meaning the necessities of nature, a sense 
first found in 1698. Cf. Glossary under "Bottom," which occurs in 
the same passage. 
OPUS MAGNUM (pp. 127, 187). The OED gives Swift credit for the 
introduction of this Latin term into English. In their "Notes on 
Dark Authors" Guthkelch and Smith call it "the technical term 
for the conversion of the baser metals into gold" (p. 356); but the 
word is used humorously by Swift in reference to the best way to 
read A Tale of a Tub. Cf. Glossary under "bonae notae." 
OSCITATION (p. 124). One of the polysyllables of the sort Swift 
objected to in the Tatler, no. 230. As early as 1656 Blount gives 
two primary meanings: "yawning or gaping," and "negligence or 
idleness." Swift's meaning is the second of these. "Oscitation" 
appears in Bentley's Dissertations upon the Epistles of Phalaris 
(1697). Cf. Oscitancy" (p. 203). 
PAUMED (p. 138). A seventeenth-century spelling of the transitive 
verb "palm," meaning to impose (a thing) fraudulently upon a 
person, which had first appeared some twenty years earlier. 
Originally a low colloquialism, the word is listed in B. E.'s New 
Dictionary, in the Tatler, no. 230, Swift refers to it as one of the 
"modern Terms of Art" and says in A Letter to a Young Gentle­
man: "I suppose the Hearers can be little edified by the Terms of 
Palming, Shuffling, Biting, Bamboozling, and the like, if they 
have not been sometimes conversant among Pick-pockets and 
Sharpers." Cf. Glossary under "upon that Score." 
PEDERASTICK (p. 41). Although the noun "pederasty"—meaning 
"sodomy" or "buggery"—goes back to 1613, the OED cites this 
use as the first in the adjectival form. 
PERPENSITY (p. 170). The word is defined as "attention" in the OED, 
and Swift's use is the single citation. 
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PHAENOMENON (pp. 60, 165, 167). Guthkelch and Smith give the 
word as "Phoenomenon" in two of the three instances, although 
there is no authority for this spelling; cf. Glossary under 
"annext" and "Fasion." In his Letter to a Young Gentleman 
Swift objects to the word "Phaenomenon," as he does to "Atoms" 
(p. 167) and "Ubiquity" (p. 154). Similarly, "Speculations" (p. 57 
and elsewhere) and "Operations" (p. 95 and elsewhere) appear 
frequently in the Tale, although both are criticized in the Tatler, 
no. 230. Swift seems to be ironic in most of these instances. 
PHYSICOLOGICAL (p. 61). This is the same sort of ironic combination 
as "Histori-theo-physilogical" (p. 137), only more particular. 
Swift is here poking fun at the many stock "physico-" adjectives 
of the seventeenth century: "physico-mechanical" (1661), 
"physico-theosophical" (1668), "physico-mathematical" (1671), 
"physico-theological" (1675), "physico-medical" (1689), and so 
forth. Swift's compound is really no more absurd than most of 
these, although his irony is clear in "Physico-logical Scheme of 
Oratorical Receptacles." The Modern's overblown, logical argu­
ments are repeatedly brought down by Swift's heavy, physical 
imagery. 
POINT (pp. 169-70). A good example of Swift's intentional mud­
dling of meaning. The Modern uses the trite "a very delicate 
Point," then mentions cutting the feather (implying his own 
quill pen); in the same sentence he refers to "the sole Point of 
Individuation," suggesting the scholastic process of individuatio 
(Guthkelch and Smith, p. 170 n. 2); and immediately thereafter he 
promises to "unravel this knotty Point," using a term meaning 
some problem difficult to solve (see OED under "knotty"). As 
these meanings blur in our minds, we come up with something 
like a quill pen split in two and tied in a knot—not a bad 
description of the Modern's writing. Swift's sensitivity to such 
repetition—in his annotation of Gilbert Burnet's History of His 
Own Times, for example—argues that he repeats himself here in 
order to create a satiric absurdity. In the allegory of the Tale, 
"Points" refers simultaneously to items of church dogma and 
laces for attaching the hose to the doublet. As is clear from the 
following examples, Swift uses the word inconsistently but never 
neutrally: "reasoning upon such delicate Points" (p. 39); "have 
recourse to some Points of Weight" (p. 75); and "a loose, flying, 
circumstantial Point" (p. 85). 
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PROTRUSIONS (p. 202). The OED lists two meanings: (1) "the action 
of protruding," a sense found in Browne and Boyle; and (2) "that 
which protrudes or juts out," a sense found first in the Tale. 
RACE (p. 80). "This is like Sr W. Temple," wrote Wotton in his copy 
of the Tale (Guthkelch and Smith, p. 314). Johnson defines the 
term as "a particular strength or taste of wine" and adds that 
Temple was the first to extend the meaning to "any extraordinary 
natural force of intellect." See Temple's Essay upon Ancient and 
Modern Learning (1690): "I think the Epistles of Phalaris to have 
more Race . . . than any others." 
REINCRUDATION (p. 68). The OED cites this as a first use. The word 
means the reduction of a substance that has reached a higher state 
back into a lower state of existence; see Guthkelch and Smith, 
"Notes on Dark Authors," p. 354. But the Modern's Latinization 
of "crud" does not succeed in concealing the corruption at the 
center of this polysyllable.There may be another irony here: 
although "Reincarnation" did not appear in English until the 
nineteenth century, "incarnation" had been extant since the 
thirteenth, and Swift's "Reincrudation" may be an irreverent 
allusion to the Incarnation of Christ. 
REINFUNDS (p. 178). The only reference in the OED. "To reinfund" 
means "to pour in again." Cf. "refunding" (p. 160). 
RELIEVO (p. 154). From the Italian "relievo," meaning "relief"; or as 
Florio defines it (Swift owned a copy of the World of Words), 
"raised or embossed worke." The OED cites Swift's use as the first 
in the transferred sense: when he says that internal winds "gave 
tne Lyes a terrible kind of Relievo," he means that the Aeolists' 
eyes were bugged, that they were thrown into grotesque relief. 
REMAINS (p. 70). The word means simply "remainder" here, 
although in this context ("before I die") Swift may also be 
implying a corpse, a sense first found in Dryden in 1700. 
ROMAGE (p. 87). An alternate spelling of "rummage." The OED cites 
this as the first use in the sense of "to scrutinize, examine 
minutely, investigate"; but Swift's use of the verb is not markedly 
different from a couple of earlier instances. "To romage" was 
sometimes used pejoratively in the sense of "to ransack." 
RUNNING (pp. I l l  , 126, 184). This is an interesting example of 
Swift's varied use of a single word. On p. Ill "Running" could 
mean, quite literally, too much running, which would indeed 
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harden a bull's feet; but Swift's phrase "ill Pasture and Running" 
seems to imply that in this context it means "ranging or 
pasturage," a sense that the OED says did not appear until 1695. 
On p. 126 Swift uses "Running" in the specialized sense of "the 
flow of liquor during the process of wine-making, brewing, or 
distillation," a common seventeenth-century meaning. On p. 184 
"Running" is used in yet a third way, in the sense of "the flowing 
or discharge of blood or humours from the body"; Swift's use of 
the word is listed in the OED as the first example of this meaning 
in a figurative sense. And there may be a pun in any or all of these 
instances on gonorrhea, which Blount defines as "a disease called 
the running of the reins, the flux of natural seed of man or 
woman unwittingly." 
UPON THAT SCORE (pp. 23, 26, 94). A vulgar gaming phrase that Swift 
specifically objects to in his annotations to Gilbert Burnet's 
History of His Own Times. Cf. A Letter to a Young Gentleman: 
"Others, to shew that their Studies have not been confined to 
Sciences, or ancient Authors, will talk in the Style of a gaming 
Ordinary." Cf. Glossary under "paumed." 
SCRIPTORY (p. 85). Although the word is used by Browne—"Val-
latory, Sagittary, Scriptory, and others"—in a somewhat broader 
way, Swift is credited by the OED with the first use in the sense of 
"expressed in writing, written." "Scriptorian" appears in Blount, 
Coles, and Phillips. 
SEDATEST (p. 138). The OED records that "sedate" in reference to a 
person showed up first in Locke and Dryden; "sedate" also 
appears in the Tale (p. 139). Swift may be the first writer to use 
the superlative "sedatest." Cf. Glossary under "skilfullest." 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE (p. 121). The term means "support given by 
a husband to a wife when the parties are separated." The first 
OED reference is to Defoe's Colonel Jack (1722); but Swift's words 
—"In copying the Will, they had met another Precept against 
Whoring, Divorce, and separate Maintenance"—point to an 
awareness of the legal significance of the term. Of course, the joke 
here is that the parties involved are not man and wife but three 
foppish brothers. Cf. "Yokemate" (p. 38)—meaning marriage 
partner—used to describe Wotton's relation to Bentley, Cf. 
Glossary under "Innuendo." 
SKILFULLEST (p. 201). This rather awkward form, like "sedatest" (p. 
Glossary 163 
138) and "profoundest" (p. 148), is probably Swift's parody of 
such difficult-to-pronounce superlatives. Cf. "fruitfullest" in The 
Publick Spirit of the Whigs, "provokingest" in Polite Conversa­
tion, and the following humorous sentence from a letter to 
Vanessa: "Well, he is the Courteousest Man, and nothing is so 
fine in the Quality, as to be courteous." 
SPARGEFACTION (p. 110). Meaning "the action of sprinkling or 
scattering," this Latinate hard word occurs only in the Tale. 
STATE-ARCANA (p. 68). "Arcanum" (pp. 114, 127)—which occurs in 
Browne and Boyle—refers to the great secrets of nature that the 
alchemists aimed at discovering. Swift's phrase "the Apocalyps of 
all State-^rcana" exposes his mock reverence for such a thing. 
This sort of compound was common; cf. "State-Surgeon" (p. 
164). 
SUBDUING . .  . TO (p. 171). Swift's phrase is "without any Thought of 
subduing Multitudes to his own Power, his Reasons or his 
Visions." In the OED the last example of this construction is 
taken from Leviathan: "When a man . .  . by Warre subdueth his 
enemies to his will." 
SUPERFICIES (p. 29). Meaning "a plane or level surface." The OED 
gives only two instances of this apparently rare term, Swift's and 
one earlier. Cf. the quite different uses of the word on pp. 103 and 
174. 
TAGGED (p. 80). Swift is cited in the OED as the first authority in the 
sense "to append as an addition or afterthought; to fasten, tack 
on, or add as a tag to something." Cf. the different uses on pp. 87, 
90, 135, and 136. 
THO' (p. 5 and elsewhere). Swift objects to this and other contrac­
tions in the Tatler, no. 230. It is thus interesting that the form 
appears in the "Apology," which was published in 1710, the same 
year as the Tatler contribution. Cf. Glossary under "annext." 
THOROUGH (p. 6 and elsewhere). "Let this Learned Doctor and his 
new Academy," says John Oldmixon in his Reflections on Dr. 
Swift's Letter to Harley (1712), "do their utmost to furnish our 
Language with what the French call Chevilles, with his 
Thoroughs, Althoughs, and the whole Army of antiquated Words 
before-mentioned." Oldmixon likewise criticizes Swift's frequent 
use of "thereon," "therein," and "thereby." The repeated 
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occurrence of such words in the Tale is one of the devices used by 
Swift to heighten his Modern's pedantic style. 
TRANSPOSAL (p. 43). Rare. The first OED example is 1695. Johnson 
mentions Swift and defines the word as "the act of putting things 
in each other's place"; note the nearly synonymous terms in 
Swift's phrase "Transposal or Misapplication." Cf. "Disturbance 
or Transposition" (p. 171). 
TROGLODYTE (p. 183). The OED cites Swift as the first author to use 
this word in an adjectival sense. See Phillips: "A people anciently 
inhabiting the farthest part of Aethiopia, of a fierce salvage 
nature, dwelling in caves, and feeding on raw flesh." Is Swift 
referring to one who avoids or ignores sense experience? Or could 
"Troglodyte Philosopher" be the Modern's crazy malapropism 
for "Stagyrite Philosopher"? 
VEGETABLE (p. 78). Swift's "vegetable Beaux" is a play on the 
seventeenth-century adjectival use of "vegetable" in the sense of 
having the living and growing properties of plants, as in 
"vegetable soul" or other variations such as "vegetable power," 
"vegetable life," or Marvell's "vegetable love." 
VITTLES (p. 118). An alternate spelling of "victuals." But that Swift 
uses "Vittles" in Peter's speech while elsewhere (e.g., pp. 116, 192) 
using "Victuals" suggests that he acknowledged a difference 
between the colloquial and proper forms of the word. 
YEOMANTRY (p. 181). Guthkelch and Smith explain: "This spelling 
occurs in edd. 1-5 (Yeomanry edd. 1711, 1720, etc.); due to 
assimilation with Gentry, or to false analogy with 'infantry' and 
similar words." But cf. Glossary under "Bombastry." 
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